This book gathers the diverse genres of the Latino heritage of *mestizaje* (the lateral mixing of cultures) in order to fashion a comprehensive political theory of “substantive pluralism” that would challenge the dominance of assimilationist and separatist frameworks, which, in John Francis Burke’s view, underpin too many of the perspectives in contemporary U.S. politics. Drawing upon philosophers, theologians, poets, and activists, he articulates a vision of “unity-in-diversity” in which ethical, political, and religious life develops through continual vibrant interchange between different constituencies. Such interchange is often difficult and full of tensions and ambiguities that never wholly resolve, but it offers our best hope for forging substantively just agreements around key issues; it is vital for reducing inequalities and suffering in a world where these are distributed along lines of race, ethnicity, gender, and class; and it is a dynamic process through which the richness of human possibilities for flourishing might unfold. Far from picturing the 500-year-long Latin American mestizo/a tradition as an insignificant “minority” phenomenon that should be assimilated into U.S. liberal or republican traditions, Burke argues that mestizaje has long been a vital mode of being for millions of Americans and is crucial to the future well-being of the United States and beyond, as numerous minorities grow in numbers and as state sovereignty is impinged upon by multiple forces of globalization.

In the first of three sections, Burke develops “Mestizaje as political theory” as a way beyond the impasses of the “culture wars.” His position has some points of contact with liberalism’s dynamic elements, but he argues that this dynamism is understood too much in terms of the choices of abstract individuals. While he shares the communitarian sense that we are socially embodied, he consistently faults these theorists for rendering such embodiment in overly singular and homogeneous terms. While he articulates themes of difference, hybridity, agonism, and affectivity in ways that resonate with many postmodern theorists, he generally faults the latter for overemphasizing incommensurability and too thoroughly deconstructing reason. Within the European tradition, he expresses most affinity with philosophers like Hans Gadamer, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Hannah Arendt, whom he reads as striking the right balance between deconstruction and construction, conflict and hope, reason and ambiguity. From Latin Catholic theologian Virgíl Elizondo and Chicana feminist Gloria Anzaldua, Burke argues for a theory and politics of agonal engagement that develops significantly by means of affective-aesthetic practices.

In the second section, he articulates a “Post-liberation theology” that draws from earlier liberation theologians’ critique (from Bartolomé Las Casas to Enrique Dussel) of cultural and economic inequality, their “preferential option for the poor,” and their focus on radically democratic base communities in contrast to established church hierarchies. Yet Burke’s rendering has a more cultural accent, and he makes a greater attempt to develop and affirm the indigenous contributions to popular religion than did many of his theological predecessors. His religious sensibilities are explicitly syncretistic.

The third section of the book looks at practical applications, ranging from a close examination of a multicultural relations committee he chaired in a Catholic parish in Houston during the 1990’s to rather quick, though interesting, discussions of the politics of language, equal opportunity, housing, and so forth.

I found many of Burke’s themes and arguments compelling, and his sustained effort to bring in works outside of the genre of “political theory” in order to creatively engage central contemporary debates concerning community, the self, reason and affect, nation, religion and politics, practices of democratization, and so forth is commendable and refreshing. The book intelligently articulates themes proximate to many theorists of postcolonialism and radical democracy—and slowly but surely, such efforts are forcing more mainstream theorists to respond to new questions and alternative visions of political life that are increasingly important, in my view. Yet one of the book’s virtues—its synthetic integration of many different genres and discourses—is entwined with a weakness. Too often I found myself wishing for more careful, developed, and probing discussions. Many of the basic themes alluded to above are quite widespread in academic literature these days. Burke pursues fascinating directions by initiating an important set of contacts where new questions and fruitful lines of inquiry may be pursued. Yet much of the hard work that matters most—the devil is in the details—remains to be done.

For example, in terms of philosophical debates, Burke repeatedly, but with too little evidence, characterizes “postmodernists” as entirely rejecting rationality, all consensus, and deliberation. Yet many important theorists commonly called postmodern (e.g., Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler, William Connolly) are far more nuanced and interesting than this in ways that would enrich Burke’s text, if they were really engaged in the spirit of mestizaje he recommends. Similarly, while Burke’s evocation of the aesthetic-affective registers is profound, particularly in relation to indigenous contributions to the ethos he envisions, this reader was left yearning for more development: How, more precisely, do the aesthetic-affective dimensions of political, ethical, and religious life interact with the more abstract, conceptual, symbolic registers (beyond lending passion)? How might we rethink the arts of political judgment in light of these interactions? Similarly, as Burke attempts to articulate the democratic politics of the mestizaje/a vision, he suggestively sketches some of the grassroots democratic practices developing in urban areas throughout the southwestern United States. Yet his discussion remains rather sketchy. This reader was left
wishing for a more careful elaboration of the political practices of these networks, such as more on how they negotiate cultural multiplicity. How do they work with visceral elements like anger, hope, enthusiasm, suspicion, and so forth? How do they mobilize alternative modes of power?

These are big questions, and deeper and more extended discussions of any of them would have required either a very long book or cutting other important parts. It is admirable that the author insightfully brings together a vast and important terrain for thinking about political practice. I suspect that *Mestizo Democracy* serves not only as a fine introduction to an often-neglected set of themes but also as a map of some of the terrain Burke will develop in more depth in future works. In this case, we will again be richly served.

**Dialogue Among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices.**

— Ronald J. Terchek, *University of Maryland, College Park*

Building on his pathbreaking work in comparative political theory, Fred Dallmayr has written a compelling, serious book that accomplishes two important and timely tasks. The first is theoretical and builds on impressive arguments about how to approach and understand cultures—or civilizations as he calls them—that are not only very different from one’s own, but which also sometimes deny the validity of one’s core values and dominant modes of argumentation. The second task comes in the form of concrete, practical case studies that show both the possibilities and richness of dialogue with different cultures. Taking us beyond an idea popular in many quarters that we are locked in a clash of civilizations, Dallmayr shows that differences can be respected and deep disagreements addressed in order to promote global justice.

The challenge Dallmayr sets for himself is to move beyond a binary understanding of cross-cultural dialogue. At one pole is the claim that very different civilizations are so distinct that it is really impossible for interlocutors to understand one another except in the most banal way. If this pole carries the day, we cannot learn from different civilizations except for superficialities because no matter how hard we try, we will never fathom the depths of alien modes of thinking. At the other pole is tied the claim that in spite of the many differences that characterize distinct cultures, there is a host of important commonalities that enable well-intentioned people from each civilization to understand one another without difficulty.

Dallmayr refuses to accept the deep fatalism implicit in the former approach or the easy optimism of the latter. Rather than borrowing a bit from each perspective, he develops an alternative reading of texts that is particularly indebted to Hans-Georg Gadamer as well as Martin Heidegger, Charles Taylor, and Jürgen Habermas. Along the way, he also reaches into the Western canon, particularly to Aristotle.

For dialogue to even begin, the parties must approach each other and their respective positions with “some kind of equality among partners . . . an equality of trust and respect” (p. 2). Dallmayr asks conversationalists to avoid acting as if they were omniscient; rather, we are invited to follow Michael Oakeshott’s idea of a conversation, which requires that the obstacles constructed by unequal allocations of power are overcome. Dallmayr then reaches for Habermas’s discourse theory, albeit with several modifications of the theory. An enlarged and generous view of “communicative rationality” promises, Dallmayr insists, a thick conversation that respects vernacular idioms, practices, and beliefs.

Even though an open disposition is required for dialogue, Dallmayr recognizes that we unavoidably bring our own prejudices into any serious conversation, and rather than deny them, he wants us to acknowledge them. In doing so, he asks us to see the fluidity, ambiguity, and tensions in our own prejudices. He turns to Gadamer to elaborate the position that even between seemingly antagonistic understandings, as can occur between the secular and the sacred, between “Athens” and “Jerusalem,” there are both tensions as well as mutually supportive relationships. Although each understanding remains distinct, each adds to the other, pointing to both rupture and continuity. For Dallmayr, Gadamer’s dialogue is “radically noninstrumental” and his hermeneutics “always . . . hovers in the ‘in-between’: between self and others, familiarity and strangeness, presence and absence” (p. 27). The horizon that emerges enables us to move beyond the here and now, not to deny the familiar or assimilate the strange but to explore.

In his discussion of “exemplary voices,” Dallmayr reaches for three from the Islamic world and three from South Asia. He convincingly shows that there is more than one Islam, and that militant expressions of fundamentalism capture just one facet of this civilization. Particularly interested in the many efforts to address the claims of faith, politics, and reason in Islam, Dallmayr reaches for Averroës, Goethe’s surprising and admiring encounter with the Persian poet Hafiz of Shiraz, and the democratic theorizing of Abdolkarim Soroush. Dallmayr begins his analysis of South Asian thinkers with Raimon Panikkar’s reinterpretation of secularism and then turns to D. P. Chattopadhyaya’s discussion of freedom and Gandhi’s arguments on behalf of self-rule.

The ideas of tension, ambiguity, and multiple meanings that Dallmayr finds in such Western writers as Gadamer also appear in many of the writers he explores in these chapters. We see this in Dallmayr’s helpful discussion of Averroës about the relationship of religion and philosophy. Each has important matters to teach us even as they involve very different ways of grasping knowledge. Even in the realms of reason and faith, there are different legitimate layers of meaning, and Dallmayr reads Averroës as teaching that there is more than one legitimate way to interpret the Qur’an and that no particular epistemological or interpretive claim trumps the rest.

These writers problematize much that seems settled in the West and challenge the view that what is happening in the world is the unfolding of the laws of reason and progress and the logic of the market, moves that they see as fatalistic,
deterministic, and dangerous. This is seen in Dallmayr's sensitive treatment of Gandhi, who embraces tradition while promoting his own views of modernity that emphasize self-governance, and who seeks to spiritualize India through service to the least-advantaged members of society at the same time he calls for a respect for religious diversity and a democratic, secular state.

Although Dallmayr writes sensitively about the asymmetries of power, economic resources, and knowledge of a certain sort between the West and non-West, he seems at times to substitute dialogue for power. The problem, however, is that power, particularly recently, has been hidden in much politics, operating under the claims of globalization or problem solving or bargaining. Dallmayr does acknowledge that power is important in his discussion of the asymmetries of global power. Because this is so, power and its many expressions need to be seen for what they are: means to control others. This is true not only of political power but also of concentrated wealth and specialized modes of knowledge. One of the central tasks of a dialogue among civilizations is to expose and challenge these many asymmetries in the world. Advocates of a globalizing economy often tell themselves and others that they act out of historical necessity, and the kind of dialogue Dallmayr proposes helps to expose their pretensions about neutrality and the power they deploy but often disguise.

The author's goal for a dialogue among civilizations is to move future "global civil life" to "a commitment to social justice and the rule of law and a willingness to shoulder the sobering demands of civic prudence" (p. 30). The content of social justice and law cannot be, for Dallmayr, one that is imposed by empire or decreed by orientalist understandings of the world. Rather, his social justice and rule of law draws from an appreciation that any civilization is partial and has something to learn from other civilizations. Throughout this impressive work, Dallmayr shows himself a master of the diverse materials he employs and makes Dialogue Among Civilizations a statement of multidisciplinary scholarship at its best, as well as a commanding argument to explore beyond our own intellectual and moral worlds.


Abraham Drassinower brings new life to an old discussion, the role of Eros and Thanatos (as Carl Jung called it) in Freud's work. Drawing on some of Freud's lesser-known works, and engaging in some aggressive but persuasive interpretation, Drassinower argues that the death drive is best seen under the horizon of the loss of those we love. It is this loss that brings death, including the possibility of our own death, into the psyche, where it naturally does not want to go. Freud said that the unconscious cannot conceive of our own death. Perhaps that remains true, but the loss of those we love brings death to consciousness, and into life.

Life, said Freud, is the struggle between Eros and death. There is a part of us that longs for death, a part that is only strengthened by the deaths of those we love, as though it would be easier for us to join them than to mourn them. The task of psychoanalysis is to teach us to mourn. In this task, psychoanalysis draws upon Eros, which is ultimately concerned not with pleasure and satisfaction but with giving up our childish attachments to those we have lost, and so entering into the world.

To see that the work of Eros is really the work of mourning is Freud's great contribution, and Drassinower does a fine job of reminding us of this. Of course, Freud was not the first to recognize that Eros is more about loss than fulfillment. Before Freud was Plato's Socrates, who defined Eros in terms of his parentage: His mother is poverty, and his father is contrivance. Bereft and destitute, Eros is always scheming to get what it wants (Plato, Symposium, 203b-e). Eros is not fulfillment and plenty; Eros is marked by lack of fulfillment, longing, and loss. Eros is the emblem of loss, and will only fulfill itself in and through mourning.

If we do not know this, if we do not wish to know this, which is tantamount to saying if we allow Eros to remain the great trickster, then the alternatives are few:

There is the denial and illusion that is religion, according to Freud. The cleric conducting the funeral service I recently attended who said "death is just a comma, not a period," was practicing the religion of denial. Pace Freud, there are other ways to practice religion, perhaps any religion, which help us confront death.

There is the illusion of hypnosis, which Freud understands as the satisfaction of being taken care of by powerful parents, projected onto the charismatic leader.

There is war and killing, as though we could become the power of death itself: "Freud's observation is that we would rather go to war than talk of death. His profound concern is that our times might no longer wish to endure life" (p. 32).

If one wonders about the relevance of one more reworking of Freud's account of Eros and death, one need only think of the recent Iraq war. Was it not easier to attack Iraq than to mourn our losses? Not just those who died on that terrible morning in September, but the loss of innocence: that there is war and killing, as though we could become the power of death itself.

To see that the work of Eros is really the work of mourning is Freud's great contribution, and Drassinower does a fine job of reminding us of this. Of course, Freud was not the first to recognize that Eros is more about loss than fulfillment. Before Freud was Plato's Socrates, who defined Eros in terms of his parentage: His mother is poverty, and his father is contrivance. Bereft and destitute, Eros is always scheming to get what it wants (Plato, Symposium, 203b-e). Eros is not fulfillment and plenty; Eros is marked by lack of fulfillment, longing, and loss. Eros is the emblem of loss, and will only fulfill itself in and through mourning.

More circumspect, Drassinower is also more optimistic that a cultural transformation is possible, one led by those who can remember their own pasts, their own dependence, longing, and need. Locating this cultural transformation "between Hobbes and Hegel" (the title of the second chapter), he argues that Freud grasped our antisocial propensities even more strongly than Hobbes, while sharing with Hegel the "labor of the negative," which Drassinower reinterprets as the work of mourning (p. 55). Because he believed in the possibility of this labor, Freud is more optimistic than Hobbes.
The reader of this review will have to turn to *Freud's Theory of Culture* in order to decide if he or she finds such comparisons helpful. I thought it was not so much a stretch as irrelevant. Freud is not between Hobbes and Hegel; he represents another tradition. Freud is not rendered more “political” by comparing him with great political thinkers, but by the consequences of his thought.

No matter how subtly Drassinower interprets Freud’s thoughts on loss and death, there is a tradition on this subject only begun by Freud that Drassinower ignores, a tradition that represents progress in thinking about this difficult topic. Consider just one example, that of Ernest Becker (1973), author of *The Denial of Death*, who writes that “the death fear of the ego is lessened by the killing, the sacrifice, of the other; through the death of the other, one buys oneself free from the penalty of dying, of being killed” (Becker, p. 99). Or so the fantasy goes.

Since Drassinower is not stingy with words and repeats his argument frequently, there was room to address Becker’s revision of Freud by way of Otto Rank. (Drassinower includes Becker in the bibliography but does not discuss him.) Freud is, in other words, the first word on this topic, but not the last. In the end, important is not “what Freud said” but what use we can make of him. Figuring out how to use Freud requires that we learn how others have used him first. But perhaps that is a topic for another book. Certainly Drassinower gives us much to think about in this one.

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— Martha Ackelsberg, Smith College

This volume, the fourth in a series arising out of the “Real Utopias” project at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, offers some fascinating reflections on the possibilities of “empowered participatory governance.” Four major case studies taken from actual experiences with the decentralization of decision making and the devolution of power to local groups—in contexts as varied as Porto Alegre, Brazil; Kerala, India; and Chicago, Illinois—suggest that meaningful, deliberative, locally based democracy is not nearly as far-fetched a goal as the increasing authoritarianism of U.S. society might lead us to believe. Critical commentaries on the cases round out the anthology, providing the reader both with useful additional perspectives and further questions to explore.

In rich introductory and concluding essays, editors Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright set out the issues that structured the conference on which this book was based—“Experiments in Empowered Deliberative Democracy”—and make clear the larger theoretical implications of the project. In recent years, Jürgen Habermas’s theories of discursive (or deliberative) democracy have become the starting points for a broad array of theorizing about democratic theories and practices. Even those (especially feminists and critical race theorists) who have questioned whether it is possible to create egalitarian discursive communities in the absence of social and economic equality have, nevertheless, taken seriously the perspectives of Habermas and his followers (see, for example, Seyla Benhabib, *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, 1996; and essays in Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, 1992). Fung, Wright, and the other contributors to this volume are well aware of concerns about equity; indeed, they make clear that the goal of “empowered participatory governance” is the creation of an institutional model that would “guarantee fairness and efficiency within a deliberative framework” (p. 45) and that would achieve efficiency and equity, as well as (and as a consequence of) broad-based popular participation. The key question, then, is: Is the goal of empowered participatory governance an achievable one? And, more to the point, will popular participation in decision making, in fact, generate the positive effects that democratic theorists lead us to expect?

The core of the book is comprised of four case studies—on participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil; decentralized planning in Kerala, India; decentralized policy making about education and policing in Chicago, IL; and habitat conservation planning under the Endangered Species Act in the United States. While the contexts are diverse, what unites the cases is a focus on decentralized decision making that maximizes the power of what used to be called the “popular classes.” As such, the cases are meant to provide tests, not only of Habermasian-style deliberative democracy but also of theories about the educative effects of participation that go back to Aristotle, Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill. Thus, in their introduction, Fung and Wright lay out the questions the cases address: 1) How genuinely deliberative are the decision-making processes? 2) How effectively are the decisions translated into action? 3) To what extent are the deliberative bodies able to monitor the implementation of their decisions? 4) To what extent do these deliberative practices nurture innovation and allow for the diffusion of those innovations to other local units? 5) To what extent do deliberative processes constitute “schools for democracy”? and 6) Are the actual outcomes of these new deliberative processes “more desirable” than those of prior institutional arrangements? (p. 30). Following the case studies, five commentaries raise important questions that carry the theoretical discussion further.

The resulting volume—which combines the best of a theoretically grounded case-study methodology with more traditional political theorizing—is extremely compelling, and should be of interest to a broad range of scholars. The case studies are fascinating, in themselves, and provide a wealth of information about the possibilities of creating more democratic political bodies—even in the most unlikely of contexts. But, beyond that, they also move forward important political theoretical debates, which all too often take place in the abstract, as if no relevant substantive data exist. Since both the case studies and the commentaries in this volume are thoroughly grounded in the political theoretical literature of
democracy, the authors can—and do—draw out the critical lessons (and questions) from their materials. Thus, while this reader, at least, would have liked to see more explicit attention to some of the many feminist critiques of Habermas’s approach (although a number of the case studies address women’s participation, fewer of them engage specifically with the broader criticisms raised by, e.g., Iris Young, Nancy Fraser, Ruth Lister, Shane Phelan, or Anne Phillips), nevertheless, the studies—and the commentaries—make a significant contribution to these debates, particularly with respect to two questions: a) the place of “self-interest” in deliberative democracy, and b) how to achieve meaningful equality of participation in the absence of “background conditions” of social and economic equality.

Thus, Jane Mansbridge, Rebecca Naera Abers, and Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, for example, question the assumption of deliberative theorists (including Fung and Wright) that participants in a deliberative democratic process should base their votes on their best judgment of what constitutes the common interest, rather than on what would forward their private, or personal, interests. In some ways, of course, this is the contemporary version of the debate between Rousseau and Mill on how to achieve a “common good.” These commentators suggest that background inequalities matter, and that, in such a context, the demand that heretofore-disempowered people put their self-interest aside may well have the consequence of once again silencing those who have never had an opportunity to have their self-interest reflected in public policy. They seem to be arguing, instead, for something like Tocqueville’s notion of “self-interest rightly understood”—a position that Fung and Wright apparently accept in the concluding essay. That essay also addresses the question of inequality in the form of a discussion about “countervailing power,” offering a number of helpful typologies of governance structures and of adversarial versus collaborative decision-making processes, and arguing that, “in general, collaborative governance without an appropriate form of countervailing power is likely to fail” (p. 263).

While the final essay (and the volume as a whole) offers some clues as to how countervailing power might be constructed, it raises more questions than it answers. But that is the real strength of Deepening Democracy: It encourages scholars to explore other real-world experiments with democracy, and to carry on this project of what might be termed applied democratic theory. This wonderful volume is a truly fine engagement with the words and actions of social movement participants themselves. The result is a mediated meditation on monographs that only defers the connection to real political struggle and only continues the alienation of contemporary political theory from its own desired object of inquiry—politics itself.

Nonetheless, Isaac once again demonstrates he is a master commentator. For the most part, he provides a thoughtful reconsideration of early-twentieth-century progressive thinking, noting that its reformist impulses were not radical and involved elements of social control of the lower classes. His criticism of Jane Addams’s alleged paternalism, however, is dated and overstated; and he totally ignores that Addams was intent on finding ways for the well-off to give up privilege as much as she was intent on helping the poor learn to live better. Overall, his assessment of neoprogressive politics itself.

This is an extremely literate rumination on progressive politics today, largely told through an examination of various books directly or indirectly related to the topic. Readers should expect nothing less an extremely literate work from Isaac, given his previous two books, one on power and the other on the relevance of such giants as Hannah Arendt and Albert Camus to today’s politics. Then there are his engaging contributions to Dissent, especially those focused on the need for the Left to confront its limited position in the contemporary political scene. In fact, the book under review grows out of several of those Dissent essays.

Yet what The Poverty of Progressivism is decidedly not is an analysis of the actual state of the Left. This is all the more surprising given that Isaac has previously written on the need for political theory to address contemporary politics. While the book may be closer than some theoretical interventions in dissecting our current political predicament, it is actually further away than other examples from academic political theory. Simply because the literature considered here is about mass political mobilization, rather than, say, gender politics, does not mean that the book more directly engages contemporary politics. While the study of texts is surely a legitimate way to gauge the status of the Left today, this book could use more engagement with the words and actions of social movement participants themselves. The result is a mediated meditation on monographs that only defers the connection to real political struggle and only continues the alienation of contemporary political theory from its own desired object of inquiry—politics itself.

The title of E. J. Dionne’s 1997 book about today’s progressives is They Only Look Dead; Jeffrey Isaac’s latest book reads as if to retort: “They are—and there is not much that can be done about it.” More on that dour conclusion later. For now, I focus on what led to it.

Isaac begins his analysis with various works that he says point to a shared wish for a “progressive revival.” He offers close readings of books by such thoughtful analysts as E. J. Dionne and Joel Rogers, who, while they may disagree on various issues, can be read, Isaac argues, as suggesting that the progressivism of the dawn of the last century can be the basis for a progressive politics at the dawn of this century. Isaac next offers a more sobering assessment of the prospects for...
such a revival, noting that progressivism was never that radical and that politics has changed to become less hospitable to even the liberalism of the old progressivism, let alone the more radical variants promoted by today’s revivalists. Things look more than bleak.

The book pivots on the literature of civil society with Isaac offering again thoughtful readings, this time of key works addressing this revived concept. He again deftly dismisses hope by noting serious limitations in the idea as discussed by Robert Putnam and others. Isaac notes that civil society suggests working outside the state, in the mediating institutions of the community, and at the local level, and that this can be the slow road to capitulating to the parochialisms that progressives seek to challenge. Nonetheless, he suggests that civil society may be the only route available to progressives in an era of diminished political expectations. Progressives not only need a new label; they also need to stop investing their hopes in national movements and turn to the long march through the intermediary institutions of civil society at the local level. Things just got a lot bleaker.

The author ends with what he calls the “Sisyphean task of civil society politics” (p. 138). He relies on a number of books, but especially Mark R. Warren’s Dry Bones Rattling (2001), which examines how the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) has successfully built a viable network of community development programs in the Southwest and other parts of the United States. The IAF’s community organizing deserves much celebration, but Isaac overemphasizes its ability to network for purposes of community development and de-emphasizes its ability to mobilize for political change. The IAF for years has focused almost exclusively on working with church congregations that give it a captive audience already organized but largely passive politically. The result is an elaborate network of organized constituencies not necessarily prepared to be mobilized politically. The long march through institutions just got a lot longer.

This elision is most problematically coupled with Isaac’s total erasure of national movement politics. While it is true that social movements often only have episodic impact on national politics, the historical record suggests that the overwhelming majority of instances of significant political change in the United States have come when people on the bottom rise up in social movements and demand it. That this happens only episodically is unfortunate, but without these episodes it is arguably the case that significant progressive change would not occur at all. Isaac does not discuss this issue; instead, he dismisses it. He makes a choice to not read the historical record that way.

And I guess that is my main concern with this admittedly eloquently written meditation on the prospects for a progressive revival. It is more about reading a literature than assessing a politics. For this reason, I would remain nervous about social-change efforts in an era of right-dominated politics. What is never really sufficiently considered are those actual efforts themselves as enacted by social movement leaders and followers. While Isaac reads books about mobilizing, others are doing it.


— Barbara Cruikshank, University of Massachusetts

If democracy is rule by the people, then who are the people? Who is included and who excluded from the people, and by what authority do they rule? These questions ignite what Alan Keenan calls Rousseau’s paradox: “the freedom and openness of the people’s foundation, which means that ‘they’ must call themselves into being before they exist and thus from a point that is not yet ‘the people’ themselves, rule out the possibility of there being any politically neutral source of generality, or definition of who the people are. One must act in the name of the people before receiving the people’s own sanction” (p. 53). Although it shares a dilemma with liberal social contract theory, Rousseau’s paradox is unique to democracy because the problem is to found the sovereignty of the people to define themselves. The liberal contract tradition solves Rousseau’s paradox by defining the people in advance as rational or self-interested in a state of nature or behind a veil of ignorance. Democracy has no recourse to imagined foundations of any sort because the fundamental task of democracy is for the people to define and to rule themselves. Keenan brilliantly examines how Rousseau, Seyla Benhabib, Hannah Arendt, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Michael Sandel, among others, resolve Rousseau’s paradox in ways that threaten and violate democratic principles, and yet their efforts exemplify and illuminate the constitutive dilemmas of democracy.

As paradoxical as “the people” prove to be, an even more confounding dilemma for democracy is that if it remains truly open, then the answers to these questions must be continuously deferred. No collective identity of the people can ever be both open to contestation and inclusive at the same time that it works to identify and unite that “people.” And yet, inevitably, the people do and must take on some substantive or normative shape in order to engage in ruling themselves, and so democracy must violate its own principle of plurality. To be and to remain democratic, any particular demos must first find itself as a people and so risk violating the democratic principle of openness by closing itself off. Clearly, openness in Keenan’s sense was not a principle of ancient Greek democracy and is not a principle of democracy per se. Democracy in Question focuses on the constitutive paradoxes of radical democracy wherein the authority of the people to govern must come from the people themselves and not from any external closure based in tradition or nature. If the people are free and autonomous enough to constitute themselves,
however, then the closure that sets them off as a people will necessarily impinge upon their autonomy, for they are then no longer free to autonomously define themselves either collectively or individually.

In the face of three tensions—between equality and liberty, plurality and commonality, openness and closure—and the resulting constitutive dilemmas of democracy, Keenan persuades the reader to stay attuned to democracy even after we learn to see it as essentially unstable and never capable of realizing its own principles. These dilemmas are constitutive of democracy, he argues, and are not capable of resolution by the adoption of new democratic principles or a new theory of democracy. The reader is further persuaded that to seek resolution of these dilemmas at all is to expose oneself to deepening their power to undo democracy. “We, the people” can no more reconcile ourselves, on the one hand, to a permanent state of becoming than we can, on the other hand, settle for what we are now or who we may finally become. Both of these strategies entail risks that are fatal to any people. The first strategy, exemplified by Arendt, Laclau, and Mouffe, affirms the contingency, plurality, and conflict of democracy. Keenan points out first that the affirmation of those democratic principles is important, but they must remain open to contestation and so do not, in themselves, ground democracy. Moreover, affirmations of democracy do not supply the practical reasons we have to stick with democracy and the techniques we might need for dealing with conflict, plurality, and contingency. For example, why is more contestation better than less? How can we learn to live with contingency if what we really want is a stable job and some respect?

The second strategy is exemplified in Keenan’s reading of Sandel and Benhabib. Neoconservatives, theorists of deliberative democracy, and (some) communitarians are attempting to restore our citizens’ virtue by force and by closure. Rather than moralize in a radical democratic voice against those closures, Keenan proposes a method for establishing a nonmoral common ground with them based on our common disenchantment with liberal government, on disinvestments in public education and public space, and on our frustration with the cynicism and polarization that characterize our media and electoral politics.

Rather than being resolved, the constitutive dilemmas of democracy must be answered provisionally and contingently within democratic politics. Keenan is not arguing for the priority of democratic practice over theory. Rather, he is deconstructing the foundations and principles of democracy in a voice that will establish common ground with post-structuralists and neoconservatives, and communitarians alike. Keenan’s interpretations and criticisms of the authors listed above exemplify his proposal for a democratic practice that seeks to find nonmoral common ground with our antagonists and interlocutors before we attempt to define who we are or take positions and persuade others. He proposes a democratic practice that does not presuppose commonality, closure, or liberty (that is, fixed opinions, stable identities or rules of the game, and autonomous selves). His proposal is for a kind of nonpartisanship that “speaks to others as sites of possibility,” even when those sites are the texts of democratic theory (p. 186). And to radical democratic theory in particular, Keenan’s work offers a dynamic word of caution on how to avoid the cynicism and shame that our calls for more political participation often meet. Keenan lays out a practical method for establishing common ground even as he teaches us how thoroughly our political practices are constituted and limited by the irresolvable dilemmas of democracy.


— Lori J. Marso, Union College

Christopher Kelly’s book explores Rousseau’s view of the role of intellectuals in relationship to politics. As Socrates observed, different rules and customs govern the polity than those that guide the life of philosophers. Should philosopher/intellectuals become involved in realms where truth is manipulated, where controlling the terms of debate translates into political power? Rousseau’s view of these compelling questions turns out to be just as complicated as that of Plato. This book defends Rousseau’s sense of himself as a “responsible” author. He aspired to be a “new sort of author and challenged his contemporaries to evaluate themselves in light of his standard” (p. 4). According to Kelly, Rousseau demonstrates responsibility in signing his name to his work, practicing self-censorship, and putting the goals of the polity and his identity as good citizen before any desire to air the truth in one’s role as intellectual.

What intellectuals should and should not say, however, depends on the nature of the political situation in which they find themselves. In chapters on censorship and the arts, Kelly reevaluates old Rousseauian debates about the intellectual’s role in the corrupt versus the good society. In corrupt societies, intellectuals should seek the truth, they should air it, and they should sign their names to it. In Old Regime France, Rousseau desired to reach a wide audience of readers and he wanted his identity known. But getting one’s voice heard under eighteenth-century rules of censorship was a tricky business. Kelly’s first chapter discusses the reasons Rousseau signed his name to the great majority of his works, while his contemporaries, such as Voltaire, mostly followed the accepted practice of remaining anonymous. Supporters of anonymity argued that it protected writers from retribution, allowed them to speak the truth fearlessly, and guarded against the temptations of self-promotion. Rousseau, however, accused Voltaire of playing games and of making opponents look ridiculous by using personal attacks and satire. Kelly makes the case for the novelty of Rousseauian authorship and for his boldness in taking risks. For Rousseau, this was a self-conscious policy; he set out to make himself into a “conspicuous model of behavior” (p. 28).
As for Rousseau’s practice of authorship in the corrupt regime, Kelly makes a compelling argument. Rousseau was braver than others, he was willing to expose himself to the authorities, and he was seeking the truth about politics as an intellectual. The argument gets less convincing when Kelly discusses Rousseau’s views on the good society. In the good society, philosophers also have a clear responsibility. There are times, it seems, when seeking the truth directly conflicts with promoting the good. According to Kelly’s Rousseau, it is irresponsible to seek the truth for its own sake or even to amuse oneself with the life of philosophy. Self-censorship, as well as state censorship, is necessary to preserve the good and create good citizens. Philosophers should “behavior as good citizens first and philosophers second” (p. 46). As Kelly puts it, “Rousseau is prepared to encourage the unorthodox not to advance their dissenting opinions publicly and to speak and act as if they accept all the sentiments of sociability” (p. 40). Moreover, “the most dangerous intellectuals are those who attempt to transform political life by subjecting the sentiments of sociability to critical scrutiny” (p. 45).

But should the “good” society not be open to criticism, even harsh criticism? Time and again, Kelly applauds Rousseau’s desire to be the kind of public intellectual whose certainty of his own virtue (and ability to direct the public good) excuses political scrutiny of the issues. Yet who decides on the content of the good? Here, all the problems with Rousseau’s “general will” should be remembered. Though Kelly rehearses arguments of critics who charge Rousseau with “coercive pathology” (p. 117), undermining free consent and indoctrinating and misleading citizens, he continually returns to the point that Rousseau’s philosophic activity was entirely compatible with his devotion to justice. According to Kelly, “Rousseauian authorship requires the ability to distinguish between respectable and unrespectable prejudices . . . between useful and other truths” (p. 49).

Ultimately, for Rousseau and for Kelly, the role of intellectuals in the good society is to bind citizens to the nation. I remind readers that this is only one interpretation of Rousseau’s politics. Kelly acknowledges that Rousseau is the author of Julie, a romantic novel, and that some readers might take away another view. But apparently they would be wrong! Kelly observes that “Rousseau Judge of jean-Jacques is an extended demonstration of the way misreadings of Rousseau and his books reflect on their readers” (p. 113). In readings of Julie and Émile, Kelly warns us to remember Rousseau’s insistence on independence, the decadence of romantic love, and the “incompatibility of novels and republican citizenship” (p. 112).

Scholars will certainly find Rousseau as Author well worth reading. As a conservative defense of Rousseau, the questions are compelling and important and the readings subtle and interesting. Yet though Kelly casts a fresh eye on familiar themes such as philosophy and politics, censorship and the arts, the behavior of citizens, and truth and the public good, in my view, his eye is too focused on defending Rousseau’s philosophy against his democratic critics.


— Cynthia Grant Bowman, Northwestern University

Problems caused by the sanctity of the private sphere when dealing with domestic violence have long been the source of a good deal of writing and discussion. Kristin Kelly’s book combines a very good summary and critique of classical political thought and modern theorizing about the public/private split with an empirical study. She then uses conclusions drawn from that study to construct a more complex model of the relationship between the public and the private, one that is more appropriate for the analysis of domestic violence. Her goal is to develop “an alternative approach to understanding and renegotiating public and private boundaries that more effectively balances familial and individual privacy with the need to frame battery as a behavior subject to public sanction” (p. 84).

Kelly first traces the origins of the public/private dichotomy through classical formulations in Locke and Mill, pointing to the two different and inconsistent models in Locke’s writing, depicting the demarcation as between the family and the state in his response to Filmer’s argument in defense of monarchy, but between the individual and the state in the construction of the social contract. Both approaches leave the protection of women within the family to the patriarchal head of the household, clearly an inadequate remedy when he is their assailant.

Kelly then discusses a number of modern feminist critiques of the classical privacy paradigm and describes attempts by radical, conservative, and liberal feminists to reconceive the public/private split. Applying each theory to domestic violence as the touchstone, she concludes that all are inadequate and, in fact, that “it is not clear that the proposed reconstructions are any more capable than the classical liberal model of addressing the complex dilemmas present in instances of domestic violence” (p. 57).

After discussing the history of the legal treatment of domestic violence and describing some of the legal strategies that now exist, Kelly criticizes Second Wave feminism as having focused on the law and on obtaining remedies from the state. This criticism is only partly accurate, for feminists in the late 1960s and 1970s engaged in a good deal of community work as well—establishing shelters and advocacy groups and lobbying not only for legal change but also for other forms of assistance to victims. Nonetheless, her conclusion that law is limited in its effect on domestic violence is clearly right. Although national crime statistics show that since the adoption of such legal remedies as orders of protection and lawsuits against nonresponsive police, domestic violence in the United States has decreased (see, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Violence by Intimates: Analysis of Data on Crimes by Current or Former Spouses, Boyfriends, and Girlfriends, 2000, pp. 1, 2–3), it still exists at unacceptable levels.
Up to this point, *Domestic Violence and the Politics of Privacy* tells a relatively old story, though one which is very skillfully reviewed. What is unique about Kelly's book is that she then follows the theoretical summary and critique with empirical work, interviewing persons who work in the domestic violence field—legal advocates, activists, policymakers, shelter workers, attorneys, and police officers—asking for their views on issues relating to privacy and domestic violence. From their responses, she concludes that legal intervention is an important but inadequate remedy, limited in ways that could be addressed (by the infusion of more public funds, for example) and limited because intervention via the legal system is too individualistic a response to a problem that is both multifaceted and, in many aspects, cultural in its scope. The persons interviewed instead emphasize a preventive approach to reducing domestic violence, involving extensive education, community participation, and coalitional work.

Combining her discussion of theory with these insights from practice, Kelly derives a new model for analyzing the private/public split and its impact—a triangular model instead of a binary one, with the family, the community (essentially the institutions of civil society), and the state forming the three points of the triangle, and the sides representing the boundaries. Thus, for example, the boundary between the state and the family is made up of structures such as search-and-seizure laws, due process rights, legislative mandates and programs, contracts, bureaucratic structures and rules, administrative law, police procedures, and physical barriers (p. 115). Yet the boundaries themselves are changing products of an ongoing democratic process (p. 162); they will shift and must be constantly reevaluated (p. 139). The advantages of this approach, Kelly says, include its emphasis on community participation and democracy and the encouragement of more links between public and private resources in the struggle against domestic violence. The new model also more adequately addresses the complex needs of victims—their economic and relational needs, for example, as well as their need for both public remedies and for privacy.

There are also problems with Kelly's new model. Most important, where does the individual appear in this triangle? Are there not both conflicts and boundaries between the individual and the family, the individual and the community, the individual and the state? While she explicitly recognizes the problems involved in conflating the individual and family in classical analysis and modern conservative feminism (p. 81), her model appears to repeat this error. Nonetheless, it is a substantial improvement on earlier conceptions in a number of ways. First, it highlights that the public/private relationship is neither binary nor a zero sum game. Second, her model includes nonstate groups as actors in the campaign against domestic violence. Third, and perhaps most important, it emphasizes that addressing domestic violence requires a multifaceted approach, involving different points of entry and a variety of players and programs, including community education, group advocacy and support, and differing approaches designed to fit the needs of diverse communities.

The subtitle of George Klosko's book accurately represents his concerns. The author focuses on important theoretical statements from classical Greeks through Lenin about how to effect fundamental moral reform. So his perspective differs from utopian scholars who study the vision to be established and political historians who look at revolutionary activity. Klosko focuses on means, or rather, theorizing about means and strategies, not on ends.

Klosko develops his themes historically, through an analysis of important figures in the history of fundamental change. Very quickly the central analytic categories surface. He begins with Plutarch's lives of Lycurgus and Solon. He finds in Lycurgus one important and recurrent model for fundamental moral reform, a model that Klosko labels "educational realism": Lycurgus uses political power (backed by violence if necessary) in order to educate the citizens to virtue. By contrast, Solon is a reformer: He changes laws and constitutions, but does not attempt to transform social and educational relations. Presenting another alternative model, Socrates attempts fundamental moral reform not through force but by persuasion of individuals; any society-wide transformation incited by Socratic questioning requires spontaneous interactions among those whom the gadfly has stung and changed.

Educational realism and individual persuasion leading to spontaneous social transformation are Klosko's two central themes; Solon's reformism concerns him little here. This book was originally a course and then a series of lectures, and Klosko uses those origins to his advantage. As befits a course, he examines major theorists (like Machiavelli and Marx), as well as theorizing activists (notably Robespierre and Lenin), always from the perspective of realizing radical change; so theoretically the book involves seeing famous figures from an unusual angle. The original lecture form means a clear and comprehensible presentation, no matter how recondite the topic.

For instance, Klosko sharply distinguishes Socrates from Plato: Whereas Socrates tries to transform individuals only through argument, Plato sees Socrates' mission as a failure and so in the *Republic* seeks to define the conditions, no matter how extreme, under which radical moral transformation could occur. In presenting his views, Klosko navigates through a series of interpretive issues, from grouping the Socratic dialogues to opposing the Strauss-Bloom reading of the *Republic*; but he does so lucidly, rapidly, and with good arguments.

Other pairings and interpretations may be less controversial but no less interesting. Unusual when ideal societies are under consideration, More plays a bit part here—as an advocate of persuading rulers with arguments and without force. Machiavelli enters because of two practical insights: It takes a bad man to seize power but a good man to rule well; and


— Peter G. Stillman, Vassar College
unarmed prophets fail. Marx joins Fourier and Bakunin as theorists of spontaneity. Less surprisingly, Robespierre (with St. Just) and Lenin (at least Lenin from late 1918 onward) appear as the leading Jacobins: Like Lycurgus and Plato, the Jacobins are educational realists who see the need to use state power to transform education and society if people are to be made virtuous. Klosko probes their thought to discern seven major components of Jacobin thinking.

Because of Klosko’s focus on strategies for change, his book is a welcome additional perspective to studies of fundamental change. The author’s conclusions complement Karl Popper’s famous argument (The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945) that utopian blueprints lead to “dictatorial societal disasters” (p. 52). For Klosko, those who advocate spontaneity or persuasion are unable convincingly to explain how such changes will occur; and modern educational realists find themselves giving the state extraordinary power without being able—as was Plato in the Republic—to establish checks on the abuse of that power.

Any book covering so much material in such a brief space will lead its readers to questions and further issues. I raise three.

Klosko’s range from Lycurgus to Lenin is impressive and gives insights, but—given his criticisms of those trying to generate fundamental moral reform—I wish that he had also examined Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution (1972). In Klosko’s terms, Arendt criticizes the Jacobins—they undercut or stifle revolutionary energy and novelty—and she appeals to the experiences of modern revolutions since 1776 to show that spontaneity and persuasion can generate new modes of interaction and institutions. So her conclusions stand, I think, opposed to Klosko’s and need examination.

Klosko happily avoids many of the definitional quibbles that can stall or divert scholarly analysis, especially of ideal societies. But in at least two places, definitional problems exist. He states that the Jacobins, like many utopians, have a “plan or blueprint” (p. 92) of their utopia, and their utopia is “a human condition that is totally new by any standard” (pp. 4, 172). On both counts, the Jacobins differ from reformers, who, like Popper, pursue “piecemeal social engineering” (p. 52) aimed at specific and limited changes (not “totally new” ones). I think that Klosko (following other scholars) here is setting up dichotomies that hide continuities among many reformers from Popperians to Leninists—they usually have a vision of a good society and a sense of how it connects to contemporary society. As Klosko’s discussion of Machiavelli suggests, his book could be profitably reread as an exploration of problems faced by many different types of reformers, from Solon through John Stuart Mill to the present.

Third, and in part because Klosko analyzes the usual suspects in the modern world—the Jacobins—he does not ask about “right-wing” equivalents to the Jacobins, theorists and actors whose “new state of being” for a future “without the problems and strife of existing society” (p. 172) is either global free trade with assured property rights or social and religious conservatism, and some of whom, in order to bring their vision into existence, are willing, indeed eager, to use state power to inculcate the proper virtues, even if citizens are uninterested or recalcitrant. Although Klosko does not ask directly about colonialism and neocolonialism, his analyses’ “unsettling implications” (p. 173) about fundamental moral reform may be relevant when a state occupies and tries to transform the population and institutions of another state.

But criticism also comes full circle. My questions ask for an expansion of Klosko’s scope, and much of the value and enjoyment of Jacobins and Utopians lies in the author’s explorations of dilemmas of fundamental moral reform and his uncovering of the ways in which many major theorists discovered and grappled with (or found themselves unable effectively to grapple with) those dilemmas.


— Lisa Pace Vetter, American University

In this recent book, Michael S. Kochin explores the relation between the Greek philosopher’s principal and longest dialogues, the Republic and the Laws. In both works, Plato seeks to transform the excessively “manly” culture of Athens that relies on the exclusion of the feminine into a more moderate one that is more conducive to his unitary view of human excellence. He does so, first, by appealing rhetorically to the macho stereotypes held by his male audience, especially those pertaining to women, and eventually by encouraging his readers to envision an alternative political society in which men and women are treated equally, as individuals. “Plato is thus willing to play on the continued existence of a distinction between male and female virtues in order to move the two standards closer to the single human standard,” Kochin writes (p. 2).

To curb the excessively masculine and thus tyrannical ambitions of his interlocutors in the Republic, Socrates constructs a view of the virtues that deals with conflicting desires by organizing them in “hierarchies aimed at final goods” and by redefining justice as “the good of one’s own soul” (pp. 5, 6). To instill moderation in these men, Socrates then “incorporates the female within the city and its military life” by redefineing military activity to encourage education rather than subjugation (p. 6). Socrates proffers communism in his ideal city because it best allows for the unified conception of the virtues he desires. Although the Socratic best city may be natural, it is not necessarily attainable because of the overwhelming difficulties involved in abolishing the family and redirecting the soul toward the individualized self in such a radical way.

Kochin sees the Laws as contradicting the Republic in its apparent egalitarianism. Although in the Laws the Athenian Stranger seeks to combat the masculine cultures of Sparta and Crete, his alternative city of Magnesia still excludes women from political life and civic education, relegating them to the private sphere of the family. This is because the Athenian
Stranger ultimately fails to unify the virtues and thereby presents a view of human nature that overcomes the separate and unequal status of women. He constructs a city that requires a slavish obedience to law, not philosophy. Not all is lost, however, as the establishment of the Nocturnal Council allows for the possibility of improving the city through secret reform of the laws mainly by observers who travel to foreign lands. And this reform requires rhetorical skills of persuasion.

Kochin contributes to Platonic political theory by uniting several schools of thought, especially that which traces Plato's transformative use of Greek rhetorical practices and that which offers a somewhat sympathetic view of Plato's account of women and gender. His analysis also deserves praise for its close reading of important portions of the Republic and Laws. For example, Kochin challenges those who condemn the erosion of individual identity in the Republic by pointing to textual evidence in Book Five that, in fact, “the guardians do not confuse their own persons and bodies (their proper interests) with those of their fellows” (p. 74). Along similar lines, Kochin's study reveals the tension in the text of the Laws between provisions allowing for the equality of women and others that oppress women (pp. 93–100), and it calls attention to easily overlooked clues that the patriarchal society of Magnesia is indeed open to reform and improvement (pp. 126–30).

Also valuable are Kochin's provocative observations about the contradictions in modern political thought from which feminism inherits many of its conundrums, such as the contemporary insistence that individuals “enter politics with fixed preferences about the policies that affect their interests,” on the one hand, and the belief, on the other, that “men and women enter into the rhetorical situation in order to form their preferences about collective actions and organize themselves into a body capable of acting collectively” (p. 11, emphasis in original). As a result of such contradictions, Kochin argues, genuine debate among those with opposing points of view is virtually impossible. Thus we see not only the erosion of patriarchal communities but also the undermining of the very possibility of a legitimate community capable of dealing with pressing political problems, such as inequality between the sexes (p. 12).

What is striking about this very brief study, however, is what is not said. Gender and Rhetoric in Plato's Political Thought may accurately diagnose some of the problems faced by feminism, but its failure to address basic questions often raised in feminist critiques compromises the overall message. For instance, following his own arguments to their logical conclusion, should we, like Plato in Kochin's characterization, condemn male homosexuality as merely a form of exploitative pederasty that destroys the political community (pp. 114–15)? Is “right pederasty,” Kochin's term for a nonsexual relationship based on the educative needs of both parties, ever acceptable (pp. 113–16)? And would the unquestioning embrace of androgyny really demonstrate that we take “seriously the problem of the relation between the needs of the community and the happiness of the individual,” as Kochin suggests (p. 133)? It is worth remembering as well that improvement of the condition of women does not necessarily bring equality, although Kochin often refers to both interchangeably. Finally, the possibility that women would object to the less manly, more moderate, and just individual as described by Plato because it is still tinged with excessive masculinity is never really contemplated. As he bypasses important questions such as these, Kochin falls rather short of his own insistence that persuasion forms the basis of true consent.

Kochin's treatment of scholarship and his textual analysis are not wholly without difficulties either. Although he rightly questions commentaries that downplay the seriousness of Plato's political teachings in the Republic, he overlooks others that challenge the veracity of particular ideals (e.g., communism and the abolition of the family) and yet see Plato offering an alternative approach to political life as informed by philosophy. For instance, Jacob Howland argues in The Republic: The Odyssey of Political Theory (1993) that Books Six and Seven go beyond the educative warfare model Kochin claims is so central in Book Five and instead embraces a philosophical education that is even more conducive to justice. By contrast, Kochin's analysis of the Republic says virtually nothing about Books Six or Seven—arguably the most important parts of the dialogue.

Those who seek a refreshing twist on familiar texts will find much edification in this book. But those who seek to better reconcile antiquity and modernity by moving beyond unhelpful dichotomies—such as Kochin's contrast between the “perspective of the few,” which for him characterizes political philosophy, and “the true interest of the unphilosophic many,” from which he suggests feminism emerges (p. 17)—may very well be frustrated in their efforts.

Radical Space: Building the House of the People.

—Clarissa Rile Hayward, Ohio State University

In this thoughtful and engaging book, Margaret Kohn makes the case that space is an important mechanism of social power. With Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, and Henri Lefebvre (among others), she agrees that space can function to reproduce and to reinforce relations of domination. Yet, she emphasizes, it also can play a transformative political role, enabling and encouraging the oppressed to challenge and to change social relations of power. Drawing on careful analyses of the histories of cooperatives, chambers of labor, and case del popolo (houses of the people) in turn-of-the-century Italy, Kohn argues that space can promote democratic change by helping to forge collective identity and mobilize collective resistance.

The book takes as its point of departure Jürgen Habermas’s work on the bourgeois public sphere (especially Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 1989). Kohn notes that due to its constitutive exclusions, the bourgeois public sphere
failed to realize the democratic ideals it defined: ideals that included political equality, freedom, and inclusiveness. Hence, the importance of attending to the “popular public sphere”: sites where members of the subaltern classes came together to form alliances and coalitions, to pool their resources, and to press for social, economic, and political change. A popular public sphere flourished in prefascist Italy, she argues, in the trade unions and in the mutual aid societies where people engaged with others from relatively similar backgrounds to discuss and to interpret their experiences. It emerged, as well, in the chambers of labor and in the houses of the people where industrial workers and artisans, domestic workers, and unemployed people met across differences of occupation, class, and ideology to define new collective identities and to create new institutions and practices that enabled them to act together.

How, precisely, can space promote transformative politics? Kohn’s central argument is that just as some spatial orders divide and segregate, others bring together people who typically would have no contact with one another. Prefascist Italian mutual aid societies, cooperatives, and chambers of labor were organized by locality, rather than by trade. They encouraged interaction among skilled and unskilled workers, among industrial and agricultural laborers, among the employed and the unemployed. Once space brings people together, Kohn stresses, it further can shape their interactions in ways that are conducive to building alliances and forging collective identities. For instance, the neighborhood circolo, or cooperative bar, enabled talk and other forms of interaction by defining what Kohn (following Charles Tilly, “Spaces of Contention,” *Mobilization* 5 [2000]: 135–59) calls a “safe space,” that is, one free from surveillance and from rule by church and state elites. Here and in similarly “radical” spaces, the disempowered could meet together. They could argue and debate with one another. They could share their experiences and their perspectives, discover common interests, and develop collective aims and strategies.

One important strength of this book is its careful attention to historical detail. *Radical Space* is a work of empirically and historically engaged political theory. Kohn’s central insight is that studying forgotten spatial orders can revitalize contemporary theorizing about democracy. “Looking at the practices of mutual aid societies, cooperatives, case del popolo, and municipalities,” she writes, “could reinforce the normative core of democratic theory by recovering the political logic of a particular moment of the process of democratization” (pp. 2–3). The book raises a series of questions that are critical for democratic theory today. What democratically promising spaces exist, or might be created, in the twenty-first century? How can political actors exploit spatial resources to expand and to deepen democratic politics? What forms of spatial transformation are needed to challenge extant relations of domination?

In order to answer these questions, Kohn would need to disentangle more carefully than she does here the specific contributions that space—as distinct from nonspatial institutions and practices—makes to transformative politics. At some points in the book, she writes as if “radical space” is no more than a facilitating condition for democratic debate and political organization. For instance, in her discussion of Sesto San Giovanni, an Italian town where in the early twentieth century workers were divided into groups of new (industrial) and old (agricultural), Kohn claims that radical space played an important role in forging alliances and enabling opposition to local elites. It is not clear from the discussion, however, how space—as opposed to organizational capacity simpliciter—produced these results. By the end of World War I, Kohn reports, socialists had experienced nontrivial electoral gains in Sesto, thanks to the “dense network of associations that linked economic needs and neighborhood-based solidarities to a political program. The power of the local government . . . arose out of a series of semiautonomous workers’ organizations that were linked together in overlapping sites of integration and coordination” (p. 133). But as Kohn herself notes elsewhere (pp. 5–6), organization is analytically distinct from space. In principle, powerful popular organizations can form absent “radical space.”

At other points in the book, however, Kohn adopts a more explicitly Bourdieuian perspective on the political import of space. At these moments, she stresses that what is distinctive about spatial order is that it encourages the embodiment of contingent dispositions: dispositions to perceive and to classify the social world in particular ways, for example, or to aspire to particular ends, while viewing others as impossible, illegitimate, unthinkable. Bourdieu (*Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 1977, p. 90) compares space to a book that the body reads by traversing. At times, Kohn draws on this insight, suggesting that what distinguishes space from nonspatialized organization is that we live the former corporeally. People come to “know their place,” she claims (p. 19), through embodied, and therefore relatively enduring dispositions, which we learn in structured spaces. The argument could be strengthened with a more detailed account of how exactly it was that radical space helped change the embodied dispositions of the dominated in fin-de-siècle Italy. What was the relation between, on the one hand, changes to practical knowledge through the production of radical space and, on the other, the identitarian and the motivational changes on which most of the book focuses? More generally, how best can democrats understand the political effects of the spaces that our bodies “read”? How can we restructure space in ways that disrupt its non- or antidemocratic effects? That *Radical Space* helps raise such questions is one of its principal contributions to ongoing debates about democratic politics and popular resistance to power.


— John McGowan, University of North Carolina

Despite the subtitle, Joseph Margolis’s twenty-second book has little to do with either America or the present historical
moment. Pragmatism is often maligned as a dressed-up version of a crude and naive American faith that willpower, cash, and technical know-how can overcome all obstacles, while John Dewey constantly called for a philosophy responsive to the needs of its time. Margolis, however, focuses on pragmatism’s response to philosophical conundrums dating back to Descartes, with nary a glance at how or why we might engage those puzzles differently or with any sense of urgency in our own moment.

Margolis’s account of pragmatism’s relation to modern philosophy is useful and illuminating. His major claim is that the two most important contemporary pragmatists—Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam—each succumbs to the major flaws of the post-Cartesian tradition, even though the classical pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey provides the resources for escape. The first flaw is Cartesian dualism, which entails the notion of an objective reality standing independent of the human minds that know it: “The minimal Cartesian dogma is that it is cognitively feasible to gain a true account of the way ‘the world’ is apart from any presumed distortion effected by human inquiry” (p. 38). Despite all the difficulties attending the attempt to offer that “true account,” the terrors of subjectivism and relativism have fueled endless revisionary efforts to secure “Cartesian realism” (p. 38).

Margolis is not afraid of relativism—and he insists that pragmatism becomes just another version of Cartesian realism if its acceptance of relativism is not accepted. Putnam, in particular, has let his fear of relativism undermine his commitment to pragmatism. I cannot, in a short review, rehearse Margolis’s arguments for relativism. And he has made the case better elsewhere than he does in the book under review. (See, in particular, Joseph Margolis, The Truth about Relativism, 1991.) More striking to me is how endless, how inconclusive, the debate between realism and relativism has become. All the moves on both sides are utterly familiar by now—and never seem to change anyone’s mind.

The second major flaw that Margolis identifies in the tradition leads him toward more interesting territory. Troubled by the Cartesian legacy of mind–body dualism, philosophy has adopted the project of “naturalizing” human capacities and activities. The goal, we might say, is a unified field theory, one in which causes in the physical world are exactly consonant with causes in social and psychological realms. Margolis shows how Rorty is committed to such causal monism. (Hobbes, whom Margolis never mentions, is the causal monist whose work is most relevant to political philosophy.) Margolis contrasts “naturalizing” to the “original pragmatists’ naturalism,” understood as “a refusal to admit non-natural or supernatural resources in a descriptive or explanatory discourse” (p. 6).

Naturalizing, Margolis insists, is reductive at best (claiming that all observed behavior can be reduced to physical processes), and false at worst.

Unfortunately, Margolis is not very clear about either the stakes in his rejection of naturalizing projects or his reasons for that rejection. Reinventing Pragmatism as a whole is poorly organized, jumping about from point to point, continually leaving the reader in the lurch just when a crucial explanation or a full-blown argument seems in the offing. He has much of interest and value to say, but he abuses his audience’s patience mightily. So what follows is my best effort at reconstructing the stakes and arguments that he leaves all too obscure.

At stake is nothing less than William James’s old bugbear: freedom versus determinism. Underlying the naturalizing project is the “doctrine” that “truth-explanation is ultimately causal” (p. 6). The uncovering of a causal narrative is the only path to truth—and demonstrates why this outcome was the only one possible. Against this vision of foreclosed possibilities, Margolis highlights the pragmatist insistence that human action alters the very lineaments of the real. The world changes as the result of human action upon it. If we take different actions, we produce different worlds. But to put it that way is too heroically subjective. Better to say: The world emerges for humans through their interactions with it. Quoting Ralph Sleeper, Margolis writes: “Dewey’s ontology is ‘pluralistic and relativistic . . . since Dewey accepts no eternal objects or permanent kinds’” (p. 123). Our world (here Margolis quotes Dewey) “can be grasped only in and through the activity which constitutes it” (p. 125). We find ourselves in the midst of a temporal flow of events and situations to which we adapt. There are external pressures upon us, so this is not pure subjectivism. But—and here is the key pluralistic claim—there are multiple ways to constitute, to characterize, these situations and multiple (although hardly infinite) paths from the present to a possible future.

Margolis’s active, pluralistic position sees humans as “constructively” moving into the future, even though they have no guarantees that the futures they aim for will come to pass. But a lack of guarantees is not an assurance of failure. If we did not, at least some of the time, secure outcomes sufficiently close to what we aimed to achieve, then the bite of our concepts of and our faith in action would be lost: “You must remember that, on the argument being offered, both referential and predictive success inherently lack sufficient or criterial confirmation, except constructively” (p. 156). The proof is in the pudding. Was the action successful, on its own terms? This question also suggests the pluralistic conclusion that “divergent productive schemes . . . might generate either incommensurabilities or incompatible predications about the same denotata” (p. 156).

Different characterizations of the situation will suggest different courses of action—and those different actions might all prove efficacious responses. Reality does not dictate one script.

For readers interested in politics, Margolis offers a theoretical justification for asserting that our situations are plastic and that human making does play a role in creating our worlds, our futures. But, we might ask, did we need such philosophical assurances? Does anyone really live as if action does not take place in a field of multiple possibilities? Arguments at Margolis’s level of abstraction miss the messier, less tractable, and (I think) more momentous questions about negotiating within a situation’s constraints (what it concretely makes difficult, if not unfeasible) and with the many others
with whom we share a world. Knowing that action is possible is a far cry from knowing what to do.

Margolis reminds us that Dewey always praised “the resources” afforded by “savoir-faire” (knowledge of how to do things) over “savoir” (knowledge simpliciter, or knowledge of things) (p. 156). One way to read pragmatism is to say that it recommends turning our backs on abstract theorizing, on the notion that only if we get our philosophical ducks in line, our conceptual and ontological foundations aligned, will successful action be possible. Such a conviction is Cartesianism rearing its ugly head once more. The pragmatists vehemently deny that we will be paralyzed with doubt if we have not found metaphysical bedrock. We come to consciousness embodied in a world (both social and natural), already standing in relation to it, and act by trying to maintain those relations or alter them. The scene of action, the place of decision, the site where knowledge is acquired and deployed, is a level below the abstractions of the philosophical tradition. That is why pragmatism—like the work of the post- Tractatus Wittgenstein—is antiphilosophical philosophy. You cannot escape the traps of Cartesianism (including the endless realism/relativism debate) unless you step outside the entire language game in which it unfolds. Margolis shows us why such an escape is desirable, even if he cannot effect that escape himself.

Liberalism and the Defence of Political Constructivism.

— John Horton, Keele University

Catriona McKinnon seeks to defend a constructivist model of political justification for liberal political principles. One of her principal purposes is to lay to rest the charge that liberal justification “only successfully addresses people who are already committed to liberal political principles” (p. ix). Although she thinks that these “well-worn” criticisms typically rest on “sloppy or wilful misreadings,” and are “crass and boring,” even “hysterical,” she allows that they “can be seen as an overstated response to a more subtle concern about the nature of contemporary liberal justification”: This is that “the assumptions about persons required for liberal principles to be justified to these persons undermine a commitment to the permanence of pluralism” (p. x). While it is best to pass over the initially dismissive (“hysterical?”) tone, as it is rapidly abandoned for one that is altogether more measured, it is hard to resist observing that for someone who rejects the charge that liberals are largely talking to each other, this seems an odd way to begin.

McKinnon aims to reformulate an important element in John Rawls’s political constructivism. She accepts the structure and purpose of his constructivism, but departs from him over the adequacy of his argument from the “burdens of judgement.” Both that argument, and Brian Barry’s alternative of moderate skepticism, are rejected as being unnecessarily demanding in the attitude they require people to have about their own beliefs. They are demanding because they require people to accept a single explanation for the fact of permanent pluralism; and such demandingness is unnecessary because McKinnon’s own, “many flowers” view allows that while people must still accept the fact of permanent pluralism, they need not do so for the same reasons. The problem then becomes one of “why people divided on the question of why pluralism is a permanent fact are all nevertheless committed to toleration and public reason” (p. 55). McKinnon’s answer is because they share a conception of self-respect and its social bases. “Self-respect,” she contends, “requires congruence between [a person’s] self-conception and her self-expression; it depends upon her meeting standards with which she in some way identifies” (p. 57). However, because a person can identify with standards that imply subservience, this account needs to be supplemented by a nonsubservience condition specifying that a person must “judge as legitimate any expectation of hers that others should offer her justifying reasons why she should perform actions she is expected by them to perform” (p. 85).

McKinnon further argues that people who are committed to their own self-respect, and who accept that other people are similarly committed, must endorse a conception of public reason for deliberating about questions of justice that requires them to give reasons to others that they cannot reasonably reject. The crucial connection between self-respect and public reason is effected through conceiving persons as, in Charles Taylor’s sense, “strong evaluators.” The final chapter then makes some tentative suggestions about what kind of social provisions and political principles will best support the social bases of self-respect conceived as “opportunities for the development of a non-subservient self-conception and the achievement of congruence according to individual criteria of excellence” (p. 125).

McKinnon is, I believe, right in arguing that liberals are better served by focusing on how beliefs and practices matter to people and minimizing any appeal to controversial epistemic claims. Moreover, many of her detailed discussions—for instance, her careful presentation of the problems with Rawls’s “burden of judgements” argument—are both illuminating and convincing. However, there are also some difficulties. For example, in her discussion of nonsubservient self-respect, it is very unclear how far her arguments are empirical, and how far and on what basis they are already normatively structured. There is also much reference to what “we” think or say, which is not intrinsically objectionable or entirely avoidable, but without adequate appreciation that many people think and speak differently. But perhaps these are not the “ideal” people with whom she is concerned (although I wonder whether, in McKinnon’s view, Roman Catholics who accept the doctrine of papal infallibility necessarily lack a sense of nonsubservient self-respect). In fairness, McKinnon is often explicit about some of the large assumptions she makes: For instance, she concedes that she simply stipulates that political justificatory reasons must take priority over other reasons, and that if they do not, “political justification as I conceive it is impossible.”
Norton demonstrates how the binary distinctions represented by the two axes intersect in such cases as the Requerimiento, a document produced by the Spanish government and read whenever Spanish officers encountered the peoples of the Americas. The document stated not only the Spanish crown’s claim on the territories occupied by the indigenous peoples, but also the benefits that would befall them if they acquiesced and the violence that awaited them if they did not. In the author’s reading, the Requerimiento was not something separate from violence upon the body, but “produced it, set it in motion” (p. 27). She also invokes the variety of writings associated with revolutions, from the revelatory claims to legitimacy articulated in the Declaration of Independence to the veiling of power through writing in both the old and new regimes in France. In all these cases, words entailed bloodshed.

As regards the revolutionary experience in England, most compelling is her discussion of the Glorious Revolution and of William and Mary. Here, Norton’s themes of word and flesh play out through the Dutch stadholder’s ascension to the English throne by virtue of the Declaration of Right and of Mary’s denial of her own lineage and willing subservience to her husband. And Norton’s enthusiasms are evident in her treatment of Edmund Burke, William Blake, and Thomas Carlyle, highlighting their extravagant metaphors. It is clearly that extravagance of expression, like Nietzsche’s, that seems to have drawn her to these figures. She revels in their language and finds much there to sustain her main themes.

When Norton proposes that we are at the horizon of this order, it appears to be because we can now see for what it is, and because the separations and distinctions within which, and by which, it operates are breaking down. And while authorial intent and historical context are rejected as constraints upon interpretation, she claims a political purpose in the present. She means to show by her examples from the past that the writings of the poststructuralists “have a presence in the flesh, and these are matters not of the word but of the world. . . . The death of the author and the dissemination of authority find their political forms in regicide and the Terror, in the peasants who soaked their bread in the blood of Louis Capet, and the burned cafés of Algiers” (p. 4). Hence her title. Her book is thus part of a political project, another contribution to the deconstruction of the order. Gay rights activism and queer theory, feminism, environmentalists, and animal rights activists are among those who are also challenging “the economy of openness and closure in which contemporary political bodies are constituted” (p. 24).

Less modestly, Norton asserts: “Reading Nietzsche, or Foucault, or Derrida, or any of those whose faith in closure is suspect produces the effects of the Medusa in the agents and beneficiaries of the rational legal order. Men claim that such insights leave them paralyzed, unable to act effectively in the political world. They are made impotent by the sight of lack” (p. 161). This effectively puts poststructuralism beyond criticism, because anyone who questions whether it has any instrumental political worth or provides a coherent political criticism of contemporary systems of power is ipso facto lining up

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— Nicholas Xenos, University of Massachusetts

Anne Norton’s new book is allusive in its form and elusive in its argument. These attributes are entailed in her approach to political theory and her understandings of language and time. She is tough to pin down, which is what she would seem to desire. Norton tosses the words and images of her study, drawn from the Old and New Testaments as well as Franz Fanon, into a nonlinear discourse that she says constitutes modernity.

Norton begins by asserting that “we stand at the horizon of [an] order” that “is visible and active in the coupling and opposition, the oscillations and transubstantiations, the rivalries and alliances, between two axes, one constituted between the poles of word and flesh, the other between openness and closure” (p. 1). The word encompasses constitutions, scripture, titles, and dictates, while the flesh involves birth, kinship, sexuality, violence, and mortality: “Openness is physical, literary, and political, manifest in the bodies of women and in revolution. Closure belongs to systematic reasoning, to orders and institutions, to the bodies of men” (p. 1). According to the worldview she associates with modernism, we should expect that we have moved progressively from the open and the bodily to the closed and the written, but retracing the footsteps of Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan, Norton unsurprisingly discovers that the story is not so simple.

(p. 5). But critics who believe that modern liberal theory largely preaches to the converted often reject this very demanding assumption. Further, while the author does not claim to answer the questions in her final chapter, only “to set an agenda for research for liberal Constructivists” (and are they the only people qualified to decide the principles of social organization?), it is far from clear that public reason will not be radically indeterminate on a great many fundamental issues, unless a host of liberal prejudices are insinuated into the discussion.

In many respects Liberalism and the Defence of Political Constructivism is a fine example of analytical liberal theorizing at its best—lucid, careful, patient, and serious in working through the arguments. But it also exhibits some of that genre’s typical limitations, most conspicuously in a deeper unreflectiveness about the viability of the liberal project understood in this way; and, pace McKinnon, one does not need to have misunderstood it to have legitimate doubts about the liberal project. If one already believes that Rawls is the best place to start thinking about questions of political justification, then grappling with McKinnon’s arguments should prove both challenging and enlightening. If, however, you are skeptical about the Rawlsian project, it is unlikely that McKinnon will persuade you otherwise, which is not of course to deny that even those who do take this view would benefit from reading her book.
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on the side of closure and order against that of openness and revolution. But she does not cite a single critic, giving her polemic a straw man quality. Similarly, when she makes the remarkable statement that Luce Irigaray "reads Plato more carefully, more respectfully, more thoroughly, than those who purport to honor him, for she read without excising the myths and the jokes that embarrass too many contemporary philosophers," she disains any references to other interpreters of Plato (p. 169). It is hard to escape the impression that Norton is arbitrarily dividing the world up into friends and enemies and that her rhetoric has gotten the better of her. When she is most emphatic about the politics of poststructuralism, she creates the sort of binaries that she otherwise abhors.

That is not the only problem. Early on, she writes that, "when Oliver Cromwell called Charles Stuart the 'Man of Blood,' he alluded not merely to his lineage nor to his acts of violence, but to the substance of his authority" (p. 10). In a footnote, she recounts a conversation she had with John Pocock, who argued that Cromwell referred only to Charles Stuart's acts of violence. Norton maintains instead that "the words 'Man of Blood' reveal the meanings immanent in them over time, in the hearing of those many generations removed from the time of their first utterance" (p. 183, n. 1). Such a position strains the meaning of "he alluded to," which, in normal English usage, entails intent, and by dogmatically ascribing autonomy to language, Norton has begged the question; she has asserted as an assumption what Bloodrites of the Post-Structuralists is meant to establish.

Norton's proclamation that we stand at the horizon of an order entails a backward glance. But her simultaneous claim that her book, and the work of poststructuralists in general, is political in the present opens a gap. Her invocation of contemporary activism points to a lack. Aside from a few general references to postcolonial theory, the politics of globalization and its resistances are absent from her discussion. The collapse of the Soviet empire in the "revolutions" of 1989 passes without notice. The furor over religious fundamentalism goes unremarked. There is an almost willfully blinkered aspect to Norton's own gaze. She understands "the central debates of our time, in politics and the academy" to be centered on the connection between sexuality and language (p. 160). That may sound plausible, even compelling to some; others will insist that there are other, equally urgent debates that define "our time."


— Patchen Markell, University of Chicago

In his book, John Tambornino explores the significance of embodiment for political theory through a study of four thinkers: Hannah Arendt, Charles Taylor, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Stuart Hampshire. Tambornino casts his project as an attempt to uncover a commonly forgotten or repressed dimension of human experience, yet his point is more finely tuned than that: By steering his cast of characters with theorists who at least partially acknowledge corporeality, but in different ways, he reaches beyond the question of whether the body is politically important to ask how, specifically, embodiment ought to be understood and engaged. His own position is most closely aligned with Hampshire's "self-conscious materialism," which treats the physiological explanation of human activity not as a denial of agency but as one possible technique of freedom. By taking account of the ways in which our thoughts, feelings, and conduct are influenced by our "bodily situations" (p. 117), we may enhance our capacity to work on and modify these situations "by tactical means" (p. 6).

The central chapters of this book are artfully arranged, with each thinker adding a new layer of complexity to Tambornino's picture of corporeality. He begins with Arendt's insistence that the body, as a site of sheer necessity and homogeneity, is properly understood as private, not public. Yet he also finds hints in Arendt of the importance of the body for politics—especially in her account of the sources of "natality" and "uniqueness," which are closely connected but not reducible to the phenomena of birth and physical separateness. Taylor improves upon Arendt by affirming embodiment as an indispensable condition of human agency, but for Tambornino, Taylor also overvalues the achievement of "attunement" between a subject's self-understanding and the purposiveness, the "single direction of life," that she finds already implicit though not yet fully developed in her (embodied) self and her (corporeal) world (p. 53). Nietzsche calls Taylor's teleology into question, stressing the multiplicity of equally inessential possibilities within and among bodies. So does Hampshire, although in Tambornino's presentation, Hampshire's materialism, unlike Nietzsche's, is tinged with pessimism, perpetually in mourning for the unlived possibilities that must be sacrificed in any project of self-making. It is also interrupted by a moral universalism rooted in a thin account of "basic needs," and part of what Tambornino admires in Hampshire is his refusal to "seek a metaphysical or metatheoretical position from which to alleviate this tension" between his moral theory and his materialism (p. 128).

Taken as a sequence of studies of four important theorists, The Corporeal Turn is a mixed success. Tambornino's central chapters are survey-like, touching on a large number of issues fairly briefly. (The chapter on Arendt discusses her critique of the philosophical tradition, her distinction between public and private, her account of natality, her view of the will, her understanding of the relationship of the body to identity, and her conceptions of thinking and judgment, all in 20 pages). This approach makes the book capacious and accessible, virtues that are enhanced by Tambornino's clear, deliberate, and largely jargonless prose, as well as by the multidimensionality and generosity of his readings. These are lucid and thoughtful portraits. On the other hand, this approach also leaves the chapters feeling slightly diffuse, and specialist
readers may find some of the material familiar, though skillfully presented. Of the four, I found the chapter on Hampshire to be the most novel: As Tambornino notes, a more predictable book would have turned from Nietzsche to Foucault, yet Tambornino makes a compelling case for Hampshire’s importance, and his presentation of the idea of self-conscious materialism—especially by contrast with “crass” materialism, which concludes that thought and will can be explained physically but does not ask how that conclusion might itself come to inform our activities and practices—is fascinating (p. 111).

Still, I wish Tambornino had devoted a full chapter at the end of the book to his account of the politics of self-conscious materialism. That is not to say that he ignores the issue. In the chapter on Hampshire, Tambornino distinguishes between two ways in which an awareness of embodiment, and the resulting psychophysical explanations of thought and behavior, might play out in practice. He imagines an individual who finds herself “intellectually committed to racial equality” but is still afflicted by feelings of revulsion at the sight of interracial couples. Such a person, Tambornino suggests, might undertake a project of reflexive work on her bodily responses, perhaps through therapy, or through gradual acclimation “by spending time in mixed settings,” or by cultivating “an appreciation for art that portrays interracial relations” (p. 120). But he also describes bodily interventions by state institutions, such as the “cognitive restructuring” of sex offenders through close physical monitoring, conditioning through aversion therapy, and the manipulation of testosterone levels (pp. 120–121). He approves of the former sort of practice, but, as a self-described “liberal pluralist,” rejects the latter (p. 139).

I share Tambornino’s gut reactions, but I wonder about the relationship between these judgments and the theoretical work that has preceded them. The difference between these two cases seems to turn on the distinction between a “voluntary” project of self-reform and an intervention from the outside (p. 120), but Tambornino’s own efforts to unsettle our conventional view of agency make it hard to invoke the distinction between “voluntary” and “involuntary” so easily—not because those terms have been revealed to be meaningless, but because, at this point, the reader has been primed for a reconstructed account of what terms like “voluntary” might mean once we have taken our hitherto neglected corporeality into account. In lieu of such an account, he sometimes seems to fall back on a conventional view of the body and its passions as something to be governed by a relatively autonomous intellect. The fixed point for the agent in his first case, after all, is her “intellectual” commitment to racial equality, and her work on herself involves bringing her feelings into accord with her thoughts: In this example, anyway, there is little of the interplay of experiment, exploration, reflection, and decision that Tambornino elsewhere describes so nicely. Still, if some parts of the argument remain underdeveloped, it is to his credit that the brevity of this smart book leaves the reader not relieved but wanting more.


— Paul Patton, University of New South Wales

This is an untimely though not unwelcome book. It is not a scholarly study of Gilles Deleuze’s relation to Marx or his politics but, rather, an attempt to disinter some of the layers of Marxist thought that inform Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s magisterial contribution to political philosophy, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. It is sometimes forgotten that both of these volumes bore the subtitle Capitalism and Schizophrenia, and Nicholas Thoburn performs a useful task in drawing attention to the nature and the detail of the analysis of capitalism on which Deleuze and Guattari rely. In doing so, he also seeks to contribute to a renewed Deleuze-Marx resonance in these postmodern times. In some respects, this book is a polemic against popular currents within post-Marxist political thought, chiefly Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s “neoGramscian Post-Marxism” and certain aspects of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire. In addition to its useful setting out of key elements of Deleuze and Guattari’s Marxism, this book serves as an introduction to the 1970s Italian Marxism of operatismo and autonomia as interpreted through Deleuzian concepts. “Operaismo” (“workerism”) refers to the current of Italian Marxist thought and politics that emerged in the 1960s and that became known as “Autonomia” (Autonomy) in the 1970s. Its distinguishing features included an understanding of the current stage of capitalist development as one characterized above all by the real subsumption of labor to capital, and a corresponding political strategy of the assertion of working-class autonomy by a variety of forms of direct action.

Thoburn begins with an account of Deleuze’s political orientation, at once anticapitalist and in favor of the invention—as Deleuze and Guattari write in What is Philosophy?—of new earths and new peoples. His focus is the concept of minority, understood not as a status but as a process of deviation from or deterritorialization of the majority. In Chapter 2, somewhat surprisingly in view of the productivist focus of later chapters, he takes Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of Kafka’s “minor literature” as the primary source for his account of minor politics. Nevertheless, this does produce some useful formulae that are repeated throughout the later discussion of Marx’s proletariat and the forms of resistance to capital: first, that minor politics is not the assertion of an established political identity but, rather, the assertion that “the people are missing”; second, that it begins not in the space of “subjective plenitude and autonomy” but in the “cramped space” typically occupied by oppressed and subaltern peoples (p. 18). In addition to illustrating Deleuze and Guattari’s politics by reference to literary figures including Jean Genet, Thoburn surveys Marx’s own mode of literary creation, Guattari’s analysis of groups, and Deleuze’s criticisms of Michel Foucault’s politics of “resistance.”

Chapter 3 turns to Marxian concepts of class and argues for a Deleuzian understanding of the proletariat as an open-ended
process of engagement with capitalist social relations. Thoburn rejects the postmodern championing of the lumpen-proletariat as a site of difference, arguing that it should be understood as a mode of composition oriented toward identity. He follows Etienne Balibar in suggesting that it is rather the "unnamable" proletariat that seeks to overcome identity and deterritorialize the capitalist socius. Understood in this Deleuzian manner, the proletarian is associated with the refusal of work, a theme that Thoburn elaborates in the following chapters with reference to operaismo and autonomia.

Chapter 4 provides an extended account of the methodological approach and concerns of these theoretical tendencies, including their reliance upon Marx's thesis of the real subsumption of labor by capital, and the importance attached to the Grundrisse and Marx's "Fragment on Machines." Thoburn traces the influence of this body of work on Hardt and Negri's *Empire*, but also points to the different elaboration of these themes in Deleuze and Guattari's account of capitalism. He effects a surprising reversal of perspective by criticizing Hardt and Negri's abandonment of Marx's and Deleuze's understanding of the manner in which regimes of control remain immanent to productive forces and their apparent discovery of an emerging communist subject. He argues that contrary to "Hardt and Negri's proposition that Empire has overcome the last vestiges of metaphysical thinking in Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault...Deleuze offers a complex and productive conception of contemporary capital, control and production, and one that actually resonates more with conceptual constellation of *operaismo* and Marx than it does with Negri's tendencies to present an emerging autonomy-in-production" (p. 102).

Chapter 5 considers the political movements and forms of class composition associated with operaismo and autonomia, including the politics of autovalorization, the refusal of work, the demand for wages for housework, and the techniques of cultural creation associated with *emarginati*, such as those associated with Radio Alice and the Metropolitan Indians. These are redescribed as movements of minoritarian becoming or lines of flight from the contemporary capitalist socius. Consistent with his earlier Deleuzian account of the proletariat, Thoburn presents the political project embodied in these movements as one that sought to disrupt both the nature of capitalist work and the subjectivity of the worker, the open-ended composition of minorities rather than the composition of a majoritarian political identity.

Chapter 6 summarizes the case for a Deleuzian conception of communist political practice. Thoburn presents an all-too-brief and unconvincing account of Deleuze's apparent hostility to democratic politics. He concludes with comments on the affective dimension of minoritarian politics, namely, the peculiar joy that is associated with the affirmation of life under the most cramped and seemingly impossible conditions. Despite his refusal of a "slightly embarrassing utopianism" (p. 147) it is difficult not to see Deleuze and Guattari as embracing a conception of politics as the art of the impossible.

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**AMERICAN POLITICS**


— Steven P. Erie, *University of California, San Diego*

"The Mega-Project is dead. Long live the Mega-Project!" This is the theme of Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff’s savvy and important study of the changing dynamics of major urban public investments since World War II. Emerging from a supposed prehistory of minimalist local government and private investment, "the mega-projects era," 1950–70, witnessed a revolutionary change as energized city governments, in league with business and unhindered by significant local opposition, used generous federal funding to promote unprecedented urban renewal projects, new highways, and airport facilities.

However, from the late 1960s through the 1970s, local governments were shaken by civil disorders and placed on the defensive by neighborhood activists, preservationists, and environmentalists. During this transitional era when few mega-projects were built, urban regimes were reactive rather than proactive, emphasizing concessions to and containment of antidevelopment forces. But since the early 1980s, momentum for mega-projects again grew as local governments perfected a "do no harm" strategy utilizing "mitigation," indirect financing, and a shift to less disruptive projects, such as airport terminal improvements, light rail systems, convention centers, and sports arenas.

The authors combine rich empirical studies of post–World War II public entrepreneurship and coalition building, both locally and nationally, for major urban transportation projects, with illuminating chapters on urban theory in relation to changing public investment strategies, and they conclude with speculation on the future of major urban infrastructure projects. The core chapters offer three detailed sets of case studies of transportation infrastructure—highways, showcasing Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel Project (CAT), “The Big Dig” about which author Altshuler acquired insider knowledge as Massachusetts Secretary of Transportation during the 1970s; airports, with detailed analysis of the diverse experiences of Atlanta, Chicago, and Denver; and rail transit, including Atlanta’s MARTA, San Francisco’s BART, and Los Angeles’s subway and light rail projects.

Discerning common patterns, the authors draw major lessons from the changing mega-project strategies in the post-1980s environment. Unlike earlier “cookie-cutter” plans for urban renewal projects or standardized interstate highway
projects, successful infrastructure projects have become non-routine, necessitating the expert construction of political consensus among highly contentious local constituencies. Except for light rail projects in Los Angeles and Portland, where environmentalists took the lead, business interests—particularly land developers and commercial property owners—remained the core constituency for mega-projects. Yet “public entrepreneurs”—like Mayor Federico Peña in connection with the Denver International Airport (DIA) and Los Angeles County Supervisor Kenneth Hahn in connection with L.A.'s Red and Blue Lines—were also indispensable.

There also has been a paradigm shift from the insouciant “you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs” attitude prior to the urban riots of the 1960s to a “do no harm” planning philosophy that prioritizes avoiding controversies, notably by siting projects—whether below grade, in tunnels, or on the metropolitan periphery—so as not to offend settled neighborhoods. The mitigation principle—a new mega-project imperative—has evolved from a commitment to ameliorate harmful impacts, such as airport noise, to seductive benefit programs promising new subsidized housing, added neighborhood amenities, and other forms of so-called green pork.

In terms of federalism, Washington's 90% payout under the interstate highway program is a thing of the past, yet cities, under the new dispensation of “bottom up federalism,” now have more latitude in defining projects and are less constrained by “earmarked” funding requirements in spending federal money. Since California’s Proposition 13 and the tax revolt of the late 1970s, mega-project financing has steered clear, to the extent possible, of local tax increases. Alternatives include indirect financing through tax abatement and long-term leases for developers; new “visitor taxes” on hotel rooms, restaurants, and car rentals; regional sales tax earmarks; and lottery revenues. When costs cannot be passed on, they can be hidden. Altshuler and Luberoff argue that a large part of the escalating costs of mega-projects—for example, from $7 million an urban freeway mile in 1980 to $54 million in the early 1990s—was a product of political pressures to underestimate initial program costs in order to avert voter backlash.

This new world of mega-projects, however, is built on ever-more-fragile economic foundations. Once-mighty highway and airport projects, which conferred major regional economic benefits, have been replaced by more politically appealing, yet economically marginal, sports stadiums, convention centers, downtown malls, and light rail projects. The book ends with a speculative chapter on 9/11’s impact on infrastructure projects. Despite the initial sharp decline in airline passenger traffic, ongoing concerns about recurrent terrorism and security, and growing budget deficits, the authors optimistically conclude that the era of mega-projects is not yet over.

This admirable book is not without weaknesses. Despite the authors’ recognition of dramatic increases in infrastructure spending by local governments during the first half of the twentieth century, they treat this period as if it were of only preparatory importance—rather like that of the Israelites in the desert before (Robert?) Moses led them into the promised land. Readers will have to look elsewhere, for example, for analyses of how early growth dynamics in such western cities as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle spawned activist development-oriented local governments, featuring bureaucrats rather than mayors as the central public entrepreneurs, and producing world-scale water, power, port, and bridge mega-projects in the years before World War II.

Notwithstanding a footnote (p. 65) commenting on the unhelpful disconnect between regime theory in urban politics and in international relations, the authors virtually ignore how economic globalization since the 1970s has internationalized the competitive logic and infrastructure priorities of local governments. For example, there is a short treatment of Southern California's Alameda Corridor mega-project creating a separated-grade freight rail link from the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to the downtown rail yards. Yet virtually no attention is given to the new globalized trading patterns that have provided a powerful impetus to regional port, trade corridor, and airport development projects, especially during the 1990s. The authors note the arguments for diminishing returns from interstate highway investment since the 1970s, but not the evidence for the increasing regional economic dividends from trade infrastructure investment.

Finally, the authors may be too sanguine concerning the future of urban mega-projects. Voter opposition to publicly subsidized sports stadiums and convention centers is mounting. Dwindling federal transportation dollars threaten to sever the surface transportation alliance between highway and mass transit interests. Strained federal and state government budgets may not recover for years. For critical trade infrastructure, security, not capital investment, is the new watchword. Despite these caveats, Mega-Projects is a major contribution to urban development policy and should attract a broad interdisciplinary scholarly audience, as well as urban policymakers and stakeholders.


— John Gastil, University of Washington

Scholarship that crosses the boundaries of multiple disciplines must access diverse literatures and adjudicate conflicting claims, and often reconcile different languages and standards of evidence. Robert Bennett's book attempts all of this in an original but flawed explanation for the distinctive shape of government in the United States.

A primary idiosyncrasy in this work is equating “conversation” with virtually every form of political communication, consisting “mostly of communication to varied segments of the citizenry from candidates for public office, government officials, and media” (p. 2). In Bennett’s view, such talk is conventional in that officials and media often take into account the passive listener’s interests when crafting their messages. As a political communication scholar, I find it difficult to overcome the shock of this misfit metaphor, given that deliberative and
participatory accounts of democracy have revived interest in the importance of actual political conversation.

Bennett argues that existing models provide an incomplete and clumsy accounting of the United States government, and he offers a “conversational account” to answer a series of puzzling questions. Why does the public passively accept the inequitable allocation of two U.S. senators to each state, despite tremendous variation in the populations therein? Why, if we draw districts based on total population, has there been almost no discussion of the idea that children’s votes could be allocated to their parents? Why do some legal observers continue to view the practice of judicial review as problematic? And why do people vote, despite the lack of a rational motivation to do so?

One difficulty Bennett may have is convincing readers that these are problematic features of American government, let alone particularly important ones. When he introduces each problem, well-documented or commonsense explanations come quickly to mind, such as the distinctive historical context in which the bicameral congressional model emerged as an expedient compromise. Moreover, these four puzzles do not amount to a paradigm-threatening string of anomalies. In each case, he overstates the gravity of the problem, acknowledges the preexisting, straightforward explanations for them, then quickly dismisses these simple accounts and diverts attention to a contrast between the conversational account and a specific rival model.

For the first three puzzles, Bennett introduces the “vote-centered model,” which seeks to explain all American political institutions, practices, and debates as expressions of an unwavering commitment to simple majority rule. For instance, the majoritarian model cannot explain why the public and academics quietly accept the Senate’s unequal districts despite their violation of the principle of equal voting power. If this country is built solely on majoritarian principles, he argues, there should be some periodic outcry: “Even if the Constitution requires us to live with a ‘defective’ Senate, that is no barrier to the expression of dissatisfaction about senatorial apportionment” (p. 51).

The conversational approach, according to the author, can explain why there is little objection to this unique arrangement. Having stable and powerful statewide districts serves to promote more “conversation”—that is, media coverage of elections and direct voter contacts by candidates. Such mass communication is valued because it promotes social cohesion, general satisfaction, and involvement in politics. By engaging citizens in “conversation,” officials and candidates make them feel as though they have been taken seriously, their needs and values duly noted. Thus, our institutions are designed, in part, to foster the production of political messages for general public consumption.

For the fourth puzzle, Bennett contrasts rational choice theory with the conversational explanation. This is a convenient juxtaposition because rational choice—a model that he views as a powerful complement to his own—is one of the only general models that finds turnout perplexing. If one rejects the conceptual contortions that define away altruistic and other nonrational motivations, rational choice theory remains puzzled by a citizen expending the effort to cast a ballot that is unlikely to be of any consequence, the recent experience of Floridians notwithstanding.

The problem is that compelling explanations already exist, including the push of civic duty and the pull of high-intensity campaign communications. Bennett recognizes both of these and repackage them as a conversational explanation: Election messages promote a sense of belongingness and involvement that, in turn, lead to voting. This move is problematic, however, because works such as Joseph Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s Spiral of Cynicism (1997) provide strong evidence that campaign and media messages can just as often dampen efficacy and turnout. Moreover, civic duty does not rise and fall with campaign intensity. Quite the contrary, it is an enduring social psychological phenomenon, often passed from one generation to the next.

The greatest virtue of Talking It Through may be its noble ambition to add a new and powerful explanation to those we already use to make sense of American jurisprudence and elections. Bennett also contributes to the ongoing epistemological debate in the social sciences by articulating a clear justification for developing partial explanatory accounts, as opposed to seeking only universal predictive models. The book also directs readers’ attention to the interesting question of whether to count children (and adults without voting rights) when drawing up local, state, and federal districts.

Unfortunately, errors and omissions limit the book’s overall value. In particular, Bennett overstates the degree to which normative and empirical democratic theorists foreground the majoritarian, vote-centered conception of democracy. For instance, deploying Joseph Bessette’s The Mild Voice of Reason (1994) as a chief illustration of this view misses the central thesis of that work, which is that democracy depends on sober legislative deliberation that can rise above more base electoral pressures. Equating democracy with the simple rule of the majority is a gross error, indeed, but this error is committed with great regularity only by unsophisticated citizens, angry mobs, and abridged dictionaries.

Bennett’s quest for a theory that traverses history, law, political science, and communication theory shows considerable bravery, for any such odyssey must encounter reviewers from each of the various disciplines it invokes. In the interest of creating robust interdisciplinary work, one can only hope that social scientists who venture into Bennett’s more familiar legal territory will face as demanding a review as has been attempted here.


— Rhonda F. Levine, Colgate University

This is a collection of 10 articles on various progressive social movements in the United States, not only with the overall
purpose of providing an overview of the particular movements but also with an eye to seeing the extent to which the movements could provide a constituency for a broader and larger progressive, or “left,” movement in the United States in the twenty-first century. John Berg, editor of the volume, tells the reader in his introduction that authors were chosen not only on the basis of their “scholarly credentials, but also for their personal involvement in the movements they write about” (p. 13). Berg assures the reader that the articles are objective, but they are not neutral, and “some show passionate commitment to their cause” (p. 13). The collection promises to be a constructive text for students of social movements, as well as useful for all those interested in rebuilding a broad-based, progressive, and left-oriented global justice movement in the United States. Unfortunately, the selections are uneven and the book as a whole does not live up to its expectations.

Berg’s introduction provides a rather cursory overview of what is meant by various terms, such as “left” and “political,” and the distinction between movements, parties, and interest groups. He also briefly discusses social movement theories, but informs the reader that the book is not about theories of social movements, since theories only interpret social movements. For Berg, the real task is to change the world, and theories are only useful if they help us change the world. Unfortunately, he never returns to this point, and with no concluding chapter to ponder the implication of the 10 separate chapters on specific movements, one is left without direction to evaluate the bigger picture.

The book begins with a chapter on the global justice movement, followed by three chapters on movements based on material needs, three chapters on movements based on postmaterialist identities, and finally three chapters on altruistic movements. Ronald Hayduk’s piece on the global justice movement provides a descriptive overview of the antiglobalization movement with assertions of its impact and achievements. Much of the chapter is a rather uncritical look at global exchange. Nevertheless, Hayduk does raise difficult questions for the movement, such as the acceptance of violence before September 11, and the huge challenges and obstacles to the movement’s growth. He argues that the power of the global justice movement might actually rest with its ability to expose the contradictions of globalization. It is anyone’s guess what this exactly will mean in the post–U.S.-Iraq war era.

Immanuel Ness’s chapter on the labor movement provides a very general overview of labor unions. Ness argues the need for unions to embark on a sustained social protest movement, yet provides little if any analysis suggesting this would succeed. In fact, at one point, he argues that changes in labor law are needed to assure decent wages and working conditions for workers, yet this seems unlikely in the absence of a militant labor movement. He seems to overlook the fact that capitalists changed labor laws in a variety of ways since the late 1940s, and that those changes actually stifled organizing. The chapter on mass-membership senior interest groups by Laura Katz Olson and Frank L. Davis is one of the strongest in the book. Olson and Davis provide a sobering account of the movement of senior citizens, showing that it is a pipe dream to talk about “seniors” as a potential constituency for a progressive left movement because they are still divided by class over various policy issues, such as social security and other old-age programs. Christine Kelly’s and Joel Lefkowitz’s chapter is informative and one of the few that actually integrates social movement theory into its argument about the movement. But Kelly and Lefkowitz go beyond an analysis of Students United Against Sweatshops and argue that the anti-sweatshop movement could provide the model by which practical issues of better wages and working conditions for workers located not only in the United States but throughout the world can be combined with radical demands like living-wage campaigns. I think the authors overstate the point when they argue that students are challenging the logic of capital. At most, they are challenging the rate of exploitation, but not the process of exploitation.

The first of three chapters on the movements based on postmaterialist identities traces changes in Women’s Action for New Direction (WAND). Although Melissa Haussman does an excellent job in applying social movement theory to the history of WAND—the fact that Helen Caldicott and WAND were and are marginal to the women’s movement and any larger movement for global justice—it is unclear what difference any analysis of WAND would make for the building of a large progressive movement. Benjamin Shepard’s chapter on ACT-UP shows how some of its struggle might link up with the global justice movement in fighting global drug companies. However, it is unclear if most of the activists in ACT-UP see it that way, and Shepard gives little evidence that would suggest they do. David Pfeiffer’s chapter on the disability movement is both useful and interesting because it clearly shows that movement participants are unlikely to join a larger movement because they feel as though they are on their own.

The last three chapters in the book are concerned with altruistic movements. James R. Simmons and Solon J. Simmons provide an overview of who the Greens are, pointing out some of the problems with the new-age membership immersed in moralism. While pointing out problems with the strategies and ideologies, the chapter does not, however, confront the structural realities of U.S. politics and the problem of third-party politics in general. Claude E. Welch’s chapter on Human Rights Watch is a detailed account of how organizations like Human Rights Watch look out well for the liberal/rights side of what is needed in democracies, and suggests that if it could extend out to union organizing rights, and other issues more “economic,” it could be a useful part of a larger progressive coalition. Like the chapter on WAND, Meredith Sarkees’s chapter on the peace movement focuses on a marginal group, Voices in the Wilderness, and although it shows that there are pockets of leftism and activism in faith-based communities, they remain small and have little prospects of developing into anything much larger.

What is clearly missing in the book is some sort of a concluding chapter that discusses the implications of the various
chapters for the prospects of building a large progressive movement in the twenty-first century. Some are useful for showing, for example, that seniors and the disabled are not some natural part of a bigger coalition, and that some of the groups like WAND and Voices in the Wilderness are so marginal that they cannot be the core of anything bigger, and indeed get swept aside when real insurgency develops. Much of the rest is a wish and a hope that either the Greens or labor movement should be militant, or that the global justice movement will expand. In the final analysis, Teamsters and Turtles? is a mixture of the realistic, the hopeful, and the marginal.


— Glenn Beamer, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey

In his book, David Berman advocates the merits of local autonomy in the wake of increasingly complex, at times murky, relationships among all levels of government. As an experienced scholar of intergovernmental relations, Berman marshals an impressive array of historical evidence and demonstrates that many intergovernmental conundrums are neither as new nor unique as often portrayed. Throughout the work, he assumes the local perspective and places local politicians in the context of the larger U.S. federal system. The perspective provides an advantage to the argument, yet he remains careful to identify competing perspectives and tensions among governmental actors.

Berman’s advocacy for local control rests on a normative underpinning that local governments, being closest to their citizenry, will be most responsive to their demands. The author cites James Bryce’s The American Commonwealth (1889) to advance his claim that local government can provide effective government and that when a service can be discharged equally well by a local or national jurisdiction, the local jurisdiction should prevail (pp. 3–6). Berman brings Bryce’s normative claim into the context of twenty-first-century governance and builds an interesting foundation with a superbly integrated mix of scholarship from history, law, and public choice economics. Berman then analyzes the intergovernmental dimensions of public authority, revenues, state incorporation of subnational governments, and state assumption of local responsibilities, as well as of local governments themselves.

The historical development of local politics and the embedded politics of home rule is first-rate. Although Berman states that much of his attention will be on intergovernmental politics following the New Deal, he presents a very interesting explication of political demands for local governance in Chapter 4. Beginning with Jefferson and de Tocqueville’s biases against cities, Berman presents the development of city-state politics with cogent, and compact, historical illustrations from New Jersey’s gyrating political machines of the 1870s and New York’s Radical Republicans in the 1860s (pp. 57–58). His skill at presenting supporting evidence and drawing the reader from the early nineteenth century through the Progressive Era demands for Home Rule is a genuine strength throughout the book.

Following the historical development, Berman renews a call for home rule with analyses of the four dimensions of intergovernmental relations—authority, revenue, takeovers, and restructuring. In Chapters 5 through 8, he isolates the particular conundrums facing local politicians as they attempt to fulfill state and national program mandates with limited, in some cases severely constrained, tax and revenue authority. Among the four dimensions, Berman’s case for local control is strongest in Chapters 5 and 6, which focus on government authority and revenues respectively. The case for local governments pursuing their endeavors and responding to voters reflects a credible normative foundation from Bryce and a straightforward theoretical perspective from Charles Tiebout. Berman details the pattern of state preemption and resource constraints that at a minimum channel local governments’ activities and at a maximum proscribe localities from responding in areas in which they have legitimate interests. He demonstrates how city responses to the “galloping federalism” of the 1960s left them ill-equipped to contend with the “fend-for-yourself” or “shift-and-shaft” federalism of the 1980s and 1990s. The imposition of federal and state mandates have constrained local authority in both policy processes and outcomes, while the traditional status of localities as state corporations has left states without resources with which to fulfill imposed policies, let alone their own endeavors.

Berman’s argument becomes somewhat less convincing in the later chapters regarding state takeovers of failing governments and state-enforced restructuring of governments. To his credit, he concedes that localities can create their own misery through resource mismanagement (p. 127); he nevertheless suggests that states can overshoot appropriate boundaries and create undue political friction. In these chapters, he might have explored some interesting scholarship presenting evidence that states will work with municipalities to avoid bankruptcy or to re-create governments such that county and city leaders are not held accountable for their incompetence (e.g., Mark Baldassare’s When Government Fails, 1998).

The two issues that may vex the book’s claim for home rule are race and class, and these receive scant attention. These issues would complicate Berman’s analysis but not necessarily undermine his argument. By engaging Nancy Burn’s The Formation of American Local Governments (1994), Thomas Sugrue’s The Origins of the Urban Crisis (1996), and Peter Drier, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanson’s Place Matters (2001), Berman would have responded to the factors that have undermined local democracy and led to calls for federal and state intervention in local politics. In fairness, these two issues are huge, and the author may have discerned them to be beyond the book’s scope. He writes that the rights of minorities and the public response to various disadvantaged groups would likely lead to a response from state and national elected and judicial officials. And he argues reasonably that such a reactive response is preferable to an intermingling of
proactive state policy prescriptions without either state-provided resources or local authority with which to finance and administer services (p. 156).

Local Governments and the States presents an impressive array of historical analyses, evidence, and illustrations that Berman uses to develop a thoughtful commentary in support of local control. The straightforward writing and well-integrated evidence make the book accessible to undergraduate students, and it will also be of substantial interest to graduate students and scholars of subnational and intergovernmental politics.


— C. Lawrence Evans, College of William and Mary

In this superb book, Sarah Binder addresses several questions that are central to contemporary scholarship about American national government. What are the policy consequences of divided government? Does partisan polarization within Congress promote or help reduce the incidence of gridlock in the legislative process? Precisely what are the institutional and electoral sources of legislative stalemate? And what are the consequences of gridlock for the electoral fortunes of individual legislators and public approval of Congress and the president? Stalemate is a major step toward answering these questions.

Much of the scholarly controversy about the impact of partisan polarization and control on legislative productivity is rooted in issues of measurement. In his landmark book Divided We Govern (1991), David Mayhew employed a combination of media accounts and the retrospective judgments of policy specialists to compile a list of landmark measures enacted by Congress between 1946 and 1990. Mayhew found that periods of unified government—when both chambers of Congress and the executive branch are controlled by a single party—do not produce significantly higher levels of legislative productivity. In the ensuing years, Mayhew’s surprising result has generated a cottage industry of scholarly work aimed at illuminating how divided and unified government shape the legislative process and policy outcomes in American state and national government.

An important limitation in much of this research, however, has been a reliance on indicators of legislative productivity that do not adequately account for the scope of the underlying policy agenda, which will vary from year to year. During the Nixon-Ford years, for instance, an extended period of divided government, the incidence of major enactments was relatively high. Did this apparent productivity derive from effective compromise and collaboration between the branches, or was the real cause an expansion in the underlying policy agenda during the late 1960s and early 1970s? We cannot adequately gauge legislative productivity without considering the demand for legislation (the size of the agenda), as well as the supply (the number of significant enactments).

Binder confronts this measurement challenge in an innovative and compelling fashion. First, she gauges the underlying agenda on Capitol Hill by coding the policy issues referenced in the daily editorials appearing in the New York Times between 1947 and 2000. These issues are conceptualized as “potential enactments” (p. 37). She then identifies whether or not legislation was passed in each area, and uses the information to calculate an overall gridlock score for each Congress—“the percentage of agenda items that fall short of enactment” (p. 40). Although the Mayhew and Binder indicators are relatively similar for the 1990s, there are major differences in earlier decades. In comparison with Binder’s measure, for instance, Mayhew tends to underestimate legislative productivity during the 1950s and the early 1980s, and overestimate it during several Congresses in the 1960s. Throughout this book, Binder makes a strong case that her measure is superior for capturing the rise and fall of legislative productivity over time.

What factors influence the ability of the federal government to address serious policy problems? In contrast to Mayhew, Binder finds that divided government is strongly associated with higher levels of gridlock. The result holds across all levels of issue salience (gauged by the number of New York Times editorials devoted to a subject), and it resonates well with E. E. Schattschneider’s doctrine of responsible parties. But Binder also finds that stalemate is significantly more likely when the preferences of Republicans and Democrats within Congress are highly polarized—an observation that is contrary to the predictions of the responsible parties doctrine, which holds that clear differences between the parties will promote responsive government. Gridlock, moreover, is particularly likely when major policy differences exist between the House and Senate. In the 103rd Congress (1993–94), for instance, Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress and the executive branch, but the House and Senate featured divergent views on important policy matters and stalemate was relatively frequent. Scholars and reformers, Binder argues, should pay more attention to the bicameral context of lawmaking, along with the presence or absence of divided government.

What are the consequences of legislative stalemate for Congress and its members? In Congress as Public Enemy (1995), John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse argue that members of the public are disenchanted with legislative conflict and, as a result, popular support for the Congress tends to be negatively associated with the level of meaningful legislative activity (which in our system almost inevitably involves conflict). In a highly important chapter, Binder reports that legislative gridlock does not appear to have much of an impact on the electoral fates of incumbents. She does find, however, that the frequency of stalemate is associated with higher rates of retirement by incumbent House members and by reduced public approval for Congress as an institution. In other words, individual legislators apparently do not pay a personal electoral cost for gridlock, reducing incentives for them to embrace the compromise and accommodation...
necessary to enact major legislation. But the public reputation of Congress is damaged somewhat by legislative stalemate, undermining the legitimacy of the legislative branch.

Binder suggests two reforms aimed at reducing gridlock in government. The regular use of joint hearings between the House and Senate, she argues, might promote early compromise between the chambers. She also proposes the use of “facilitated consensus” methods in which an external neutral mediator is called upon to help find common ground between disagreeing parties. A greater reliance on bicameral hearings strikes me as a good idea. But facilitated consensus methods? Given the strong incentives toward intransigence and position taking that often exist on Capitol Hill, it seems unlikely that outside mediators would be able to dampen conflict between the parties and the branches.

The difficulty of devising incremental reforms that would significantly reduce gridlock in Washington should not detract from Binder’s accomplishment. This brief volume is a major addition to the scholarly literature about lawmaking, and thus merits sustained attention from scholars and graduate students. And it is sufficiently important and accessible to become a staple of undergraduate courses about American politics. Stalemate is a remarkable book.


— H. Gibbs Knotts, Western Carolina University

The commonly prescribed remedy for underrepresentation of racial minorities in the United States has been the formation of majority-minority districts. However, race-based districting is not without problems and has come under increasing scrutiny by the courts. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and David Brockington argue that alternative electoral systems, specifically cumulative voting (CV) and limited voting (LV), can result in more minority representation, increased competition, greater campaign activity, and higher voter turnout than majoritarian systems. In Electoral Reform and Minority Representation, the trio has written a groundbreaking volume that serves as a model for empirical political scientists. By using the tools of social science to gather evidence from the real world of politics, the authors address questions fundamental to democratic society. The writing, analysis, and discussion are easily accessible, and the findings should generate considerable debate among academics, public officials, and citizens alike.

The authors chronicle the history of alternative voting systems in the United States, and discuss the emergence of CV and LV voting in response to Voting Rights Act actions brought by minority plaintiffs in the 1980s and 1990s. They identify nearly a hundred towns, cities, counties, and school districts with alternative electoral systems, found mostly in small, rural, southern communities in Texas and Alabama. Much of the book’s empirical evidence relies on comparisons between CV and non-CV jurisdictions, matched on the basis of geographic proximity, racial composition, median income, and population characteristics. This strategy generated a treatment group of communities under alternate electoral systems and a control group of communities with majoritarian electoral systems.

Many of the empirical findings come from elite survey data collected by the authors. Chapter 4 focuses on the attitudes of political candidates, particularly the ways in which white and minority candidates respond to CV elections. The authors present evidence that minority candidates are much more likely to ask voters to “plump” (cast all votes for one candidate), and that minority candidates are more likely to say that groups in the community were working actively to register and mobilize voters on their behalf. Chapter 5 provides evidence that CV elections are more competitive than majoritarian elections, and that groups in CV elections are more likely to register voters than are those in non-CV jurisdictions. The chapter also includes a multivariate analysis of campaign activities demonstrating that controlling for other factors, candidates in CV places have higher levels of personal campaign activities, including speaking publicly, conducting interviews with editors and reporters, and meeting with supporters.

After considering elite attitudes, the authors shift attention to citizen reactions to alternative electoral systems. Unfortunately, the authors do not have survey data from citizens in the rural southern communities that make up such a large part of the analysis. As a result, they present evidence from a 1989 exit poll conducted by Richard Engstrom and Charles Barrilleaux during the first CV school-board election in Sisseton, South Dakota. The authors demonstrate that Native American candidates respond to vote-coordinating strategies and that Native American candidates were more likely to be contacted by a campaign and asked to plump.

The authors also analyze administrative data, including measures of voter turnout, election results, and demographics from the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Department of Education. In several multivariate analyses, they demonstrate that CV elections increase turnout by 4% to 5%. The authors also provide evidence that CV and LV rules result in levels of minority representation greater than plurality at-large elections and similar to single-member simple-plurality elections.

One of the book’s shortcomings resulted from efforts to explore the relationship between minority citizens and minority officeholders. The authors’ use of pooled American National Election Study data on minority representation in Congress seemed misplaced in a study of local elections. In addition, given the importance of case selection in this study, the authors needed to provide more details on the comparability of cases. A table providing detailed demographic comparisons between the CV and non-CV jurisdictions would have been a useful addition. Perhaps the biggest limitation was the relatively short time period covered in this analysis. The authors conclude that CV elections increase turnout, but
they do not give enough consideration to the monumental impact of changing a community’s electoral rules. They concede that “voters could be attracted temporarily by the novelty of a system where they can vote three or five times for a single candidate but over time could grow bored of this new voting scheme and resume their preferred pattern of apathy” (p. 89). Although the authors briefly address this “novelty factor,” most jurisdictions adopted alternative systems in the 1990s, resulting in too little time to evaluate the longer-term impacts (p. 89). Finally, public education efforts that occurred in CV communities surely affected candidate attitudes, citizen responsiveness, and voter turnout.

Nevertheless, the importance of the topic and the skills of these researchers make Electoral Reform and Minority Representation an important contribution to the political science discipline. The book should be of interest to comparative and American politics scholars, and teaching faculty will likely use examples from this book in a range of courses. The book would also be appropriate supplemental reading for graduate and advanced undergraduate students.


— Garry Young, George Washington University

Few topics in the study of American politics attract more attention than divided government. Yet while we have a reasonably good handle on why divided government occurs, our understanding of the effects of divided government remains limited. For example, David Mayhew’s (1991) Divided We Govern and the huge literature it spawned reveal a host of contradictory findings about divided government’s impact on major policy production. Why is this? Perhaps because we usually treat divided governments as empirically indistinguishable when there are very good theoretical reasons to believe that divided governments differ—and that these differences directly affect politics. Reducing divided government to a mere dummy variable fails to account for huge variations in factors like congressional party margins, party cohesion, and party polarization.

In this valuable volume, Richard Conley takes significant strides toward developing a much richer perspective on divided government, particularly as it applies to the behavior and impact of the president. Looking at the post–World War II period, he argues that a president’s legislative effectiveness depends on “presidential leverage in political time” (p. 7). Leverage runs along a strategic continuum from the positive (“coalition-building leverage”) to the negative (“veto leverage”). The way divided (or unified) government interacts with the electoral, institutional, and environmental contexts determines where a president resides on the continuum.

Conley goes on to argue that during the postwar period, these contexts aligned in various ways to create three secular eras: Bipartisan Conservative [1947–64], Liberal Activist [1965–78], and Postreform/Party-Unity [1979–98] (p. 36). Each era was characterized by its different influences on presidential effectiveness, especially under divided government. Factors such as declining presidential coattails, increases in the incumbency effect, increased centralization of power within Congress, generally decreasing deference to the president’s agenda, and, of course, the dramatic rise in the internal cohesion and external polarization of the two parties served to put recent divided-government presidents on the defensive.

So, for example, President Eisenhower effectively asserted positive leverage because he could build cross-partisan coalitions to pass legislation. In contrast, the first President Bush, unable to find enough Democratic votes to support his agenda, resorted to aggressive use of negative leverage: the veto.

Conley sets up his basic theory in the Introduction. Chapter 1 follows with a series of statistical analyses examining the impact of the contextual factors on presidential success in Congress. He combines this analysis with a separate examination of the way the three eras—interacting with divided government—affect success. His results largely conform to his arguments, but scholars familiar with the mammoth literature on presidential success will not find many surprises. His analysis of the president’s contribution to the production of major legislation is more unique. Using Mayhew’s familiar list, Conley identifies the subset of major legislation that originates with the president. He finds that a large proportion of important legislation that was passed during unified governments came from the president’s agenda. Those important laws passed during divided governments are substantially less likely to come from the president’s agenda, and this likelihood declined over time.

The rest of the book features careful and statistically informed case studies of various groups of presidents. A sequence of chapters examines the Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton experiences under divided government. These are followed by two chapters on unified government Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, and Clinton.

A necessarily terse review such as this cannot do justice to what is a nuanced work. Conley deftly combines quantitative analysis with a keen and detailed sense of the strategic challenges different presidents faced. Nonetheless, early in the book he overstates some of his claims about era differences. As just one example, the claim that presidential coattails in opposition party districts “shrank rather considerably during the postwar period” (p. 17) is not supported by the data in Figure I-3.

Conley’s use of three different eras is well grounded in the literature (though its association with Stephen Skowronek’s well-known conception of “political time” is loose). I am uneasy when scholars endow time periods with meaning. At worst, an era is simply a summary of events that happened. This can quickly lead to tautology when we denote some period as “Activist,” for example, and then use an Activist Period variable to predict something like policy production. At best, and certainly the way Conley uses it, the denotation of an era is simply a convenient way to summarize some bundle of
independent factors that happened to coincide. Thus, the Bipartisan Conservative Era is an easy way of describing a particular mix of electoral, partisan, institutional, and environmental factors that existed at a particular time. These underlying factors, and not the eras themselves, cause the variation in the phenomena we care about. In the context of this book, a measure that simply denotes an era necessarily masks important variation within the era, even after we distinguish between divided and unified government. Thus, for example, Conley finds that Truman and Eisenhower had very different divided-government experiences, even though both served during the Bipartisan Conservative Era. On a somewhat related note, I am not sure that the interaction effects between the divided-government variable and the three era variables would hold up if the underlying dummy variables, rather than just the interaction terms, were in the models. Arguably, they should be included.

Finally, it is unfortunate that this book fails to confront Keith Krehbiel’s (1998) *Pivotal Politics.* Krehbiel argues that it is not divided government per se that is important. Rather, the underlying structure of preferences and institutions is key, and this structure may correlate with unified or divided government only weakly, if at all. Despite a very different theoretical approach, Conley’s work shares some basic insights with Krehbiel’s, but it differs dramatically in the way it conceptualizes divided government—and thus party—as crucially important, no matter the era. Conley passes up the opportunity to show why his approach is potentially superior.

These quibbles aside, Conley has written a fine book. *The Presidency, Congress, and Divided Government* should reinvigorate and redirect the literature on Congress and presidents.


— Paul Brace, Rice University

This is a compact volume that attacks very large issues. Most fundamentally, W. Mark Crain wants to understand why the American states experience vastly different rates of economic growth and have vastly different living standards. He goes beyond looking at average annual growth rates and instead adds an evaluation of the variance, or volatility, of state income. His main insight is that states exhibit dramatic differences in volatility and that high-income states are the most volatile.

The attention to volatility in income and revenue is a welcome addition to the literature on comparative economic development in the American states. State policymakers worry about state economic fluctuations, although the degree of their accountability to the electorate is only beginning to be understood. Concern about volatility in revenue is also a strong element of the policy process in the states. Crain thus draws our attention to vital dimensions of subnational political economy and illustrates how state tax structure and fiscal institutions may impinge on state economic growth.

While I applaud Crain’s focus, I was perplexed by the fundamental difference in his findings with those published in a well-known study of cross-national growth rates (Garey Ramey and Valerie A. Ramey, “Cross-Country Evidence on the Link Between Volatility and Growth,” *American Economic Review* 85 [December 1995]: 1138–52). Where that team found a strong negative relationship between volatility and growth, Crain finds exactly the opposite but provides little explanation.

What accounts for this stark contrast in findings? Could it be that the relationship between growth and volatility essentially reverses itself in the subnational setting where economies are open and labor and capital can migrate freely? Unfortunately, no explanation is provided, but an insight here could be vitally important for understanding the economic future of U.S. states as well as the European Union when capital and labor can move freely.

Because state income and state volatility are positively correlated, Crain believes that this tempers the attractiveness of states to potential workers and investors. Consequently, when factor location decisions take volatility into account, a stable state economy may substitute for a hike in income, just as some investors prefer low-risk, low-return portfolios to high-risk alternatives.

I must confess that I have trouble understanding how this works to explain differentials in state economic growth in the manner that Crain imagines. As I read his thesis, volatility reduces the attractiveness of high-income (and volatile) states to workers and investors. If the flow of labor and capital to these states are reduced, as he seems to expect, would virtually any output equation not predict declining growth in those states? If volatility makes some states less attractive to workers and investors, should the more attractive (less volatile) states not benefit in relative if not absolute terms?

Similarly, while Crain believes that volatility accounts for the pattern of income divergence that has emerged in the American states over the last three decades, would the effect of volatility he offers not retard capital and labor migration and benefit the poorer but less volatile states? If so, would this not work to stabilize, or reverse, rather than accelerate differences between rich and poor states?

Is it possible that the volatility that Crain observed is illusory? The author controls for annual levels of inflation by using a national level index. However, he does not control for variations in costs of living among the states. There are meaningful differences in cost of living among states (William Berry, Richard Fording, and Russell Hanson, “An Annual Cost of Living Index for the American States,” *Journal of Politics* 62 [May 2000]: 550–67), and they may exaggerate volatility in high-income states and underestimate it in low-income states. Controlling for interstate difference in the value of money might reveal that poorer states are more volatile than richer states, just as the leading study of cross-national volatility indicated. Future studies may wish to examine the effects of interstate differences in spending power on volatility.

*Volatile States* is valuable because it puts ideas about state political economy on the table that will stimulate future
research. This book draws attention to the multidimensional aspects of economic performance in the American states, and this is most welcome. It should be a welcome addition to the libraries of those interested in state political economy and economic development. Without question, economic performance and its determinants preoccupy many political actors in the states. Elites and their constituents gauge economic performance from many perspectives: national, state, and local, and average growth versus the variance in that growth. If political scientists ever wish to solve the puzzles of state political economy, we must acknowledge the myriad dimensions of economic performance that inform the public and policymakers. W. Mark Crain has added another dimension for our consideration.


— Ken Collier, Stephen F. Austin State University

For the last two decades, political scientists have increasingly focused on the relationship between the president and the public in their explorations of presidential power. At the same time, news media have increasingly portrayed occupants of the White House as consumed with public opinion. Despite this, surprisingly little research has been done specifically on how presidents go about learning about public opinion. While a number of studies have revealed a great deal about how and why presidents talk to the nation, much less has been done on how presidents listen to the public.

Robert Eisinger’s book makes a significant contribution by providing one of the few multidimensional studies of how presidents learn about and make use of public opinion. Eisinger’s central argument is that presidents’ use of polling has grown “from a small and secretive enterprise to a large and secretive institution” (p. 5) in order to provide the White House with autonomy from Congress, political parties, and media. The power to assess public opinion is a central tension between the presidency and its rivals as they battle to claim to interpret the public’s will.

Eisinger wisely goes beyond the simple question of why presidents need to track public opinion. Given the wide variety of media and other polls, the White House could easily rely on secondhand sources and analyses. Instead, Eisinger’s analysis looks at the White House’s shifting mix of internal and external sources of public opinion data that the presidency needs in order to gain greater independence from other political actors. Similarly, the author is careful to detail exactly how polling data flows. This distinction is especially important given the book’s discovery that presidents often keep information from potential allies in Congress, their party organizations, and, in some cases, members of their own White House staff.

One of the challenges in this research requires uncovering evidence of a process that the White House prefers to keep out of sight. It is clear from the evidence in the book, and through the public condemnations of Bill Clinton and other presidents for using public opinion data, that the White House has little desire for others to be aware of their testing of public opinion. This leaves researchers like Eisinger to dive deep into the archives of past administrations and carefully assemble a picture of a process that is often intentionally concealed, even from many on the White House staff.

Eisinger uses the first two chapters to track the early development of presidential polling. In these introductory chapters, he makes the case that the rise of presidential polling was the product of political forces, rather than having been driven by the technical innovations of the random sample. The middle chapters are used to detail the White House’s efforts to gain autonomy from the Congress, political parties, and media. From Eisinger’s perspective, these institutions can be viewed as rivals threatened by the president’s expanding claim to representation of the people. The author strikes a careful balance between developing the specific cases of each president and his broader theme. By organizing these middle chapters around the conflict with each institution, Eisinger is highlighting his theme. However, the insights into individual administrations and presidential styles are also interesting. Throughout the book, readers find out how the White House has struggled in a variety of ways to find the pulse of the public. One of the most interesting is the Hoover administration’s quantification of newspapers’ editorial content in order to gauge public opinion (pp. 107–10). This case not only demonstrates that presidents were eager to gauge public sentiments before polling, but it also illustrates the role that newspapers once held in reflecting the public mood.

The rivalry between Congress and the president as the primary interpreter of public opinion is important as each branch struggles for supremacy in the policy process. While an argument can be made that Eisinger overemphasizes this source of tension between the branches by not discussing it within the context of other sources of conflict, he has clearly identified an important source of friction in the sharing of power.

The final chapter examines the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Although the study of these administrations is limited because their presidential papers are not available for research, the author uses them to show that the thirst for public opinion data continues to grow.

The book addresses several other issues. One is the question of whether presidents use polls and focus groups to lead or to follow public opinion. While this is not the primary focus of the book, Eisinger’s research supports the argument that the White House uses what it learns from polls to market, rather than select, the policies that the president will advocate.

Eisinger concludes that presidential polling has produced mixed results for democracy. On one hand, he argues that polls do provide more reliable indicators of public opinion than reading newspaper editorials and that democracy is best served by use of the most reliable barometer of the public’s sentiments. At the same time, the author cautions that polling misses the deliberative nature of public opinion and that the
quick and superficial responses summarized in polling data may discourage presidents from developing a deeper understanding of the public’s wants and needs.

The Evolution of Presidential Polling provides valuable insights into presidents’ use of public opinion. This book will be of great interest to scholars of the presidency and of public opinion in general.


It is a quarter of a century since Richard F. Fenno published his classic work *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (1978). That book set the standard, and high one it was, for on-site, soaking-and-poking observation of members of Congress as they make their rounds back home, keeping in touch with their constituents. What animates the members? How do they see their constituencies? What are their strategies? What kinds of things do they do? In light of this evidence, what does representation seem to amount to?

In recent years, Fenno has taken to the trails again and produced two new works that are extensions, and in some respects updates, of *Home Style*, although the new works have few new members under scrutiny and Fenno is careful not to make any claims about representative sampling. Any fan of *Home Style* will want to curl up with these new books, too. My undergraduate class raved about the first of them, *Congress at the Grassroots: Representational Change in the South, 1970–1998* (2000).

Now we have *Going Home*, and welcome to it! This work deals exclusively with African American members of Congress—four of them. Two of the four, Louis Stokes of Cleveland and Barbara Jordan of Houston, are repeaters from *Home Style*. The material about them, aside from a brief revisit to Stokes, is taken from Fenno’s research records of the 1970s, although the two members are treated here by name rather than, as previously, anonymously. New to Fenno’s collection are Chaka Fattah of Philadelphia and Stephanie Tubbs Jones of Cleveland, members of the current congressional generation. Tubbs Jones succeeded the veteran Stokes in the same district in 1998, which allows a touch of then-and-now analysis.

Again, the numbers are small, but what is it that emerges as distinctive about these black members and their connections of representation? I would say four things, drawing on Fenno’s analysis. First, all these members have aimed to serve what Fenno calls a fourth constituency—“a national constituency of black citizens who live beyond the borders of any one member’s district, but with whom all black members share a set of race-related concerns” (p. 7). This adds to the concentric threesome of home constituencies that all House members need to worry about—their full geographic districts, their November election coalitions, and their primary election supporters (a typology rendered familiar by Fenno in *Home Style*). Second, all four members have accented their symbolic representation of African Americans. In appearances back home and elsewhere, there is a recurrent theme of standing for, exemplifying, setting standards for, and blazing trails for (p. 34). This is a role unavailable to white politicians otherwise serving blacks (p. 260). Third, in policy endeavors and otherwise, all four members have emphasized education. This propensity stuck out for Fenno and surprised him: “Cumulatively, they spent more time talking about education than about any other single subject. . . . They harped on it continually as the necessary foundation of African American strength” (p. 258). Fourth, all four members have enjoyed edgy, or at least wary in the case of Tubbs Jones, relations with their local Democratic party organizations. All those organizations had been run by whites who did these black politicians few favors early in their careers.

Yes, there is some evidence of change across the three decades. The familiar scenario of “from protest to politics” is to some degree borne out. Today’s House members Fattah and Tubbs Jones appeal to many whites as well as blacks, they build citywide coalitions for various purposes, and they enjoy relatively easy relations with their cities’ media. The mayors possibly aside, they are the leading politicians in their cities. Those options and standings were less available to urban black members in the early 1970s.

But that is just about it for distinctiveness, which at any rate seems to be declining. Then and now, these black members seem an awful lot like House members, period. In Fenno’s accounts, I was continually impressed by the initiative, aggressiveness, energy, craftiness, and political finesse exhibited day after day by these black politicians. That is the story of House members in general, to which Fenno here adds richly. Congressional politics is a Darwinian universe. You need to get there and stay there by yourself. You need to be better at it than anyone else (although you also need luck). A part exception in Fenno’s foursome is the somewhat reticent Louis Stokes, who rose in politics largely courtesy of his brother, the mayor of Cleveland, Carl Stokes. But Barbara Jordan, Chaka Fattah, and Stephanie Tubbs Jones have been forces of nature from their early days.

Also rubbing against distinctiveness is the diversity among these four black politicians in what Fenno discusses as their personal goals (p. 256). The entire House membership is probably not more diverse in this respect. Fenno characterizes Stokes as “group-interest intensive.” His finest hour came as a feisty founder of the Congressional Black Caucus. Tubbs Jones is “person intensive.” She specializes in personal contacts and in generating civic participation back in Cleveland. Fattah is “policy intensive.” So far, his finest hour has come as author of the Gear Up program in 1998, an effort to attract low-income high school students into college by offering suitable incentives early on. To get this plan enacted, he needed to devise a credible incentive scheme, engage the Clinton White House, win over a few Republicans on the House Education Committee, and strike a deal with Senator James Jeffords. All that was done. Fenno classifies Jordan as “influence intensive.” We remember her for her rhetoric at the
Nixon impeachment hearings and as keynoter at the Democratic convention in 1976. But she came into Congress before that as the ultimate inside operator and power builder, a role she had rehearsed in the Texas state senate.

To study representation, Fenno shows in these accounts once again and argues here explicitly (pp. 5, 252, 263), should be to study more than matches between roll-call votes and constituency opinion. Other techniques are useful, too. He closes with these words: "The test will come if, as, and when more political scientists find themselves 'going home,' too" (p. 264).


— Robert H. Salisbury, Washington University

In 1950 the American Political Science Association published a special report, produced by a Committee on Political Parties chaired by E. E. Schattschneider, entitled “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.” The report put forward a wide variety of recommendations designed to strengthen the institutional structures of the two major parties, centralizing authority in their national components and enhancing their capacity to develop coherent programs and, after election, to enact them into policy. More “efficient” parties would offer the electorate clearer and more meaningful choices and could be held accountable for their actions in office. Thus, they would be more “responsible,” and being more responsible, they would more adequately meet the standards of democratic government. The present volume consists of 11 essays by notable contemporary students of American politics that examine the ways in which developments of the past half century have altered the parties and affected the factors the original report believed were critical to “responsibility.”

After an introductory statement of the volume’s purpose and design, John White and Jerome Mileur place the committee’s report in its historical context, summarizing the decades of effort to reform the parties that led up to the report and going on to outline such major postreport reforms as the McGovern-Fraser changes that followed the 1968 Democratic Convention debacle. John Green and Paul Herrnson follow with a very useful review of the principal changes in party organization and practice, making it clear that party reform was characteristic of much of the twentieth century. Many of the changes, they believe, were consistent with the committee’s recommendations, but others either failed to take hold or had consequences that moved away from the report’s prescriptions. A rather similar conclusion is reached in the useful essay by Sandy Maisel and John Bibby, which describes developments in the formal rules and legal context of party practice. They suggest that these developments have enabled the national parties to develop a stronger organizational presence, but they have also encouraged the rise of candidate-centered elections in which the parties’ role is reduced in its impact.

In an excellent summary of changes in the financing of parties and elections, Frank Sorauf describes the extraordinary growth in the national party structures’ ability to raise and allocate money, but he notes that their emphasis on electoral success has cut into any tendency to use their financial leverage to increase intraparty policy coherence. The national party committees serve primarily as service agencies for individual candidates, who, moreover, raise much of their money themselves and, in addition, build their own structures of campaign services by engaging consultants and technical experts of various kinds. David Magleby, Kelly Patterson, and James Thurber present data on campaign consultants showing that their ties are primarily to the candidates, not the parties. The direct primary has come to be the main method of nomination, as, ironically, the committee hoped, but this has helped make campaigns increasingly candidate-centered, rather than the coordinated processes of candidate recruitment and campaign appeal called for in the responsible parties model.

In the past half century, Congress has moved a considerable distance in the direction of partisan government, adapting many of its rules and practices so as to strengthen the party leadership, especially in the House, and with the massive changes in the respective party constituencies—Republican growth in the South, Democratic dominance of the Northeast—there is relatively little ideological disunity to interfere with partisan government. Barbara Sinclair effectively describes the ways in which the changes in party composition and in the legislative process have interacted to generate intensely partisan behavior and, arguably, a politics of rancor and divisiveness that may be the underside of responsible partisanship. Charles Jones considers the position of the president in the responsible party model and, noting that the committee gave relatively little attention to the party leadership role of the chief executive, suggests that given the separation of powers, it is more appropriate to think of the American system as a government of parties with multiple structures, many of them partisan but neither cohesive nor centrally controlled, operating to shape the conduct of electoral campaigns and the formulation of policy proposals.

In its report the committee, writing just prior to the development of survey research, largely ignored the electorate. Essays by Herbert Weisberg and by Gerald Pomper and Marc Weiner consider the trends in voter behavior over the last several decades, pointing out the growth in ideological polarization but noting also the presence of a large uncommitted segment and, in the Weisberg essay, the tension between sharp partisan differences and a Downsian quest for the median voter. Leon Epstein concludes the volume with a nicely framed critique of the whole concept of responsible parties in the context of American constitutional and cultural realities. He points out that the committee worked from a normative model derived from British practice, and that despite the considerable extent to which committee recommendations have
in fact been adopted, American party politics does not operate like the quasi-parliamentary system the committee seemed to want. More than that, as several of the essayists note, the committee had an implicit policy agenda. They reflected a deep frustration at the inability of strong and popular presidents, especially FDR, to secure programmatic support in Congress and the courts, and a distaste for such distributive policies as tariffs and pork-barrel spending, produced by bargaining among decentralized constituency agents uncoordinated by party discipline. As David Mayhew and others have shown, cross-party coalitions can sometimes achieve impressive policy results, and the Gingrich Congress of 1995–96 demonstrated that a showdown between strong parties may generate deadlock, rather than “responsible” government.

The committee’s report was controversial when it was issued, widely regarded as flawed in its analysis and naive in its aspirations. Responsible Partisanship? underscores how many features of the party system have changed over the past half century, but it also demonstrates, if only between the lines, how much more comprehensive our knowledge of the system is today and how much more sophisticated the theoretical foundations of our analyses have become. These essays remind us that political reform is never a simple matter and should be undertaken with due caution, lest we get what we wish for.


— Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University

Fans of green politics and those interested in public opinion and the rational behavior of consumers should read this book. It accomplishes what another recent work, Eric R. A. N. Smith’s (2002) Energy, the Environment, and Public Opinion has also deftly done: It provides not only an important analysis of its subject, but it is also an excellent work on public opinion more broadly. Deborah Lynn Guber focuses on the nature of, and influences on, public opinion toward the environment, covering broad aspects of this topic in a number of novel chapters.

Although V. O. Key never tackled environmental issues, his insights about consensus are central to this book. Key saw consensus as a nice theoretical notion that is illusive, given the actual nature of public opinion. For public opinion on specific issues, the devil is in the details: An apparent consensus to deal with a problem by moving in a particular direction turns into ambivalence and far less than certainty when the public confronts what specific remedies to support. While not noted by Guber, this phenomenon is apparent for other major issues, such as racial inequality, health-care reform, anti-poverty assistance, Social Security, national defense, and activism in foreign affairs (on “ambivalence” generally, see John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, 1992). Guber shows this persuasively for the environment:

What looks like a consensus on the surface—with the environment looking like a mom and apple pie “valence” issue—conceals fundamental ideological disagreements that require deeper digging to observe and understand. That environmental policy is more divisive than it appears makes it susceptible to a particular type of politics and leadership.

Aside from some minor methodological and related problems, the book’s chapters overall are nicely developed and written. The first two chapters present the data confirming that the public overwhelmingly sees the environment as a serious problem requiring some kind of concerted action. But what kind of action? Some data show that at best, a plurality of the public prefers government regulations, whereas, when other response options are offered, sizable percentages prefer market or other incentives as remedies or report that they “don’t know.” The strength or intensity of these environmentalist attitudes declines as contingencies, constraints, costs, and trade-offs, such as taxes or economic consequences, are attached to particular choices, or if we expect to find a commitment to action, not just a consensus based on words. Indeed, the public’s low level of knowledge about the relevant details of environmental problems, solutions, and their consequences makes the public’s uncertainty quite understandable. While there is a consensus on broad goals—though the level of consensus may be overestimated somewhat due to the effects of question wording and the different ways of measuring the relative importance of an issue—there is also an underlying ambivalence on how to reach these goals.

The third chapter is short but its multivariate analysis of what influences public support for government action, as measured by support for increased spending, has a big payoff: Support has increased due to the entry of a new generation that has been more concerned about the environment than its predecessors, and due to the increase in media coverage of environmental problems. Support has fallen off during periods of declining economic conditions and, in “thermostat” fashion, after government spending on natural resources and the environment has increased. Here the author missed the opportunity, through additional analyses involving Granger causality tests, to strengthen her causal inferences and, most important, to examine the crucial “so what” question: To what extent has public opinion influenced government spending? The influences on opinion that are found show the public’s collective intelligence and also, of political importance, what factors work for and against environmental activism at the national level.

Chapter 4 explores further the influences on individuals, expanding the multivariate analysis to include environmentally related economic behavior and activism (though the reliabilities of the scales examined are not reported, and no attention is paid to the variables’ causal orderings, which bear on the causal processes at work). The main finding is the overall lack of variation in attitudes and behavior, providing little evidence for an environmental “elitism” among the young and those with more education and income, and confirming how the issue has penetrated the national
Consciousness widely. There are ideological and partisan cleavages that remain in policy preferences, and while younger cohorts have more pro-environment opinions, this is not reflected in their behavior, such as recycling, cutting back on driving, or avoiding produce grown with pesticides.

Chapter 5 finds striking unidimensional ideological consistency in the public’s environmental attitudes (the consistency is clear in the correlations and does not seem to require the further statistical tweaking that is done). Guber first describes this in a way that emphasizes the public’s sophistication, but she then backs off on the dimensionality quandary and questions the importance of this for environmental activism. The next chapter then shows that environmental opinions have had no significant consequences for voting in presidential elections. It will be of no surprise to students of voting that any possible effects these opinions might have had on presidential voting in 1996 and 2000 (for the environment either as a “hard” issue or an “easy” one that candidates can dance around) are swamped by other well-established influences—no doubt, even if alternate decisions were made to improve the models estimated and the measures that were used.

Chapter 7 makes up for the earlier missed chance to examine the opinion-policy connection by presenting new and original data that show how concern for the environment is reflected in the increasing number of environmental ballot propositions at the state level. While environmental propositions pass at about the same rate as others, there are differences by type of environmental issue. Case studies suggest that the nature of the campaigns fought by those on both sides and the ways in which they framed their arguments had effects beyond the characteristics of the issues themselves, although Guber does not consider how the nature of the issues may affect the arguments that can be made and whether they might evoke the public’s ambivalence and thereby thwart a ballot’s passage (e.g., the difference between the threat posed by toxic waste versus bottles that are not recycled).

Chapter 8 offers a highly original and intriguing analysis showing that in the case of the environment, the economic marketplace seems to defy economic rationality and resembles the political marketplace. Although Guber should have addressed how well survey responses reflect actual behavior here, the data show that economic self-interest (income) is not related to self-reports of buying green products. Environmental advertising appears to matter, and ideology does as well—though less so than for reported political behavior but more than might be expected—and there is even some correlation with efficacy (my emphasis on particular variables here differs somewhat from Guber’s discussion).

The concluding chapter of The Grassroots of a Green Revolution draws on the marketplace findings in making recommendations on how to marshal public support for environmental issues. Politically, the public’s false consensus that Guber emphasizes gives leaders considerable latitude to engage in symbolic “cheap talk” or to develop policies with or without engaging the public, and to use political campaigns to pursue their goals through leadership—or manipulation. How public opinion affects national- and state-level environmental policymaking and how political rhetoric and issue framing by leaders affect public opinion are important subjects for future research.


If I were building a course on the politics of education around a single book, this would be the one. The authors base their examination of education policy and politics on a central feature of the nation’s political tradition—the ideology of the American dream. As the book shows, the impact of this ideology runs broad and deep, and education is central to how the nation understands and puts into practice the American dream. Although the book is relatively short, its organizing theme is made concrete and informed by rich detail.

The dream has two parts. One venerates individual freedom and assumes that opportunity is open and widely available. The other part pays dues to good citizenship: “to respect those whose vision of success is different from my own, to help make sure that everyone has an equal chance to succeed, to participate in the democratic process, and to teach my children to be proud of this country” (p. 1). The politics of education revolves around the tension between these two parts, and that tension runs through a full canvass of major issues—desegregation, school finance, standards and accountability, the mainstreaming of special education students, vouchers and charter schools, systemic school reform, group identity and its place in the curriculum, creationism, and ability grouping. All and more are covered, not in a point–counterpoint way, but by testing the fine points of each against the criterion of a vital American democracy.

Behavior falls short of the democratic ideal. A recurring pattern is that, as abstract principle, majority opinion supports claims under the banner of responsible citizenship, but in actual practice, noble sentiment often gives way to the desires of parents to see that in a competitive world, their offspring enjoy maximum individual advantage. In a showdown between equality of opportunity (as an element of citizenship duty) and liberty (specifically the liberty of parents to promote the chances of success for their children), equality of opportunity usually has the weaker hand. Citizenship duty in the form of pride in country, by contrast, holds its own with liberty. However, Jennifer Hochschild and Nathan Scovronick believe that neither ideological claim nor the pull of parent protectiveness is predestined to carry the day on all matters. Within bounds, political leaders make choices and shape public sentiment. They do so perhaps more by framing the agenda than by the treatment of particular points of
controversy. The authors make the point that in the face of a changing demography, polarizing identity issues of the early 1990s gave way to more inclusive concerns about class size, teacher quality, and test scores.

The authors find that despite various crosscurrents, the nation has made significant gains over the past half century. The strongest are probably opportunities for children with disabilities. In addition, dropouts are generally lower (but not for Hispanics) and test scores have mostly gone up, with the greatest increases by black students. Systemic reform spurred by state-set standards has registered some significant successes, and schools are more sensitive to the varied backgrounds of students than in the past. Yet there are significant disappointments, many based in what Hochschild and Scovronick term “nested inequalities.” In a trend particularly unhelpful to democratic vitality, class separation is growing.

Overall, complacency about the future is not in order. Gains have come in an era of prosperity, and for that reason, the authors steer away from unguarded optimism about the future. In the past several decades, spending on education has gone up dramatically (much of it attributable to spending on special education). But the new demography gives cause for concern, particularly at a time when antitax rhetoric is at full stream. Hochschild and Scovronick trace projected changes involving both the graying of the baby boomer generation and the increasing share of the school-age population composed of immigrants and children of color. Current research suggests that people in retirement incline toward less school spending, especially when they are of a different ethnic group from the student population. As health and retirement income compete with spending on schoolchildren, the authors question whether political leaders “will inflame these divisions or ameliorate them” (p. 195). Hochschild and Scovronick caution that in the past, claims of those labeled as minorities and the poor have fared badly.

In the treatment of sundry topics, The American Dream and the Public Schools is laden with telling facts, organized around central themes. For example, the authors cite a study showing that “while children from families with more than $100,000 annual income account for just thirteen percent of the test-taking population, they make up 27 percent of those who receive special accommodation when taking the SAT” (p. 140). Despite rhetoric about equality of opportunity, inequality has many ways of asserting itself.

If the book by Hochschild and Scovronick has a weakness, it lies in the enormous hope they place with the schools for overcoming the consequences of “nested inequalities.” By contrast, in Tinkering toward Utopia, David Tyack and Larry Cuban open by telling readers that education has often carried an unrealistic burden and that “the utopian tradition of social reform through schooling has often diverted attention from more costly, politically controversial, and difficult societal reforms” (1995, p. 3). In looking to education to undergird the vitality of American democracy, Hochschild and Scovronick emphasize the fact that public schools have been at the heart of the nation’s social policy, including its effort to integrate an ongoing flow of immigrants into society. Still, looking back, one has to wonder, for example, what the consequences would have been if the leading push to end racial discrimination had been employment rather than education. Was education the best lever for social change? And, for today, what should be the balance between seeking improved wages for those at the lower end of the income ladder versus school reform under the slogan “no child left behind”? Hochschild and Scovronick make a powerful case for keeping public schools at the center of social policy. It would be interesting to see what an equally careful and incisive analysis of employment and wage policy would yield.


— Michael D. Cobb, North Carolina State University

David Jackson observes that politics and entertainment media are becoming increasingly intertwined. Therefore, he asks, should we not anticipate that young Americans’ political beliefs are increasingly shaped by what they see and hear through the entertainment media? From this seemingly straightforward reasoning, Jackson proceeds to argue that pop culture has been inappropriately omitted from studies of young-adult political socialization. According to the author (p. 2), theories of political socialization need to include the entertainment media “if for no other reason than the fact that young people are targeted by the entertainment media and spend astronomical amounts of their time engaged with it.” He concludes that the rather modest statistical results of his study nevertheless point to an important role for the entertainment media. According to Jackson (p. 121), “the information presented in the preceding chapters clearly demonstrates that the entertainment media do influence young people in some circumstances. The entertainment media may not be the most important agents, but they do matter.”

This study is more imaginative than most research on political socialization. Relying on original survey data, it uniquely measures young adults’ exposure to specific kinds of entertainment media, including music, television, and movies, and analyzes the relationship between exposure and their political beliefs, opinions, and values. After a few introductory chapters, the remaining ones examine the political influence of each particular kind of media, followed by three types of music: rap, rock, and country. Most interesting is Jackson’s data about the persuasiveness of pop musicians. Although these data were not intended to directly advance the literature on questions about which elites can persuade, the author finds that young adults are persuaded to take positions that match those of opinions attributed to certain pop musicians.
Nevertheless, Jackson’s conclusion that the entertainment media have some secondary socializing role is less than remarkable and also problematic. To start, insufficient theorizing prevents the book from reaching its promise; Jackson does not develop a comprehensive model of the kinds of political attitudes the entertainment media are likely to influence. Nor does he satisfactorily explain why we should suddenly suspect that the entertainment media influences not just young adults’ social preferences but also their political beliefs. He briefly notes that politicians are more likely to appear on late-night television, but oddly, the more obvious political repercussions on viewers’ political values are not sufficiently measured. Disinterest in politics, for example, which is supposedly rampant among American youth, is not even included in the survey. As a result, the beliefs measured in this study are not unmistakably political or necessarily of great consequence. Even the magnitudes of the discovered entertainment media effects are quite limited. Explicitly measuring political participation and efficacy and then examining their relationship to entertainment media habits would have made a more significant contribution. In general, outwardly obvious factors or relationships were ignored. For example, it was surprising to read a book about how entertainment media shape political views when obvious examples of entertainment media that spoof politics are overlooked, such as The Daily Show on Comedy Central and “Weekend Update” on Saturday Night Live.

To be sure, Jackson argues that he examines political values because he promotes an expansive view of politics. His definition of political values is based on the relevance of the “culture wars” to political ideology. In fact, he contributes to a lively debate about what political ideology means to younger Americans by arguing that young adults’ understanding of political ideology is nearly synonymous with their awareness of cultural lifestyle-value conflicts. Young adults do not appreciate traditional distinctions between liberals and conservatives about the roles of government. Instead, they consider political ideology to reflect how one lines up on the growing number of lifestyle issues, such as religion, abortion, promiscuity, marriage, violence, and others. Jackson, for example, reports that Madonna is perceived to be more liberal than Eddie Vedder, the lead singer for the band Pearl Jam, even though Vedder is more active in traditional politics. The actual mechanism of choice is still a bit fuzzy, but reasons for using frames and the consequences to political discourse have influenced both the research agenda in political communication and the behavior of the press itself. One of the central elements in her analysis is media “framing” of political coverage. The Press Effect (coauthored with Paul Waldman) is the best work yet on this topic. This is because Jamieson has been able to refine her argument about why reporters adopt frames and the consequence of those frames.

In the end, however, the research is significantly limited by its data and analysis. All but a few empirical tests are restricted to examining the correlations between political and cultural values and specific entertainment mediums, such as Hollywood movies in general or particular television shows, like Seinfeld. More troubling, evidence that the entertainment media affect young adults’ political attitudes is quite literal; any statistically significant effect will suffice because Jackson does not anticipate too many specific types of relationships. Empirical investigations subsequently degenerate into fish-finding expeditions. Likewise, he does not consistently examine the same variables within each entertainment medium and does not provide a theoretical justification. To make matters worse, findings often defy intuition, leaving the impression that statistical significance transcends the value of explaining the origins of these relationships. Readers will further be disappointed to find that the author’s speculations are examined solely with data acquired from two cross sections of college students in one region of the country. If additional data for the research could not be acquired, at least Jackson should have explained this to be the case. Thus, the specific evidence that he marshals is unlikely to persuade readers of the validity or importance of his thesis.

Perhaps Entertainment and Politics should be viewed as laying a foundation for future scholars to build upon. In particular, future research would hopefully answer the following questions that Jackson’s book raises but does not answer: Have the entertainment media always influenced political values or is this truly a more recent phenomenon? If the influence is more recent, is this because politicians are more likely to embrace alternative media outlets and make personal appearances on late-night television shows, or is it because of the media’s increasing promotion of political values?


— Kathleen Knight, Barnard College, Columbia University

Kathleen Hall Jamieson has been analyzing the media and political rhetoric for more than two decades. It does not go too far to say that her critical observations about political advertising and campaign coverage have influenced both the research agenda in political communication and the behavior of the press itself. One of the central elements in her analysis is media “framing” of political coverage. The Press Effect (coauthored with Paul Waldman) is the best work yet on this topic. This is because Jamieson has been able to refine her argument about why reporters adopt frames and the consequence of those frames.

Jamieson and Waldman argue that reporters view the world through lenses, “the shifting perspectives that color what reporters see of the world at a given moment” (p. xii) and use the metaphor of frames to describe “the news coverage that results from those views” (p. xiii). They assert, “By choosing a common frame to describe an event, condition or political personage, journalists shape public opinion” (p. xiii). The actual mechanism of choice is still a bit fuzzy, but reasons for using frames and the consequences to political discourse of adopting them are illustrated in a lively fashion.

For the authors, frames come about because of the natural need to provide coherence to a story. The choice of the frame will determine what kinds of questions the reporter needs to answer to complete the narrative, and what things need not be bothered about. This can occur simply because the main
The central story is so important, an incidental falsehood is not worth attention—as in their example of the unidentified young woman who “testified” that she had seen Kuwaiti babies tossed from incubators by Iraqi soldiers at the outset of Gulf War I. Knowledge that it was the Kuwaiti ambassador's daughter (a member of the royal al-Sabah family) dispossessed by the Iraqi invasion) who made the claim might have undermined its credibility. Instead, the story was successfully shopped to Amnesty International, who retracted it soon after the war. It was also adopted and embellished upon repeatedly by President George H. W. Bush to reframe the issue as a moral one and defuse opposition coalescing around the “no war for oil” position. The adoption of human rights as the operative frame solidified support for the war in Congress and further diminished the need for reporters to exercise their primary function as custodians of the facts. Other atrocities occurred in Kuwait, but this central metaphor was a lie that could have been easily discovered at the time.

The idea that a consensus frame emerges as parts of the story are selected and repeated in the media is central to Jamieson's theory of the dynamics of media influence. Factual inaccuracies that remain uncorrected become part of the historical memory of reporters and stand some chance of further repetition when news stories are researched at a later date, particularly when they have been distilled as metaphors that can be communicated in sound bites. Consensus frames emerge because old information must be capsulized as “the news” rolls on. The fact that the consensus frame is a product of give-and-take between political actors and reporters provides the space for rhetorical competition. Jamieson's previous works, notably Dirty Politics (1992) and numerous books and articles authored with colleagues, have illustrated this process vividly.

The central story of The Press Effect is how Republicans won the rhetorical wars during the 2000 general election and its aftermath. For example, in the 2000 general election, the frame that developed was, in the shorthand of late-night comedy, Dumbo versus Pinocchio. The central question in the evaluation of George W. Bush was whether he was smart enough to be president. This meant that Bush's misstatements of the truth were ignored, but that his lack of knowledge and malapropisms were highlighted. Al Gore was expected to be knowledgeable. The media's long-standing description of him as “wooden” fused with accusations that he embellished the truth to produce the Pinocchio analogy. Jamieson and Waldman suggest that the stereotypes appealed to the amateur psychologist in reporters by promising to reveal something of value in understanding the candidates' characters. They find that both characterizations “stuck.” Across time, survey respondents were more likely to say that the term “honest” fit Bush, but not Gore, and “knowledgeable” fit Gore, but not Bush. They argue that in this case, however, the implication that Bush was “dumb” was perceived as one that could be remedied by a good staff, while the implication that Gore was a chronic liar was perceived as irredeemable: “Once the untrustworthy lens was locked in, any move on Gore’s part could be interpreted as a cynical attempt to hide his true self” (p. 42).

It is not possible to do justice to Jamieson and Waldman's meticulous account of the meltdown of the media “soothsayers” on election night, or to their detailed coverage of the 36 days afterward. Bolstered by a rich collection of empirical data on media coverage and the public response, they argue that the “rhetorical dexterity” of the Bush campaign “created a climate on the Sunday morning talk shows more hospitable to the Republican case . . . , elicited polling questions biased to the assumption of a Bush win, and may have helped overcome the ideological reservations of the five conservatives on the Supreme Court who ended the count” (p. 129). In subsequent chapters, they show how consensus media frames switched dramatically in the aftermath of 9/11. George W. Bush developed gravitas; throwing out the first ball in the third game of the World Series demonstrated courage (in the face of strategic leaks concerning terror threats), rather than frivolity. The operant frame of the media's reanalysis of the Florida vote changed from “who really won” to “the system worked.”

Jamieson and Waldman conclude by listing a series of principles that will help redirect journalism toward what they view as its central task—custodian of the facts. Media coverage of events since the book was completed, such as the “D. C. Sniper” episode and “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” serve to underscore the importance of a return to these principles. A principled press will help public discourse, but it will not end the war of words, because as E. E. Shattschneider proposed in Semi-Sovereign People, “the definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power; the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is involved in the definition. He who determines what politics is about runs the country” (1960, p. 68).


— Philip Abbott, Wayne State University

James A. Morone has single-handedly revived what appeared to be a defunct genre in American studies. Books with broad themes covering the entire history of America from the Puritans to the present seemed to have been replaced by efforts more theoretically compressed and edgier, especially in terms of interpretations of the question of American exceptionalism. Compare, for example, Catherine A. Holland's The Body Politic (2001) or Anne Norton's The Republic of Signs (1993) to this book or Morone's earlier Democratic Promise (1998) and one can see immediately that the latter have more in common with Vernon Parrington's Main Currents in American Thought (1927, 1930), Charles Beard's The Rise of American Civilization (1927), V. F. Calverton's The Awakening of America (1939), and Daniel J. Boorstin's The Americans (1958, 1965, 1973). Parrington, Beard, Calverton, and Boorstin—and now Morone—offer the reader accessible, spritely written narratives with a measured pace that permits fascinating stopovers to ruminate on particular personalities and events in American history.
Parrington’s sketch of Fisher Ames as a representative of a “testy little world that clung to its small clothes and tie-wig” (1927, 271) and Beard’s reinterpretation of the Civil War as a delayed revolution are just two of many examples. This genre has never been, however, an atheoretical one, for each of these writers offers his histories in the context of a broad theme usually presented in a dichotomous format. Parrington portrayed both American history and letters as conflicts between two liberalisms, one derived from the French and the other from the English. Beard saw America as battleground between big and small capital; Calverton between Puritan and Dissenter sensibilities, themselves carryovers from the Normans and the Lollard resistance; Boorstin between community and novelty. Morone’s Hellfire Nation exhibits all the virtues of this genre of thematic history and, of course, its limitations.

Reviews rarely note an author’s preface, but Morone’s neatly conveys its purpose. He begins by describing that “the book came to me while I was in an upscale supermarket picking out salad greens.” A man in the store suffered from a loud spasmodic cough. Although the sufferer was aged, an African American, and clearly a workingman, probably a plasterer, a woman came up to him, waved a finger in his face, and said, “I hope you don’t smoke!” The man assured the accuser that he did not, but his reply did not dissuade her from giving him a long lecture on the evils of tobacco. Morone expected that the other shoppers would be as horrified as he was by her rudeness, but one after another came up to her with congratulations. He then “began to wonder about the righteous streak that ran through these polite, well-dressed liberals” (p. ix). Morone decided to present a narrative that places moral fervor at the center of American politics. Although America is certainly a commercial republic in which the pursuit of self-interest is readily acknowledged, it is also the role of “the redeemer nation,” first posited by the Puritans, that “drives American politics” (p. 10). These moral crusades—to abolish slavery, restrict immigration, protect “womanhood,” prohibit liquor—reflect two “vital urges: “redeeming ‘us’ and reforming ‘them’” (p. 3). Morone reviews these movements in America and presents some very fine descriptions of this redeemer politics. Particularly well done are the discussions of the cultural and political antecedents to the Mann Act and the Eighteenth Amendment.

Why are Americans so prone to not only moralize issues but also regard moral disputes as threats to national identity? What are the consequences of these repeated “moral outbursts”? Morone offers several intriguing, though undeveloped, answers. Since American identity is not, at least overtly, based upon religion or ethnicity, every demand for inclusion by new groups challenges settled answers to questions such as, Who are we? How did we get here? How did we succeed? and “What will these people do to the virtues that got us here?” (p. 494). Sometimes Morone suggests that it is the fluidity of a market society itself, not only in terms of shifting economic patterns but cultural ones as well, that produces this kind of politics. As a consequence, in a “vibrant, changing nation . . . entire groups wrench themselves out of one moral frame and into another.” One day they are a dangerous threat and the next they are “good people who got a raw deal, pushed down by bigotry or bad luck or big business” (p. 13). As a result, however, political development in America proceeds as much from economic change as from these efforts to “improve” people. State building in America, for Morone, is formed by the residue of past moral crusades. His analysis of prohibition is a convincing example for this argument. Prohibition “pushed federal power into the nooks and crannies of American crime-fighting,” including “federal plea-bargaining, a boom in prison construction, voluminous legal precedents guiding searches, seizures, wiretaps, judicial process, and more” (p. 343). Moreover, prohibition “may have helped fertilize the political culture for the New Deal.”

Like the thematic historians noted here, Morone presents a dichotomy to anchor his analysis. Moral politics in America consists of two distinct ethical outlooks. One derives from the Puritans and focuses upon individual responsibility, conceiving of policy problems in terms of “protecting us and controlling them” (p. 17). The other, the “social gospel,” completely reverses the Puritan perspective by reconceiving moral issues as collective problems. While the Puritan ethos tackles substance abuse by demanding personal pledges, sin taxes, ostracism, and even prohibition, the social gospel perspective seeks health insurance and living wages. To Morone, these “two great moral paradigms develop and duel across American history” (p. 497). The Puritan ethos was replaced by five decades of the social gospel, “cresting in the 1960s,” but returned in the 1980s, and now Morone hopes that the stage is set for a “new Social Gospel era committed to social justice” (p. 497).

The problem with this dichotomy is that it is very difficult to distinguish the two moral paradigms in most periods. Morone admits that the abolitionists provided “a picture of slaveholders that still stands as the classic construction of an immoral other” (p. 145). Progressives, who are surprisingly absent from Morone’s narrative despite his adoption of the social gospel as the designation of one moral model, gave us business and consumer regulation but also promoted eugenics, food fads, and prohibition. Sixties activists receive a very kind reception from Morone, who sees in their agenda a “dazzling awakening” of the social gospel that “buried deep taboos on . . . almost everything” (p. 443). But who could be more insufferable in terms of its moral certainty of its own villains than this protest generation? Is it even possible, too, that New Deal ethics, represented by Morone as the acme of the social gospel paradigm, were sui generis in the history of American political reform?

Perhaps this dichotomization is itself one of the reasons for the decline of thematic history in American studies, for all Morone’s forerunners were avid modernists who hoped to lay bare the irrationalities in American culture that could be overcome with exposure. He, too, hopes that Americans will shed their dependence upon Puritan mores and finally bury “that cranky, narrow, prohibitionist mindset” (p. 344). Yet that
The future of Medicare is one of the major political issues of our time. In the 2000 presidential election campaign, Al Gore and George W. Bush offered sharply contrasting proposals for providing prescription drug benefits to Medicare recipients. Liberal and conservative politicians not only battle over the generosity of Medicare’s benefit package but also clash over how to maintain this vital yet expensive program for the baby boomers. Clearly, no one can claim to understand contemporary American politics and policymaking without understanding the Medicare program. Few scholars are more knowledgeable about Medicare politics than health policy expert Jonathan Oberlander. Combining rich, detailed narrative with acute political analysis, Oberlander offers an illuminating guide to Medicare’s evolution since the program’s creation in 1965. This book immediately takes its place as the best short monograph on Medicare’s political development, current status, and future prospects.

By design, *The Political Life of Medicare* lacks a unified theoretical framework for explaining Medicare’s unfolding trajectory. Oberlander asserts that Medicare politics is so complex that it defies “artificial simplification” (p. 11). Most of the book is devoted to a crisp descriptive analysis of the intricacies of Medicare financing, regulation, and administration. The author’s detailed substantive claims about how Medicare works are highly informative and reliable. Yet he does not shy away from heated theoretical debates. In tracing the course of Medicare’s historical development, he questions a number of leading political science hypotheses, raising doubts, for example, about the alleged influence on Medicare policymaking of interest-group power and path dependence. His theoretical arguments are not unimpeachable, but he successfully demonstrates the need for much better empirical explanations in policy-oriented political science research.

Oberlander’s central historical thesis is that from 1966 to 1994, Medicare was governed by the “politics of consensus” (p. 5). Medicare policymaking was largely bipartisan, the program’s operations rarely triggered public debate, and policy elites shared a belief in favor of maintaining Medicare as a universal federal insurance program. He acknowledges that Medicare politics has never been problem- or conflict-free. During the 1970s and 1980s, policymakers struggled to control Medicare outlays without either disappointing program beneficiaries (who wanted the program’s benefit coverage to keep pace with the standard in the private insurance market) or alienating medical providers (who wished to preserve their professional autonomy). Nevertheless, until the mid-1990s, policymakers were generally able to keep the conflicts produced by the tensions embedded in Medicare’s administrative structure below the political radar screen.

But the politics of consensus in Medicare came to an end in the mid-1990s. Oberlander makes a good case that the fracturing of the Medicare consensus was not simply the result of the Republican takeover of Congress in 1995. Rather, Medicare’s political environment was transformed in the mid-1990s by the growing ideological polarization of policy elites, political resistance to payroll tax hikes, and the rise of intergenerational equity concerns among certain officeholders. The author is at his best in showing how the exogenous changes in Medicare’s political environment were mediated by the program’s inherited financing design. At the time of the program’s adoption in 1965, federal policymakers agreed not to rely on general revenues for Medicare’s primary source of financing. Social insurance advocates like Wilbur Cohen believed that Medicare would be most successful if it were financed as a self-supporting program through payroll tax revenues. For his part, Ways and Means Committee chairman Wilbur Mills (D-AR) insisted that payroll taxes be confined to Medicare Part A (hospital insurance) and that beneficiaries share the costs of Medicare Part B (physician services). Medicare would therefore be financed through two distinct trust funds. One result of this fiscal design was that Medicare Part A would face the threat of “bankruptcy” whenever the program’s outlays grew faster than its dedicated receipts. A great deal of Medicare politics since 1965 has consequently focused on maintaining program “solvency.” Oberlander makes a powerful case that both the timing and character (if not the existence) of Medicare-reform debates would have been altered if the program had been established with different financing mechanisms (p. 104).

In Chapter 6, Oberlander engages the political science literature by testing several major theories of public policymaking. He examines whether Medicare policy outcomes between 1965 and 1994 were consistent with the direction of election results, public opinion, elite preferences, interest group lobbying, and the feedbacks from past policy decisions. This chapter is quite provocative but it leaves some important issues unresolved. Ultimately, Oberlander seems more interested in supporting his central claim that Medicare policymaking is too complicated to be modeled than he is in determining how much of the variance in Medicare policy outcomes any given factor can explain. He does make some excellent critical points in this chapter, observing, for example, that the disparity between elite and popular opinion on Medicare casts doubt on politicians’ justifications of their positions as being reflective of mass preferences. In addition, he shows that the influence of constituency pressures on Medicare outcomes has not been uniform but, rather, has varied with the nature of the issues and group identities at stake in particular debates. He claims that the observed empirical...
patterns are largely due to budgetary conditions and fiscal constraints, but the specific causal mechanisms at work could be articulated more clearly.

The author’s discussion of the influence of policy feedbacks and path dependence is also only partially satisfying. He is right to argue that it is not easy to identify all the potential feedback effects relevant to Medicare policymaking that should be measured. But his concluding observation that Medicare politics today is “back where it started” in 1965 (p. 196) fails to adequately consider the many important ways that current officeholders are constrained by the Medicare policy decisions made by their predecessors. While I am quite sympathetic to the author’s skepticism of moncausal explanations in policy research, he could have given the major contending theories a better workout.

These caveats aside, The Political Life of Medicare is a significant contribution to the literature. Well-organized, elegantly written, and jam-packed with sophisticated insights about the substance and process of U.S. public policymaking, the book deserves to be read by anyone concerned with American national government, health-care politics, and the welfare state.


— Neil Kraus, Valparaiso University

This is a detailed case study of the racial politics of school desegregation in Mobile, Alabama. Rather than focusing merely on policy, Richard Pride emphasizes the language associated with the desegregation struggle and its relationship with political and cultural change. The author argues that "stories affect our perceptions of the world and that these alterations in turn affect our individual and collective behaviors" (pp. 1–2).

Pride’s account of the events of desegregation in Mobile is thorough. He chronicles the struggle that began shortly after the Supreme Court’s Brown decision in 1954 and continued through the middle 1960s. During this period, numerous methods were employed to prevent whites from attending school with African Americans. Led by Alabama Governor George Wallace, white resistance to court-ordered desegregation was intense, with radicals calling for direct action to preserve the southern hierarchy, and conservatives advocating legal and political actions to stop desegregation. Wallace sought to "construct a story of illegitimate federal hegemony" (p. 45), to which many whites responded favorably. Rather than emphasize the inferiority of African Americans, Wallace and other opponents of desegregation reiterated the theme of "freedom of choice," which maintained that parents should be able to send their children to the school of their choosing, and therefore not be coerced by government to send their children to schools in other neighborhoods. From the beginning, it was clear that school desegregation would not be accomplished smoothly, and the narrative of freedom of choice, with its implicit emphasis on individualism, lent support to desegregation opponents.

The next critical phase began after the U.S. Supreme Court approved busing as a method of desegregation in Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg (1971). Adopted after the Swan decision, Mobile’s desegregation plan, which included busing, left more than a quarter of the county’s schools over 90% segregated, however, which further revealed the slow pace of desegregation and implicitly illustrated the unpopularity of busing. Opposition to busing played a role in the presidential election of 1972, in which Richard Nixon carried Mobile County by a large margin over George McGovern. The threats of many whites to hold Democrats accountable at the polls were coming to fruition.

Pride also describes how the concept of community schools gained increasing popularity among many whites and African Americans during the 1970s. Community schools within a metropolitan area that is largely segregated by race necessarily means the perpetuation of segregated schools. The growing popularity of community schools within certain segments of the African American community was directly at odds with the integration strategy of the NAACP and the Justice Department, however, which further complicated the politics of desegregation.

The book’s most insightful chapter is Chapter 10, “Redefining the Problem of Racial Inequality.” It contains a substantial amount of original analysis of census data, school performance indicators, and public opinion in Mobile throughout the period of desegregation. During this period, inequalities between the races decreased somewhat, but substantial differences remained. Over time, most local whites came to interpret the world in a different manner, which assumed that racial inequality resulted not from innate racial differences but, rather, from insufficient effort on the part of many African Americans to improve their circumstances. This chapter provides the best evidence of the author’s link between stories and cultural change, a link that could have been given more attention in the previous chapters.

A shortcoming of the book is Pride’s application of the concept of the third face of power, as articulated in John Gaventa’s (1982) classic work, Power and Powerlessness. The first face of power involves an examination of behavior and decision making; the second face involves looking at the political agenda and the non-decision-making process; and the third face of power involves an analysis of how the perceptions, values, and beliefs of the powerless are shaped by those in power. This type of analysis involves analysis of the use of communication, symbols, language, and so forth, and how these methods are used to maintain the current power relationships.

Considering the events in Mobile that Pride describes in detail, it is not clear how the third face of power is relevant to the analysis, and the author does not make the link between the third face of power and the events of desegregation explicitly. While there were factions within the civil rights movement, clearly the vast majority of African Americans believed that discrimination was widespread and that steps needed to be

— Kent E. Portney, Tufts University

In many respects, the literature on environmental justice and policy has reached its second wave, focusing on broad issues of policy and conceptualization building on the conclusions of the first wave, the empirical examination establishing that there are significant actual racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic differences in environmental risks. Edwardo Lao Rhodes, who worked for a year in the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of Environmental Justice, takes a step back into the first wave of research, reassessing the evidence concerning the extent of racial and class differences, and offering what he calls a “new paradigm” for analyzing whether such differences exist in specific places. Perhaps the best way to summarize this book is to say that it advocates the need for greater emphasis on environmental justice, but for different reasons than those articulated previously.

The book begins with a series of chapters examining an outline of the history of the concept of environmental justice (by which he largely means environmental equity), and the evolution of both “mainstream environmental organizations” and the environmental justice movement. This section concludes with a brief (and mild) critique of the EPA in its handling of environmental justice issues. The purpose of these chapters is to make the case that issues of environmental justice are of great public policy importance, but that the traditional or mainstream ways of thinking about such issues is based on a variety of incorrect analytical assumptions.

The book then turns its attention to a section called “Policy Analysis of Environmental Justice.” Here, the discussion turns to a series of assertions about what constitutes public policy analysis, starting with the contention that policy analysis is the progeny of “modern economics,” an idea with which much of the conceptual literature on policy analysis might take issue. It then provides a brief, but sweeping, critique of analytic approaches taken in existing empirical studies of environmental justice, that is, studies that purport to find race differences, per se, in environmental risk or exposure to hazardous substances. The author’s argument is that before one can draw broad inferences about environmental justice (and presumably act on these inferences), one must examine such issues across populations, geographic areas, time, and environmental risks. For example, Rhodes states that in “ignoring issues of proper measurement units—whether to use counties, zip codes, or census tract or block units—it becomes too much of a leap of faith to conclude on the basis of a single factor’s characteristics that environmental-justice problems do or do not exist in a community or across a region” (p. 142). Without extensive discussion, this seems like a curious assertion, in the sense that if people in heavily African American census tracts, for example, actually do experience significantly greater exposure to, say, environmental lead than people in less heavily African American census tracts, then there is no reason not to draw a relevant environmental justice inference. Indeed, there may not be a need to establish that people who live in heavily African American census tracts are also disproportionately exposed to other environmental risks before drawing inferences, or advocating policy responses, to the problem of potential exposure to environmental lead.

The core of this section, however, is the expression of Rhodes’s effort to promote “data envelopment analysis,” or DEA, as an appropriate alternative analytic method for analyzing environmental justice issues. DEA represents a multivariate data analytic technique that allows researchers to essentially combine multiple dependent variables (or “potential environmental risk factors”) into a single measure. In other words, it promises to be able to allow analysis of a combination of environmental variables, such as the quality of the air, proximity to hazardous waste sites, and presumably other variables, at the same time. As a result, it provides a potential means for assessing the relative influence of race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status on this combination of risk factors in ways not possible with traditional, single dependent variable, multivariate statistics.

The book’s third and final section focuses on a case study of an effort to site a hazardous-material disposal facility in Noxubee County, Mississippi, and prescribes new directions for environmental policy. The case study does not apply any particular analytic techniques, but rather simply documents the complexity of the decision-making processes associated with efforts to site this facility. The prescriptions consist mainly of recommendations to get federal bureaucrats to be more attuned to problems of equity in environmental risks, to provide greater community access to environmental information, and make federal and state regulations more flexible in order to respond to specific local environmental inequities.

What is perhaps most perplexing about this book is that it addresses many of the issues almost in an academic vacuum. Instead of attempting to develop his arguments as extensions or corrections to existing literature, Rhodes often seems to be unaware of such literature. For example, in the discussion and
critique of the mainstream environmental and environmental justice movements, there is no reference to such works as Christopher Foreman’s *The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice* (1998), Bunyan Bryant’s edited volume *Environmental Justice: Issues, Policies, and Solutions* (1995), or other scholarly works that have examined this very issue. In his discussion of what constitutes public policy analysis, Rhodes seems content to make assertions about what policy analysis is (and by inference what it is not) without any reference to literatures that might support or refute these assertions. In his case study of the hazardous-materials disposal facility siting, there is virtually no reference to any of the extensive literatures on this issue, the not-in-my-backyard syndrome, or any of a host of related issues. This is not to say that *Environmental Justice in America* is altogether unsuccessful. It implicitly acknowledges the unease in dealing with issues of equity and justice found in many approaches to environmental policy and risk analysis. For anyone wishing to learn about how those who are formally trained in and practice economic approaches to environmental policy analysis might approach the issue of environmental justice, this book is important reading.


— Leslie Lenkowsky, Indiana University–Purdue University, Indianapolis

Joan Roelofs begins her examination of the influence of grant-making foundations with an unusual disclaimer: “My philanthropy studies have been financed entirely by my position as professor at Keene State College” (p. x). The reason quickly becomes apparent: The thesis of her book is that virtually anyone who receives a foundation grant, participates in a foundation-sponsored conference, or joins a foundation-supported organization risks—and often succumbs to—being co-opted by the dominant, usually capitalist, elites who create and govern foundations. Whether in community organizing or international development, supporting the arts or advancing human rights, foundations, as she sees them, have had an overwhelmingly baneful effect, channeling those who might otherwise have been critics, innovators, and radicals into tame bureaucrats, defenders of the status quo, or promoters of causes inimical to their “real” interests.

If philanthropic money is corrupting, the disclaimer with which *Foundations and Public Policy* begins is meant to show that its author is incorruptible. But so one-sided is her argument, so selective is her evidence, and so strained are her conclusions that one might be tempted to believe that she is really trying to settle scores with donors who have not supported her favorite causes.

Roelofs’ main point—that foundations serve the interests of their donors—is hardly novel. Indeed, it is rooted in the thinking of the early-twentieth-century Italian socialist, Antonio Gramsci, who maintained that economically domi-

nant groups exercise political influence by establishing cultural “hegemony,” especially through patronizing intellectuals, broadly understood. His writings attracted a following among 1960s radicals and generated a number of books and studies, aimed at demonstrating that foundations are critical links in this process. Roelofs draws these together and adds some examples of her own to build her case.

Thus, for example, the money foundations spend on international activities goes mainly, as she sees it, to the cultivation of local elites who will be friendly to American—read, “capitalist”—interests. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are the principal villains. With the foundation (and U.S. government) money they receive, they recruit and indoctrinate aspiring leaders, drawing them away from potentially far-reaching avenues for social change, such as protest movements or class-based political parties, to work within existing channels of political power. Despite their claims to fight abuses of personal and civil liberties, human rights organizations, Roelofs argues, actually reinforce the status quo by treating political conflicts as legal issues or regime-sponsored terrorism as aberrant behavior, rather than the way elites habitually quash dissent. Though widely praised elsewhere for his work in former Soviet-bloc countries, financier George Soros is portrayed here as a philanthropic imperialist, bent on “civilizing” the new leaders of these nations in order to shape the decisions they will make, including, of course, on monetary matters (p. 177).

Similar examples abound on the home front as well. Thus, Roelofs writes, “radical activism often was transformed by grants and technical assistance from liberal foundations into fragmented and local organizations subject to elite control” (p. 121). Thanks to foundation and government support, “neo-populist” neighborhood groups, such as those associated with Saul Alinsky, turned into social service agencies. And militant civil rights organizations, such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, hungered for support, while those willing to work within the political system, such as the NAACP or the National Council of La Raza, prospered. Indeed, in the author’s eyes, foundation efforts to assist minority groups are inherently problematic because they foster “identity politics,” rather than class consciousness (p. 134).

These are mostly well-worn tales that have been told before (and less anecdotally) by J. Craig Jenkins, Barry D. Karl, and other scholars. Except for a survey of the impact of grants given in the late 1970s by a social-change—oriented donor called the Haymarket People’s Fund, Roelofs has done no primary research on foundation giving patterns, though data are readily available through the Foundation Center and other sources. Even the survey reveals more about the obstacles radicals face in bringing about social change (such as the difficulties of sustaining momentum and building organizations) than the role foundations play. And many of the foundation-supported groups she accuses of being tools of moneyed interests would undoubtedly take exception to that characterization.

Such demurrals would not matter much to Roelofs, whose analytic stance allows little deviation from the Marxist
paradigm. Any grant that does not serve class interests is ipso facto one that is inimical to them. This would come as a great surprise to the leadership of most large foundations, who believe their aim should be, as an American Assembly report several years ago proclaimed, to redress inequality wherever they might find it. To be told, for example, that promoting women’s rights in patriarchal countries is simply a way of ameliorating a fundamentally unjust society would strike them as absurd. And it is: Not all social changes need be sweeping ones to be valuable, and some that seem quite small—for example, the investment foundations made in the agricultural research that led to the “Green Revolution,” which developed hazard-resistant crops for Third World countries—may have extraordinary effects, for good or for ill.

Roelofs—and ironically, more than a few foundation executives—would prefer that grant makers were more overtly political in their giving. Indeed, in her eyes, among the forces that have stunted foundations is their embrace of the Progressive-era ideology of change through knowledge and planning, which was at its pinnacle when the archetypal foundations, such as Rockefeller and Carnegie, were born. This not only blinded grant makers to the importance of political engagement but also biased them toward the views of educated elites and technocrats, limiting the range of acceptable options (and, not coincidentally, reducing potential disaffection among intellectuals).

But whatever might be said about the consequences, the importance foundations have placed on developing and applying knowledge to public problems also legitimized the role of professional staff and expert consultants in advising donors or their trustees about how to give away their money. As a result, the more interesting question may be not whether foundations serve the interests of the wealthy, as Roelofs argues, but whether they have been used by intellectuals to advance their own interests. In the struggle for cultural hegemony, foundations may more often be the weapon of the educated classes than the moneymed ones.


— Jean Reith Schroedel, Claremont Graduate University

For more than three decades, the public and policymakers have grappled with the contentious question of how much value should be accorded fetal life. Prior to Roe v. Wade (1973), courts viewed the interests of the woman and fetus as identical, or at least congruent. Roe’s trimester framework, by according separate and potentially competing interests to the fetus at different stages in a pregnancy, provided a legal rationale for abortion opponents to try to establish fetal rights in a variety of contexts. Typically, the issue was couched as a maternal/fetal conflict where a range of women’s actions are viewed as threats to fetal health.

As Rachel Roth persuasively argues, fetal rights policies are “often counterproductive to those goals, and always under-
women are misguided. Not only are fetal abuse prosecutions constitutionally suspect, but they also work against the ostensibly aim of promoting fetal health. Roth argues that involuntary drug screening of pregnant women in order to gather evidence for criminal prosecutions only discourages them from getting the necessary prenatal care.

Although Roth posits that all women’s constitutional rights are threatened by the extension of legal rights to fetuses, she recognizes that not all women are equally at risk. Workplace fetal protection plans most directly impact working-class women, not professionals. Most of the forced medical interventions have been performed on immigrant women and members of minority religious sectors, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses. In a similar vein, Roth shows that poor African American women are far more likely to be prosecuted for “fetal abuse” than are white women, even though drug-use rates are comparable.

Although a useful addition to the fetal policymaking literature, Making Women Pay has some shortcomings. Because Roth tries to cover so much ground, her analysis lacks the depth of works that focus on single-policy domains (e.g., Suzanne Uttraro Samuels, Fetal Rights, Women’s Rights: Gender Equality in the Workplace, 1995). Moreover, the research only encompasses the period from 1973 to 1992. Thanks to the efforts of legislators and lawyers associated with the religious right, fetal policymaking is one of the most unsettled areas of the law, and so it is extremely important to use data that is as up-to-date as possible. But these are minor quibbles.

Overall, this is an excellent introduction to the area of fetal policymaking. I particularly recommend it for use in undergraduate classes. Roth does a superb job of making complicated legal arguments accessible to the general reader. Moreover, she effectively uses compelling stories of actual women’s lives to put a human face on the negative consequences of extending rights to potential human life. How can one not feel the pain of Theresa Wright, who was forced to choose between being surgically sterilized or losing her high-paying job?


— Patrick Fisher, Monmouth University

Irene Rubin’s work looks at the reactions of federal agencies to the pressure of balancing the budget, from the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1981 to the advent of federal budget surpluses beginning in 1998. The work focuses on cuts in federal expenditures and the resulting effects these cuts had on federal agencies. The key question Rubin asks is: Did Washington prioritize wisely, “trimming the herds” in a rational and efficient manner, or was it “eating the seed corn” by cutting what was politically easy to cut without any regard to the effectiveness of the cuts?

Until the late 1990s, the literature on the federal budget process had been extremely pessimistic regarding the ability of the federal government to produce balanced budgets. Deficit reduction became the gospel within the beltway, and public opinion seemed to concur that reducing the deficit should be a priority. When Bob Dole proposed a major tax reduction after winning the Republican presidential nomination in 1996, for example, his proposals were met with general skepticism and failed to be a vote winner because they were linked to the Reagan tax cuts of 1981, which led to massive budget deficits.

What changed to make seemingly unavoidable budget deficits turn into large government-produced budget surpluses at the end of the twentieth century? As Rubin argues, “the goal of a balanced budget is fundamentally a political one, not an economic or technical one” (p. 2). Once federal policymakers had determined that deficits had gotten out of hand, significant spending cuts were in order. The question became where to cut spending. According to Rubin, this became problematic because the federal government did not necessarily do a very good job of prioritizing expenditure reductions.

The author argues that the federal government was able to produce budget surpluses by cutting where it was politically easy to do so, even if this was not the most efficient way to reduce expenditures, because some agencies (such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the General Accounting Office) unquestionably were forced to lower degrees of performance. Rubin makes a compelling argument in this respect. Balancing the budget did hinder the performance of the federal government, at least to some degree. The downsizing of the department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), for example, did not bring about efficiencies. Instead, she claims that the pressure for survival made the agency more vulnerable to interest groups, fragmenting the mission of the agency.

In trying to balance the budget, therefore, policymakers may have gone overboard, without looking at the consequences of budget cuts. The goal of balancing the budget may have overwhelmed other important government priorities. As Rubin contends, balancing the budget needs to be combined with flexibility to allow for a response to changing needs or to downturns in the economy.

This is not to say that the spending cuts are always detrimental. Revenue reductions are potentially an important check on government as the nation’s priorities change. A positive aspect of spending cuts, Rubin asserts, is agency responsiveness—revenue reductions force agencies to respond. While the agencies that she studied had difficulty adapting to lower staffing levels, for the most part they succeeded. Overall, however, budget cuts tended to be implemented in a haphazard fashion that undermined the mission of the agencies.

Rubin’s focus is on the expenditure side of the balanced budget equation, not the revenue side. In this regard, she is similar to other critics of the federal budget process, such as Aaron Wildavsky (The New Politics of the Budgetary Process, 2d ed., 1992), Allen Schick (The Capacity to Budget, 1990), and Dennis Ippolito (Congressional Spending, 1981), who place the blame for skyrocketing deficits on the inability of
the federal government to curtail spending. But one can just as easily argue that it is the inability of the federal government to tax enough that makes balancing the budget difficult. In particular, the declining progressivity of federal taxation may make it more difficult for the federal government to get the required revenue to balance the budget. Since the end of World War II, the federal tax system has become substantially less progressive, as the corporate income tax has declined while payroll taxes have increased and the progressivity of federal income taxes has been reduced.

The tax side of the budget, therefore, should be considered equal to the spending side of the budget in its political and economic importance. Undoubtedly, the spending cuts that Rubin studies played a role in the reduction of the large federal budget deficits of the 1980s and early 1990s. Spending reductions, however, did not account for most of the reduction of the federal budget deficit. Overall spending outlays by the federal government continued to increase at a greater rate than the rate of inflation throughout the 1990s. The primary reason for the elimination of the budget deficit was the ability of the federal government to dramatically increase revenues. The combination of tax increases and a strong economy led to a windfall of revenues for the federal treasury. After it became law, the 1993 Budget Reconciliation Bill, which raised the top income tax bracket from 31% to 39.6%, was extraordinarily successful at bringing in more revenue. Spending cuts were important but secondary to revenue increases in the reduction of the budget deficit. In this regard, Rubin may overestimate the role of spending cuts (especially the cuts that she analyzes in her work) in eliminating the federal budget deficit at the end of the 1990s.

Overall, _Balancing the Federal Budget_ is an interesting and unique approach to the study of federal budgeting and an outstanding contribution to the field. Although the degree to which spending cuts were responsible for balancing the budget can be debated, spending cuts did play a role in balancing the budget, and these reductions had an important impact on government performance.

The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited.  
By Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 459p. $70.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

— Gregory A. Caldeira, Ohio State University

Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth are back again, as feisty as ever, challenging friend and foe alike and vigorously defending their well-known and much-controverted “attitudinal model,” albeit with a few concessions here and there to critics of various stripes. The original version of this book, published in 1993, made a major splash and became the subject, or should I say object, of many roundtables, panels, and symposia and the motivation for numerous articles. Without a doubt, no matter how one views its intellectual merits, _The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model_ was, and is, one of the most important books on law and judicial politics published in the last 25 years. It made a major intellectual mark on the subfield and, I believe, in American politics more generally, and lately it has received a lot of notice from professors of law. For its critics, it is a book they love to hate; for the faithful, it serves as the urtext; and, for the rest, it is an endless source of hypotheses, data, and ideas for further research.

Segal and Spaeth, I suppose, could just as appropriately have labeled this a second edition. Their decision to use the term “revisited” probably stems from the main motivation of a new version: not to provide the newest data or the latest decisions, although they do this in many places, but, rather, to deal with and integrate intellectual currents in the field that they did not address the first time around. So, if one puts the two versions side by side, one quickly notices that the authors have eliminated the chapter on judicial impact and then rearranged the theoretical chapters to take into account developments in positive political theory and the “new” institutionalism. For my money, dropping the chapter on judicial impact is a blessing; this literature is, to put it mildly, not a hotbed of intellectual inquiry these days, and it did not fit well with the theoretical focus of the rest of the book. Its presence in the 1992 version probably reflected a desire for completeness in coverage or perhaps the marketplace for textbooks.

Now, in connection with the last point, I did not and still do not understand why Segal and Spaeth include a very long chapter (60 pages) on the history of the Supreme Court. It is, of course, good fun to read because it so well reflects the authors’ hard-baked view of the Court and its decisions and is very much in the style of seat-of-the-pants political analysis for which Thomas R. Powell, Thurman Arnold, Edward S. Corwin, Robert Cushman, and many others were famous in the salad days of public law, when a long discussion of the Court’s term appeared each year in the American Political Science Review. Yet in a book the purpose of which is to present and test an explicit, scientific model of judicial behavior, this chapter sits rather oddly. And even if one puts intellectual consistency aside, their discussion of the Court’s history is too abbreviated to be convincing and too long to fit well and not interrupt the argument in the rest of the book.

Several other chapters suffer from excessive attention to detail, of a textbookish sort, as, for example, in the discussion of legal requirements for access to the federal courts. If one conceives of this book, as I do, as a scientific monograph based on a theoretical model, it is not clear we need a detailed discussion, to name just one example, of pendant and auxiliary jurisdiction. It is nice to have this information in a handy place, but it hardly helps Segal and Spaeth to advance their argument.

In the theoretical section, as I have said, the authors attempt to reconcile their work with alternative approaches to the study of judicial behavior. This is a useful corrective. Nonetheless, the concessions they make to positive political theory and to institutional approaches are fairly minor and give the impression of their having put on patches here and there, rather than truly reformulating their ideas. They continue to hew closely to the
notion of justices driven by policy preferences and not much
constrained, if at all, by law, precedent, or other institutional
actors. Ultimately, Segal and Spaeth stand pat, with a few “ifs”
and “buts” here and there. The problem, I think, derives from
the lack of a coherent story about how justices proceed from
their fundamental values, beliefs, and attitudes to decisions
about how to vote, which opinions to join, and so on. Spaeth
and company initially proceeded from the theoretical
approaches of Rokeach and others; but the world of social psy-
chology went far beyond Rokeach long, long ago, and cogni-
tive models, to give but one example, have come to the fore. In
this recent incarnation, Segal and Spaeth briefly discuss “moti-
vated reasoning,” but then let the matter drop, moving on
to treat attitudes in very much the same fashion that one would
treat preferences or ideal points in a spatial model. The result is
to render the phrase “attitudinal model” something of a
minor, for it is in practice the familiar spatial model of vot-
ing, in one dimension, with single-peaked preferences, which
we see used in the study of voters and legislators, applied to the
study of Supreme Court justices. Additionally and relatedly, the
term “attitudinal” is also unfortunate because “attitudes” are
subject to many and varied conceptualizations; and, so far as I
can tell, the authors never spell out which of the various mean-
ings they want to adopt. Do they, for example, mean in their
usage of attitude to incorporate the whole range of beliefs,
values, and attitudes, or a narrower conception?

Segal and Spaeth, I believe, have given little intellectual
ground to opponents. This is both a weakness and a strength.
I have already noted the problems with taking this stance.
The strength of this approach is that, unlike so many academics,
these authors do not waffle on any theoretical or empirical
contentions but, rather, set down a bold challenge to others to
musterm contrary evidence. It is all there in black and white for
anyone to controvert, with no secret doors or escape hatches
built in for them. The original version, and now its sequel, are
particularly impressive in at least three senses: first, in the can-
dor and force with which they set out their views and provide
empirical tests of them; second, in distilling and combining a
long-term program of research, going back perhaps as far as
the 1960s; and, third, in the amazing breadth of the work that
Segal and Spaeth, have created, together and on their own,
over the last 20 years in the case of the former and nearly 50
in the case of the latter. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model Revisited, and the work it reflects, are major achieve-
ments for which students of the Supreme Court are deeply in
debt to this pair of distinguished scholars.

**Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life.** By Theda Skocpol. Norman:

— Kristi Andersen, Syracuse University

Theda Skocpol has a number of ambitious goals in this
engaging book. She wants to correct the myth of localism—
the idea that the nineteenth-century American civic life laud-
ed by Tocqueville and idealized by numerous people since was
centered exclusively, or even primarily, around autonomously
organized groups in individual communities. She wants to
make the case that classic American civic organizations were
cross-class organizations, and to explain “what we have lost”
by moving away from that situation. She aims to convince
readers of Robert Putnam’s work that “social capital” is an
overly simplistic concept that does not provide nearly enough
theoretical leverage for an understanding of the dramatic
recent changes in the American civic landscape. And she
wants to offer a plausible explanation of these changes, to
convince the reader that our polity is the worse for them, and
to make some suggestions for reinvigorating civic life. In my
judgment, she succeeds reasonably well in most of these
areas, though her suggestions for change seem a bit tired and
fragmented.

Skocpol takes on the “myth of localism” both empirically and
normatively. In her second chapter, “How the United
States Became a Civic Nation,” she provides a concise descrip-
tion of the waves of association-formation that resulted in fra-
ternal organizations like the Masons, the Odd Fellows, the
Ancient Order of Hibernians, and so forth. Skocpol’s Civic
Engagement Project at Harvard has collected data on a num-
ber of large mass-membership organizations, and these data
allow her to generalize about membership trends, organiza-
tional structure, and the life spans of these groups. But beyond
this, *Diminished Democracy* pulls together a huge range of sec-
ondary sources and—unusually, she acknowledges—a large
but unsystematic collection of archival materials, such as cer-
emonial ribbon badges, membership lists, programs, organiza-
tion manuals, and convention minutes. With these multiple
sources of evidence, she makes a strong case that most of the
important organizations in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century America were national in both structure and focus. She
argues that larger organizations lasted longer than small ones
and that connecting through district, state, and national meet-
ings was very important to local groups. She traces the history
of a number of organizations to show how national organizers
“encouraged the creation of local units in each state and then
handed the job of membership organizing to native state lead-
erships elected by the earliest few local chapters” (p. 92).

Not only does Skocpol want the reader to understand the
translocal nature of American mass-membership organiza-
tions, but she also wants to make a normative case for these
types of organizations: “Inside the clubs or lodges or posts of
America’s vast voluntary federations, millions of people
learned about group operations and collective debate and
decision-making” (p. 99). Organizational mimicry of U.S.
federal structures and representational practices, as well as the
constant reinforcing of patriotic values, helped prepare mem-
bers for the responsibilities of citizenship. The conventions
and intrachapter communications helped to give members a
sense of a larger, collective purpose; and she points out that of
the 58 large associations (enrolling over 1% of the
relevant populations) her project studied, 34 “mobilized their
members to work for explicitly political causes” (p. 122).
The translocal nature of the organizations, Skocpol argues, also contributed to their cross-class nature. I have always been somewhat skeptical about this particular argument of Skocpol's: Having studied women's organizations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, I was left with a strong impression that most local groups were pretty homogeneous in terms of class. In this book, Skocpol presents some evidence for the diversity of some chapters of fraternal and other organizations, but more importantly, she argues that the federal structure, with its attendant opportunities for leadership, travel, and connections among local chapters that might represent very different constituencies, meant that in significant ways, “there were many participatory venues open to average Americans, where men or women of various backgrounds could learn skills of expression and organization relevant to civic and political life more generally” (p. 104). As she demonstrates in her last few chapters, these opportunities for leadership and involvement have largely been lost.

Skocpol carefully describes the ways that Americans’ civic organizations—whether the Elks and Moose of the nineteenth century or the Sierra Club and National Organization for Women in the current era—have been “thoroughly intertwined” with the state: “Leading membership federations gained by being associated with bold national efforts that concretely helped millions of citizens. And of course the U.S. Congress and state legislatures responded when widespread voluntary associations mobilized members” (p. 71). Today, “new institutional levers” are available for advocates—“additional niches” through which to attempt influence (p. 201). Government grants and the practice of subcontracting government services to nonprofit organizations have also helped to fundamentally reshape the landscape of civic organizations.

The larger point that Skocpol wants to make here—and I think she does it well—is that “social capital” is too blunt a concept to allow us to understand the pathways to citizen involvement in the polity. Social capital is often thought of as the extent to which people regularly get together with friends and neighbors, the extent to which people feel they can count on and trust each other. But this condition is neither sufficient—nor, perhaps, necessary—for vigorous democracy to exist. In a footnote, she says that her argument about civic life is “analogous” to Rosenstone and Hansen’s argument about electoral politics (Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America, 1993). I think the development of this argument is her most important contribution in Diminished Democracy. That is, she demonstrates the myriad ways that political structures and institutions and public policy shape the opportunities people have for participating in civic life, the ways they can be involved, and the impacts that their involvement is likely to have on public policy. Leaders, for example, will organize large numbers of people at the grassroots level only if there are structural incentives for them to do so. If, as at the present time, they can establish influence over public policy by deploying small staffs, expertise, and foundation grants, then why organize? Skocpol’s comparison of the strategies of Frances Willard (leader of the Women’s/Christian Temperance Union in the 1870s and 1880s) and Marian Wright Edelman (founder of the Children’s Defense Fund a hundred years later) is very instructive in this regard.

Two of many implications of this argument are the following: Understanding changes in the incentive structures of political institutions can help us understand why working-class people have been effectively closed out of American civic life. And Robert Putnam is looking in the wrong places when he wants to explain the decline of civic life in terms of individual choices like job/career balancing or television watching.


— Elizabeth Hull, Rutgers University-Newark

According to many political scientists, America’s governmental structure is so riddled with checks and balances that lawmakers are rarely capable of passing comprehensive legislation. Yet during one remarkable decade, between 1965 and 1975, public officials enacted unprecedented civil rights legislation, instituted affirmative action policies, stripped discriminatory provisions from immigration statutes, extended parity to women in education and sports, guaranteed opportunities for the disabled, and promoted bilingual education.

If it is so hard to achieve substantial change in American politics, sociologist John D. Skrentny asks, “how did we get a minority rights revolution notable precisely for its sudden, rapid, bipartisan policy development?” (p. 6). In The Minority Rights Revolution he attempts to answer this question and thereby “improve American democratic deliberation by informing participants in policy debates how we arrived at our current situation (p. v).” Accordingly, he explores how context—historical, global, political—influenced policy during the 1965–75 decade; the reasons that certain controversial developments, such as so-called identity politics, took root; and why some relatively weak groups “won big” while others lost out.

The book is dense with information culled from internal government documents, congressional debates, interviews, and legal documents. Its subject matter is fascinating, however, and Skrentny writes in a lively style and with a minimum of social science jargon; even nonscholars interested in American political and social history will enjoy reading his book.

According to Skrentny, the United States abandoned institutionalized racism largely in response to the perceived needs of national security. How could the country maintain credibility in its fight against Nazi Germany and imperial Japan so long as it retained its own odious racial policies? Then, during the Cold War, how could it prevent the Soviet Union from winning the hearts and minds of nonaligned (and largely
nonwhite) people so long as its own black citizens were segregated and otherwise demeaned?

Once laws were passed addressing the needs of African Americans, the rights revolution took on a life of its own. Women, Asian Americans, Indians, and Latinos benefited apace from the antidiscrimination and affirmative action policies that blacks had fought long and hard to achieve. (As Skrentny says, “they got a free ride” [p. 141].) Why these particular groups? Apparently because governing elites considered them analogous to blacks. White ethnics and homosexuals, by contrast, were denied “minorityhood” status; the former were deemed insufficiently oppressed, and the latter, while oppressed, were beyond the public’s zone of toleration.

Skrentny accounts for the 1965–75 rights revolution in ways that challenge, or at least go beyond, many of the generally accepted social-movement theories. For instance, many researchers maintain that revolutions—or what Sidney Tarrow calls “protest cycles”—take place from the “bottom up” (Power in Movement, 1998, p. 129). Skrentny counters, however, that such a model fails to explain the outcomes of social movements, the nature of the reforms they inspire, or the reasons that only some participants achieve their goals. Why did an ambitious law for the disabled emerge in the absence of any coherent movement? How was it that Asians won significant immigration rights without notable mobilization, whereas women, a well-organized and potentially powerful constituency, faced resistance and ridicule?

The answer, Skrentny asserts, is that the allocation of “rights” was not primarily determined by demanding protesters with fists raised high, or the “network of federated interest groups” that political scientist Theda Skocpol studied in successful earlier movements (Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 1992). Rather, action came from governmental elites who engaged in what the author calls “anticipatory politics.” These elites were responsible for minority business incentives; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, prohibiting colleges and universities receiving federal funds from engaging in sex discrimination; and, most notably, the Bi-Lingual Education Act of 1968, which represented almost a total break with the country’s centuries-old “English-only” tradition, yet became official policy with scarcely a rumble. (According to Skrentny, the “intense, almost-anything-goes political strategizing of Nixon’s anticipatory politics” presaged the way governing now transpires in this country, “driven by polls and Svengali-like political consultants who make educated, semi-scientific guesses as to what groups of Americans really want” [p. 329].

Skrentny generally supports affirmative action—which he describes as “the most important component of the minority rights revolution” (p. 85)—but he acknowledges its problematic legacy. It has replaced “difference-blind” policies with ones that have splintered society into “majority” and “minority” groups, and then “turned group victimhood into a basis of a positive national policy” (p. 353). With little forethought, government officials created a “new discourse of race, group differences, and rights” that have mirrored racist talk and ideas by reinforcing racial differences (most incongruously, the author points out, among Latinos) (p. 353).

Because race-based programs ignore class distinctions, moreover, they have elevated even the lowliest white ethnics into “privileged oppressors” and alienated them from the “official minorities” who could have been their allies (p. 353). As a consequence, Skrentny says, while affirmative action benefited official minorities, it “may have foreclosed more comprehensive reforms” (p. 353). To the extent it has done so, ironically, the minority rights revolution has in fact been a counterrevolution.

However much Republicans inveigh against race-based policies, they deliberately promoted and disproportionately benefit from measures that emphasize ethnic, rather than class, differences in the electorate. Even such stalwart conservatives as Barry Goldwater and Robert Bork urged Republican presidents to implement programs, such as bilingual education and minority-targeted enterprise grants, that were designed to woo key constituencies, particularly Latinos. By 1975, Republicans were eagerly courting disaffected whites, portraying Democrats as beholden to racial minorities. During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan led what Skrentny describes as a “rhetorical counter-revolution” (p. 330), and throughout the 1990s, Bill Clinton and members of the middle-of-the-road Democratic Leadership Conference continued the retrenchment by co-opting much of the conservative agenda.

Still, the United States in no way resembles the country it was 40 years ago. Certain values have become virtually unsalable, reflecting the profound changes that have occurred in both domestic and world culture. Human rights (what Skrentny calls “this 20th Century invention” [p. 357]) are almost universally honored, at least in principle, and few Americans want to see national origin quotas reinstated anymore than they want to see policies resurrected that discriminate against minorities, women, or the disabled. While the rights revolution as such may have ended in 1975, then, Skrentny suggests that its repercussions will be long-lasting and largely benign.


— Kerry L. Haynie, Duke University

Understanding the nature and extent to which black Americans take pride in being black and understanding the political and social consequences for such pride is the subject of this latest Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza collaboration. Using a creative experimental design to augment and enhance a standard and more conventional survey methodology, the authors address two primary questions: 1) Does taking pride in being black come hand in hand with blacks being more likely to be anti-other (i.e., those who are not black)? and 2) Does racial solidarity or having a distinctive black identity mean that black Americans do not share a sense of
connectedness to the larger American culture? As for answer to these questions, according to Sniderman and Piazza, black pride contributes to black solidarity but does not lead to black intolerance of other groups. Moreover, they find that, in general, the black masses overwhelmingly reject racial separatism and tend to see themselves as being part of the larger society. As they put it, “in the larger black community being pro-black does not mean being anti-white—or anti-Jewish, or anti-Hispanic, or anti-Asian. Black pride and prejudice are not opposite sides of the same coin” (p. 164). The data that yield these findings come from a 1997 telephone survey of a representative sample of blacks in Chicago. The authors anticipated generalizability questions that might be raised about their findings by including, for comparison purposes, data from national surveys of blacks.

Chapter 1 introduces the main research questions and provides the context and contours of the study. Here the authors reveal the discovery of two recurring and seemingly conflicting themes that coexist within the black community: distinctiveness and inclusion. Distinctiveness marks and reflects the sense of difference that blacks feel from other Americans, and inclusion underscores feelings of commonality with their fellow citizens. These two themes are reminiscent and provide empirical confirmation of W. E. B. Du Bois’s idea of “double-consciousness,” expounded in his now-classic *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903). Sniderman and Piazza argue that the indiscriminate amount of attention paid to the potential tension between these themes obscures the reality that blacks, for the most part, are very successful at managing this duality. That is, “black Americans can and do simultaneously affirm their distinctiveness as blacks and their commitment to the common culture they share with their fellow Americans” (p. 10).

In Chapter 2 the authors explore the concept of black solidarity, that is, what it means for blacks to identify with other blacks. A desire for economic independence, a desire to have black achievements acknowledged, and feeling a sense of linked fate with other blacks are some of the expressions of black solidarity identified and discussed. Among several noteworthy findings from the analyses in this chapter, two stand out. First, Sniderman and Piazza find that there is a link between economic class and feelings of black identity. Blacks who are more well-off tend to more strongly identify themselves as black. Second, after controlling for the effects of education, they find no connection between a sense of black identity and levels of self-esteem. Both of these findings challenge the conventional wisdom that is derived from the existing identity politics literature.

It is also in Chapter 2 where we discover perhaps the most controversial findings of the study. While finding no significant evidence that black pride and black solidarity are connected to blacks’ readiness to be prejudiced against Jews, the authors do report a link between support for Afrocentrism and black anti-Semitism. Sniderman and Piazza contrast the definition of Afrocentricity used in “serious scholarship,” like Martin Bernal’s *Black Athena* (1987), with what they refer to as the popular meaning of the term. For them, the scholarly conceptualization is based on extensive research and holds that Egypt (i.e., Africa) significantly influenced the development of Greek civilization (p. 22). The authors represent the popular understanding as being the belief that European achievements and contributions to human civilization have been unabashedly exaggerated, while at the same time, legitimate African accomplishments and contributions have been systematically ignored or downplayed. They argue that this popular notion of Afrocentrism can lend itself “to claims that violate ordinary standards of evidence and reasoning” (p. 22). Moreover, they state that “truth sometimes seems a secondary factor” in research projects that employ this popular understanding (p. 23). It is ironic and disappointing that the authors themselves violate ordinary standards of evidence and reasoning to support or substantiate these claims about the popular understanding of Afrocentrism. Not only do they rely on an overly narrow conceptualization of Afrocentrism, but they also rely on a single example as their evidence for their decidedly negative conclusions about it.

Reactions to two statements are used to gauge the degree to which the so-called popular understanding of Afrocentrism is present within the black community. Seventy-three percent of the respondents agreed with the statement: *The ancient Greek philosophers copied many ideas from black philosophers who lived in Egypt*; and 89% agreed that *African wise men who lived hundreds of years ago do not get enough credit for their contributions to modern science*. Sniderman and Piazza characterize such beliefs as “odd” and “off-the-wall.” However, it is reasonable to conclude that such beliefs are derived, either directly or indirectly, from “serious scholarship” and well-researched mainstream academic studies, such as the 1987 Bernal study that is referenced by the authors.

The core of the study’s experimental analyses are found in Chapters 3 and 4. The conventional wisdom regarding black conflict with other groups—whites, Jews, and Koreans—is tested in Chapter 3 by using experiments that allow for randomized variations in questions and scenarios. The conventional wisdom offers three explanations for this conflict: 1) competition for scarce resources; 2) irrational hostility that accompanies prejudice; and 3) black pride (p. 61). In general, the results of the experiments call into question much of our existing knowledge and understanding on this topic. Chapter 4 focuses on the views that blacks have about American society and their place in it. Sniderman and Piazza find that although ordinary black citizens tend to possess distinctive identities as blacks, they maintain a commitment to a common American culture, and they remain overwhelmingly committed to racial integration. The authors argue that these findings refute the multiculturalist claim that American culture has no common core. However, here, as was the case with Afrocentrism, their critique relies on an overly narrow representation of the multiculturalist perspective.

Overall, *Black Pride and Black Prejudice* offers several important findings. This somewhat provocative book is well researched and is very well written. Its detailed analyses

— Todd Swanstrom, Saint Louis University

When a major league sports franchise threatens to quit a locality, public officials typically engage in a frantic scramble to assemble a subsidy package to retain the team. Local governments subsidize publicly owned stadiums and arenas to the tune of an estimated $500 million annually (p. 20). In order to justify taxpayer dollars going to benefit private businesses, boosters put out glowing estimates of the huge multiplier effects the expenditures will have on the regional economy. In fact, these estimates of the economic benefits of professional sports franchises are usually wildly exaggerated. For the most part, professional sports franchises do not expand regional economies; they simply redirect consumption expenditures from one entertainment venue to another.

When pressed, sports boosters often acknowledge that the direct economic benefits of sports franchises are exaggerated but stress that there are many intangible benefits that are impossible to quantify. Major league teams give cities national visibility and priceless publicity. You cannot be a major league city without a major league team. Sports teams act as a “civic adhesive” (p. 28), bonding citizens across the divides of race, religion, and class. A professional sports franchise can help a central city to acquire an identity that it can use to market itself as an exciting destination in the expanding leisure economy. In short, the symbolic benefits of sports franchises justify deep public subsidies.

Integrating the insights of cultural studies without any of the jargon, It’s Hardly Sportin’ is a scholarly evaluation of the symbolic benefits of sports franchises. At the center of Costas Spirou and Larry Bennett’s analysis is a basic question: What is the relationship between cultural or symbolic production and capital accumulation or growth?

The second characteristic that sets this book apart from most of the literature on sports franchise relocation is its emphasis on the impact of sports stadiums and arenas on their immediate neighborhoods. By generating foot traffic, stadiums can stimulate neighborhood retail opportunities, especially bars and restaurants. The negative effects on the neighborhood, however, are often overlooked: noise, traffic congestion, litter, rowdy fans, and crime. In the long run, a stadium can change the whole ambiance of a neighborhood, its mix of residents and even its identity. This is one of the best scholarly treatments available of the neighborhood impacts of sports stadiums and arenas.

Spirou and Bennett employ a comparative case-study method to examine their issues. By choosing their three cases from Chicago during the 1980s and 1990s, they control for a wide range of factors and thus are able to isolate the effects of key variables, such as neighborhood political strength. Their three examples are 1) the tearing down of the old Comiskey Park and the building of a new one in a poor area (South Armour Square) just south of the Loop; 2) the successful effort to allow night games at Wrigley Field, home of the Chicago Cubs, in the affluent cosmopolitan Lake View area north of the Loop; and 3) the building of a new arena, the United Center, to house the Bulls and the Blackhawks, in the poor, largely minority Near West Side. The three cases are similar enough to make the comparisons valid, yet different enough to make them interesting.

In an early chapter, entitled “From Urban Renewal to the City of Leisure,” the authors argue that urban development has changed from the bad old days of urban renewal with its extensive displacement and unfeeling, overscaled projects, to a new postindustrial approach that enhances places by integrating projects into the urban fabric. I am skeptical that the old urban renewal approach is dead. Indeed, the authors show that the new Comiskey Park, an island in a sea of asphalt parking lots that displaced hundreds of residents and local businesses, looks very much like urban renewal, only without federal funding.

The authors cite Wrigley Field as a positive example of a stadium that is integrated into the fabric of the neighborhood. Until 1988, Wrigley Field was the only major league stadium that did not allow night games. When the Cubs demanded the right to have night games, the powerful neighborhood organization successfully negotiated a compromise, limiting the number of night games to 18 and initiating a series of actions to mitigate negative neighborhood effects. As a result, the neighborhood is thriving, with home values appreciating and young people flocking to local bars and restaurants.

Spirou and Bennett demonstrate that capital and community do not necessarily conflict, at least with regard to stadium development. Stadiums, like Wrigley Field and Coors Field in Denver, can be designed to enliven, rather than damage, surrounding neighborhoods.

One of the ironies of the sports franchise relocation game is that team owners with less power often do better than those that are able to dictate to their cities and neighborhoods. Because the Cubs were profitably rooted in a unique ballpark drenched in an urban vernacular that fostered intense fan loyalty, the threat of the owners to move was never taken very seriously. A well-organized neighborhood association was able to negotiate a compromise that resulted in a win-win outcome: The neighborhood is prospering at the same time that fan loyalty is boosting the Cubs’ bottom line.

By contrast, lacking the Cubs’ fan loyalty and solid roots in the neighborhood, the White Sox threat to move to St. Petersburg, Florida, had to be taken seriously. In addition, the South Armour neighborhood, riven by economic and racial
divisions, was politically weak. Holding all the cards, the Sox were able to dictate the design of the new Comiskey Park to accommodate suburban fans and their immediate profit goals. By tearing down local businesses, the Sox insured that they would monopolize the sales of food, beer, and souvenirs. In the long run, however, the way Comiskey was built underminded not only “a demonstrably decent neighborhood” (p. 107) but also the profitability of the White Sox franchise. Fans have not gotten over the Sox threats to move and their destruction of McCuddy’s Tavern across the street from historic Comiskey Park where Babe Ruth supposedly went for a quick beer between innings.

It’s Hardly Sportin’ is a provocative, insightful, and carefully researched study of the relationship between stadiums and urban development. By focusing on the symbolic effects of sports franchises on neighborhoods, the book breaks new ground. Firmly grounded in the scholarly literature, the book is sprinkled with colorful characters, engaging stories, and helpful photographs that make it suitable for advanced undergraduate as well as graduate classes.


— Jane B. Singer, University of Iowa

They are b-a-a-a-ck: the campaign materials in your mailbox, the ubiquitous political advertisements on radio and television, the annoying telephone calls from pollsters and partisans. And do not think that when the presidential election is over, they will go away for another four years. As J. Cherie Strachan documents, it is not just the people who would be president who have become addicted to such campaign tactics; it is the people who would be mayor and city council member and sheriff, as well.

High-Tech Grass Roots describes the dramatic increase of what she calls “new-style” campaign tactics at the local level. Such tactics—notably public opinion polling, television and radio ads, and targeted direct mail—require specialized skills and sophisticated technology to use effectively. As a result, candidates hire professional political consultants to deploy them, usually in combination with the still-effective grassroots methods of traditional local campaigning, such as speeches, door-to-door canvassing, and literature drops.

Strachan convincingly offers a threefold proposition. First, local candidates, as well as political reporters and even voters, increasingly see these sophisticated tactics as necessary to a successful election bid. Second, because the tactics cost more than traditional ones—both in and of themselves and because of the need for paid specialists, rather than generally low-skilled volunteers, to implement them—serious money is becoming vital in local elections. And third, despite an increase in the amount of campaign rhetoric available to voters, the trend is inherently dangerous to democracy: Moneled interests can gain undue influence over local campaigns, and economically disadvantaged candidates or potential candidates are less likely to have a voice at any level in our political system.

Although she emphasizes that there is no single, simple solution to problems raised by the new political reality, she sees a renewed “service” role for political parties in meeting local candidates’ need for money and expertise as the most viable approach. Perhaps, though surely both the media and the citizenry also have a vital part to play; the First Amendment protects and supports them as much as it does campaign contributors, as described in the last chapter.

The book is an interesting—and, at only 130 content pages, a quick—read about an important topic. It could make a nice supplemental text in a course about local politics, campaigns, or political communication. Strachan has a very accessible writing style, and her reliance on three complementary methods and data sets—a mail survey of political consultants, telephone interviews with political reporters, and a case study of Albany, NY, mayoral elections—produces a richer depiction of the issue than would any one alone. She organizes and delivers her points nicely, going well beyond merely documenting the trend in order to cogently explore the broader issues of why local candidates are changing tactics and the implications of those changes.

High-Tech Grass Roots does have some drawbacks, however. Although Strachan explains that the vast number of local elections across the country makes it difficult to talk directly with politicians, her reliance on consultants and newspaper reporters forces her to use secondhand information about what candidates are doing and why, shaky ground on which to base her conclusions. For instance, reporters are her sources on everything from the tactics citizens expected mayoral candidates to use (p. 49) to assessment of candidates’ social class (p. 74) to an approximation of how much money candidates spent (p. 76) and more. In the absence of more extensive information from candidates and without a local equivalent of the Federal Election Commission, journalists’ best guesses take on credence they may not deserve, despite reporters’ reputed “predilection for factual accuracy” (p. 127).

Another significant shortcoming is the lack of information about candidates’ use of the Internet. Again, Strachan offers an explanation: The novelty of the medium as a campaign tool at the time of her study, apparently (though this is not specified in the methodology) in 1997 and 1998, minimized its impact in local elections. Despite its well-documented use as early as 1996 at the federal level, that is quite possible—but the book has a publication date of 2003. The five-year gap is a lifetime in Internet years. Moreover, the title suggests the use of tactics that are, well, high-tech. It is disconcerting that this category includes advertisements for the 80-year-old mass medium of radio but excludes the Internet, particularly since a major premise is that newer tactics force candidates to hire specialists—such as, presumably, website designers and producers. It would be interesting to consider how computer-based communication technologies, which are likely to play an increasingly crucial campaign role, either exacerbate the problem outlined here or, conversely, accommodate a new

— John A. Clark, Western Michigan University

Few serious observers of American politics would deny that race continues to play an important role in U.S. elections. At the same time, much has changed since segregationist politicians used race baiting as a way to ensure victory in the South and possibly other places. In his book, Matthew Streb explores the way that race was used by gubernatorial candidates in the late 1990s. He lays out theoretical expectations about when racial appeals are likely to be used, and he presents issue agendas on which candidates from each major party can run successfully.

Streb argues that candidates behave strategically in deciding what issues to push during a campaign. The two most critical factors in terms of using racial issues are 1) the percentage of the state's population that is African American and 2) the percentage of the state's population that is working-class white. The degree to which the state's electorate is receptive to racial messages is shaped by these two contextual factors. Republican candidates are most likely to use racial appeals in states with large populations of both blacks and working-class whites. Poorer white voters will be more willing to see blacks as an economic and political threat in those states. Unlike the pre-Voting Rights Act era, implicit racial issues are more likely to be effective today. Democratic candidates have no reason to employ racial issues, instead emphasizing class-based appeals to unite lower-income white and black voters. The smaller the percentage of African Americans and working-class whites in a state, the less likely a candidate will use racial appeals.

To test his theory, Streb examines gubernatorial campaigns in seven states in 1998 (Alabama, Georgia, Arkansas, Ohio, Iowa, and Massachusetts) and 1997 (Virginia). The states are categorized along two dimensions: high, medium, or low black population and high or low working class white population. His qualitative data come from interviews with politicians, journalists, and academics; from newspapers; and from campaign advertisements. He also collects quantitative data from a content analysis of newspaper articles and campaign ads, which are used to see what issues are being discussed in the campaign and whether the candidates are setting the issue agenda. Finally, exit-poll data show how voters responded to the campaigns offered up by the candidates.

While the book is about race rather than region, the only states in which more than a quarter of the population is black are the five Deep South states. No southern states fall into the low black population category (less than 10%). To enhance his ability to compare across regions, Streb examines two southern states and one northern state from the middle category.

The author's content analysis shows that candidates did not resort to explicit racial appeals in 1998, even in the heavily black states he examines. The qualitative evidence suggests a slightly more nuanced conclusion, however. Even when racial issues are not a part of a candidate's campaign arsenal, racial controversies can emerge through endorsements or campaign techniques. Other candidates on the party ticket can introduce a racial dimension independent of the gubernatorial candidate's attention to racial issues. For example, Republican Guy Millner in Georgia may have alienated black voters with his opposition to affirmative action, but the presence of three African American candidates running statewide as Democrats and racially insensitive comments by the GOP candidate for lieutenant governor had an impact as well.

How can candidates forge winning coalitions centered on black and poor white voters? Streb argues that Democratic candidates should emphasize class-based issues that appeal to voters from each race without alienating voters from the other. Republican candidates can use race to win the favor of lower-class whites, but only if the black population of the state is large enough to make the racial threat viable. They can appeal to blacks using social issues, religion, education, and economic development, but issue-based appeals only appear to work when the candidate has built prior trust with the African American community. The idea of "issue ownership"—emphasizing issues that are associated with the party—also plays an important role in Streb's analysis.
One weakness of the book is that the generalizability of its conclusions may be limited by case selection and time. Was the 1997–98 election cycle unique? One might reasonably expect a different pattern of racial appeals in times of economic uncertainty, compared to the reasonably robust economy during the period under examination. The Clinton impeachment saga might have played a role in mobilizing black voters in Georgia and Alabama. The lack of a strong Democratic challenger in Arkansas may have allowed the Republican incumbent to reach across racial lines in a manner made more difficult in a close election.

Streb does not examine the role of turnout, especially for African Americans, in these elections. Black turnout was up substantially in the states with the most homogeneous black voting (Georgia and Alabama). In Arkansas, where almost half of black voters chose the Republican candidate, African Americans comprised only 9% of the voting public in 1998, well down from 27% eight years earlier (p. 108). These differences are noted but not explained. Potential voters must first decide whether to cast a ballot before deciding which candidate to support. Differences in black turnout may reflect the ability of the Democratic candidate to appeal to this core constituency. It may also stem from factors outside the gubernatorial race.

Streb’s content analysis does not capture these subtleties, but his qualitative analysis generally does. Unfortunately, there is some imbalance in the strength of the interview data from state to state. In Georgia and Alabama (where stronger racial appeals are found), his reliance on journalists and academics gives the impression of objectivity. The named sources in Arkansas are primarily Republican operatives whose glowing reports of appeals across racial lines might well be suspect. The unique aspects of the Arkansas election in terms of black turnout and candidate preference compound this deficiency.

Despite these weaknesses, *The New Electoral Politics of Race* does much to clarify the role that race continues to play in electoral contests. The theoretical argument for when candidates are likely to use racial appeals is especially important. Matthew Streb’s book should be read by students of race, elections, and southern politics.

Craig Thomas, representing the latter camp, has chosen a fascinating conflict for an in-depth investigation of interagency cooperation—the struggle over biodiversity, where litigation has triggered growing interest in such cooperation. By focusing on several case studies involving biodiversity disputes in California, Thomas illuminates the shifting terrain admirably and helps to vindicate his thesis that incentives to cooperate vary sharply within agencies, across agencies, and over time. California is a particularly appropriate choice for in-depth analysis, because it has more endangered and threatened species than any other state except Hawaii.

Unlike other scholars, who stress disincentives for interagency cooperation, Thomas argues that administrative agencies often cooperate. To understand when and why this occurs, he argues, we must look at exogenous factors, such as lawsuits, and the incentives of different types of agency officials.

Line managers, he posits, focus primarily on their agency and its well-being and seek to advance their agency by protecting its autonomy. For them, interagency cooperation is not particularly appealing.

Professionals, he asserts, have dual loyalties, to their agency and to their profession. When professions are dispersed across agencies, as is the case with natural-resource and wildlife agencies today, professionals can be avid promoters of interagency cooperation.

Field staff, he maintains, tend to identify closely with the community in which they reside. If interagency cooperation poses a threat to their local community, it inspires nervousness; if it offers benefits to their local community, it has some appeal.

Because line managers ultimately make policy for the agency, the key is for professionals to convince the line managers that interagency cooperation is in the agency’s best interest. Less importantly, it is also useful for professionals to persuade field staff that interagency cooperation will enhance the socioeconomic development of their community.

According to Thomas, litigation under the Endangered Species Act in the 1980s and 1990s enhanced the ability of conservation biologists and other ecologists to win over line managers to the cause of interagency cooperation. That is because some of the lawsuits focused on the failure of government agencies to obey legal requirements that they “consult” with the Fish and Wildlife Service concerning the impacts of agency policies and practices on biodiversity.

In Thomas’s narratives, the often-maligned Bureau of Land Management (BLM) emerges as a surprising supporter of interagency cooperation to promote biodiversity. As the target of more lawsuits than any other natural-resources agencies, the BLM and its California director, Ed Hastey, saw interagency cooperation as a benign method for taking ecological impacts into account on favorable terms and for avoiding lawsuits in the process.

But the BLM was not alone in promoting interagency cooperation. Prodded by conservation biologists and other professionals, a number of federal and state agencies embraced interagency cooperation, gingerly at first, but
eventually with some conviction. By 2002, for example, 39
government agencies had become members of the California
Executive Council on Biological Diversity (p. 148).

The case studies that comprise the core of this book are
unusually rich and well documented. Interviews with nearly a
hundred public officials provide most of the evidence for the
author’s conclusions, but he supplements the interviews with
government documents and other sources. For example, he
utilizes data on the attendance and participation of agency
representatives at meetings of the state Executive Council on
Biological Diversity.

In a commendable departure from custom, Thomas quotes
the overwhelming majority of his respondents by name. As a
result, it is possible to trace specific milestones and interven-
tions to particular individuals. An additional advantage of
this technique is that it humanizes the bureaucracy and makes
it relatively easy to discern how civil servants actually shape
administrative decisions.

Although impressive in many respects, the book does
have some limitations. First, the author does not explicitly
compare his analytical framework with others available to
students of interagency collaboration. One wonders, for
example, whether the author’s framework yields more or less
analytical leverage than resource dependence theory, organi-
zation theory, institutional theory, or an organizational cul-
ture perspective. Second, the author sidesteps a question of
critical importance—namely, whether interagency coopera-
tion actually produces good results. Are public policies more
efficient, more equitable, or more sustainable as a result of
interagency cooperation over biodiversity? The author
believes that the answer is yes, but his research mainly tells
us why cooperation occurs. In fact, one prominent state offi-
cial resigned from the Executive Council on Biological
Diversity because he thought it legitimized gubernatorial
inaction on biodiversity (p. 119). Other fragmentary evi-
dence also lends some credence to allegations that intera-
gency cooperation often amounts to “symbolic politics.”
Finally, the book sometimes suffers from a surfeit of detail.
Although the author’s enthusiasm for his subject is conta-
gious, some readers will wish for a little more attention to
the forest than to its trees.

Despite these limitations, the book is noteworthy for the
spotlight it throws on civil servants and political appointees
whose role in public policy innovation is often overlooked.
Thomas makes it clear that these individuals, motivated by
different impulses, pushed California and the nation to pay
closer attention to the ecological implications of land man-
agement decisions. Moreover, they pushed harder when cer-
tain external conditions were met. Thus, although he focuses
primarily on factors internal to the bureaucracy, he does give
external factors their due, especially in his narratives.

Bureaucratic Landscapes has considerable potential for
classroom use, in courses on public administration and envi-
ronmental policy. Students who anticipate careers in the civil
service will find good role models in this book. And students
who care about environmental politics will discover that the
best way to influence line managers at administrative agencies
may be through agency professionals who act as “moles” with-
in organizations whose primary mission has little to do with
biodiversity per se.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

296p. $65.00.

— Jakub Zielinski, Ohio State University

Josephine Andrews analyzes decision making in the Russian
Supreme Soviet (Parliament) between 1990 and 1993. Her
book has two objectives. On the one hand, it uses the case of
Russia to shed light on the main result of the social choice
theory—the intransitivity of collective preference under
majority rule. On the other, it relies on this result to explain
the behavior of Russia’s political elite. As such, the book
should be of interest to a wide audience of political scientists:
Russia specialists, scholars of legislative institutions, students
democratic transitions, and empirically minded, formal
theorists.

To get a flavor of the core theoretical argument, consider a
stylized legislature where three deputies, Dinissa, Katya, and
Olga, have to adopt a new constitution. Imagine that there
are three basic options: a parliamentary system, a premier-
presidential arrangement, and a presidential constitution.

Dinissa, who is an Anglophile, prefers the first alternative over
the second over the third. In love with France, Katya prefers
the second alternative over the third over the first. Finally,
Olga, impressed by the United States, prefers the third alter-
native over the first over the second. Imagine also that the
three legislators already have deliberated about the best course
of action and were unable to reach a consensus. Perhaps
their disagreement reflects divergent conjectures about the
efficiency and stability of different constitutional designs, or
perhaps it simply mirrors different financial ties to special
interests.

Since there is no consensus and since they live in a democ-
acy, they have to vote. If they had to decide between parlia-
mentarism and premier-presidentialism, then they would
select the parliamentary system because both Dinissa and
Olga prefer this alternative over the premier-presidential
design. On the other hand, if they were to choose between
parliamentarism and presidentialism, then the presidential
system would win, with Olga and Katya voting for and
Dinissa casting her ballot against. However, if presidentialism
were pitted against premier-presidentialism, then they would
adopt the premier-presidential system because both Katya
and Dinissa would be in favor and only Olga would be
opposed. Notice what happens here: In pairwise, majority
voting, presidentialism defeats parliamentarism, then pre-

cier-presidentialism defeats presidentialism, and finally par-

liamentarism defeats premier-presidentialism. In short, eachalternative defeats and in turn is defeated by some other alter-

native. As a result, while the preferences of each legislator are

fixed, the collective preference of the legislature cycles from

one constitutional design to the next.

Andrews derives two broad empirical implications from this

result. The first one is that legislative decision making may

exhibit a certain degree of confusion. In particular, in a given

session, legislators may pass a sequence of amendments only to
cycle back and adopt the original bill at the end of the day. This

problem should be especially pronounced in legislatures,
such as the Supreme Soviet, which have fairly permissive

amendment rules. The second implication is that the person

who controls the legislative agenda acquires a considerable
degree of power. For example, if Katya were in charge of sched-
uling parliamentary votes, she could begin the legislative ses-

tion by pairing parliamentarism against presidentialism and

then pit the winner of this contest against the premier-presi-
dential constitution. On the first ballot, presidentialism would

defeat parliamentarism, and on the second ballot, premier-

presidentialism would defeat presidentialism. As a result, by

being clever about the sequence of parliamentary votes, Katya
could ensure that the legislature adopts her most preferred

alternative. Since the same is true of Dinissa and Olga, it fol-

lows that the agenda setter is critically important.

Given these hypotheses, the book has two empirical objec-
tives: to demonstrate that preference cycling is not just a the-

oretical artifact but can plague a real-world legislature, and to

show that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan

Khasbulatov, was able to craft a legislative agenda that exploit-
ed such cycling to further his own political ambition. The

empirical section on legislative cycling is especially interesting.

It consists of a descriptive case study that carefully documents

the failure of the Supreme Soviet to pass a new constitution,

and it attributes this outcome to the cycling of preferences.

Moreover, Andrews presents a statistical analysis of roll-call

votes from the Supreme Soviet and argues that in addition to

the choice of a new constitution, preference cycling affected a

wide range of issues. As a result, it led to a permanent political

pathology that made the Supreme Soviet incapable of decision

making and thus contributed to a violent showdown between

the Supreme Soviet and the president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin.

While this argument has a considerable appeal, the theore-
tical side of the book could have been strengthened by a more

careful justification of the assumption of sincere voting. As

things stand, there is a certain tension in the underlying logic

because we are simultaneously asked to assume that legislators

are sincere while the agenda setter is highly strategic. To see

the significance of this point, return to the above example where

Katya controls the agenda. Notice that at the beginning of a

parliamentary session, Olga might anticipate that by voting

sincerely for presidentialism on the first ballot, she effectively

ensures the adoption of premier-presidentialism on the second

ballot. Since this is her worst possible outcome, she has an

incentive to vote strategically on the first ballot and support the

parliamentary system. This way, parliamentarism defeats presi-
dentialism on the first ballot, and then it defeats premier-
presidentialism on the second ballot. In short, Olga's craftiness
as a voter may foil Katya's careful planning as the agenda setter.
Along these lines, a clearer discussion of how Chairman

Khasbulatov was able to monopolize the agenda-setting powers

in the Supreme Soviet, given the Soviet's liberal amendment

rules, would have strengthened the empirical side. Over all,

however, When Majorties Fail constitutes a solid piece of com-

parative politics, and it contributes to our knowledge of legisla-
tive and constitutional politics, as well as to our understanding

of Russia's transition to democracy.

Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta,


University Press, 2002. 368p. $65.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

— Julio Faundez, University of Warwick

In 1973 General Augusto Pinochet led a military coup against

the democratically elected government of Chilean President

Salvador Allende. The coup brought to an end four decades of
democracy and a long tradition of constitutional govern-

ment. Pinochet's stated aims were to rid the country of the
cancer of Marxism and restore democracy and the rule of law.

To achieve these objectives, he established a reign of terror

aimed at silencing Allende's supporters and suppressing any

form of opposition. He destroyed unions, outlawed political

parties, closed the congress, and intervened in educational

institutions. During his regime, torture and murder became

essential instruments of state policy. Given this background,

the linkage that this book makes between Pinochet and con-

stitutionalism is, to say the least, provocative.

Robert Barros is not unaware of this problem. In Chapter 1

he makes it clear he is not arguing that Pinochet's regime was

restrained by the principles of liberal constitutionalism or that

his administration upheld the rule of law. He does argue, how-

ever, that legal rules enacted by Pinochet had the effect of curb-
ing the powers of his regime. The limitation of power brought

about by these rules is what he calls constitutionalism. On

the surface, it may appear as if Barros is simply making an argu-

ment about rules in any type of social setting. After all, even a

band of robbers is subject to rules. His argument, however, is

more ambitious and more specific. It is ambitious because his

objective is to develop a theoretical framework for understand-

ing politics and law under dictatorships. It is specific because he

argues that the rules enacted by Pinochet had the attributes of

legal standards.

Barros's main focus of attention is the constitution enacted

by Pinochet in 1980. This document contained an authori-

tarian vision of politics. It also envisaged the establishment, in

the future, of an elected president and legislature. Some of its

rules were especially designed so that at some later date,

Pinochet could transform himself from a dictator into a pop-

ularly elected president. As it turned out, however, these

expectations did not materialize, and in 1990 Pinochet
handed over power to a democratically elected president. Barros attributes this unintended outcome to the rules of the constitution. This interpretation leads him to raise an important question: Why did Pinochet and his colleagues in the armed forces create such rules? His answer is disarmingly simple: The conditions that made the emergence of such rules possible stem from the fact that Chilean armed forces are institutionally divided into separate services (army, navy, air force, and the police). Given that under the constitution the four heads of the armed services constituted the legislative power, there came into existence a mechanism that, according to Barros, operated in a way similar to the traditional separation of powers and led to the emergence of rules that restrained the behavior of the government (pp. 34–35).

The evidence on which Barros relies to construct his argument is taken mainly from minutes of meetings of the military junta, the drafting committee of the constitution, and other official bodies. Not surprisingly, these documents reveal several policy differences between Pinochet and members of the junta. Some of these differences relate to strategic questions, such as whether the government should ignore international pressure and press ahead with its repressive policies. Others relate to tactical differences, such as the type of repressive measures that the government should employ to confront the opposition. The policy disagreements recorded in these documents are the basis upon which Barros builds his argument about constitutionalism. These documents, however, were not public at the time and were only known to the inner circle of the regime. The author does not, however, consider the implications of the absence of publicity (and public debate) for his argument about constitutionalism, unless, of course, his argument is about ex post facto constitutionalism.

But Barros’s argument has other fundamental problems. First, he assumes that the views expressed by the members of the junta in their secret discussions with Pinochet represent the views and interests of their respective services. Although this assumption is not implausible, nowhere in the book does he explain the conflicting institutional interests of these services or how these interests were reflected in the junta’s deliberations and decisions. Instead, what the reader gets are excerpts from speeches—delivered mainly by the heads of the navy and air force—that reflect the personal preferences of the individuals concerned, but not the views of their institutions. Paradoxically, in terms of Barros’s argument, what these discussions show is the extraordinary political influence of one man, Jaime Guzmán, Pinochet’s most loyal and trusted civilian advisor.

Another serious difficulty with the author’s argument is his extremely flexible ideas as to what constitutes limitation of power. His interpretation of one of Pinochet’s most infamous decrees illustrates this problem. The decree in question (Decree Law 788 of December 1974) conferred the status of a constitutional amendment to any decree enacted by the junta before December 1974 that was inconsistent with the prevailing constitution. It also provided that in the future, only decrees that explicitly stated that they were amending the constitution would be regarded as having the force of a constitutional amendment, while the rest would have the status of ordinary laws. Barros argues that Decree 788 limited Pinochet’s powers because decrees that the government did not characterize as constitutional amendments would, from then on, be subject to review by the Supreme Court (pp. 101–3). This interpretation is astonishing and misleading. It is astonishing because the objective of the Decree, as its text makes clear, was to validate scores of arbitrary decrees enacted by the government during its first year in office. It is also misleading because throughout the Pinochet administration, the Supreme Court behaved as an arm of the executive, rather than as an independent branch of the state. Barros’s conception of what constitutes an effective limitation of power is so flexible as to be meaningless.

A further problem with the author’s argument is his view that the restraints on Pinochet resulted from the operation of legal rules. This formalistic argument is self-defeating and reveals a surprising lack of familiarity with studies on the impact of law in society. Even in open political systems, it is virtually impossible to ascertain whether political outcomes are directly attributable to legal rules as opposed to political, economic, or other factors. This is why scholars who study the role of law in society are so skeptical about legal formalism.

Despite these misgivings, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship does suggest some intriguing questions. Why were Pinochet and his advisors so obsessed with legality? What impact did Pinochet’s constitution have in shaping the transition to democracy? How much longer will Pinochet’s (and Guzmán’s) vision of politics haunt Chilean democracy? Scholars interested in pursuing these questions will find this book valuable, provided they do not take seriously the author’s attempt to reinterpret the hazy concept of constitutionalism.


— Suzanne Ogden, Northeastern University

In their book, Thomas Bernstein and XiaoBo Lu ask three major questions: What has led to the huge tax and levy burden on China’s peasants? Why has the central government not stopped it? Why has it not led to a major social movement in China? In addressing these issues, the authors have chosen to focus on “agricultural China,” the central and western provinces that, unlike the eastern coastal provinces of “industrializing rural China,” have not necessarily benefited from the many market-oriented reforms undertaken since the 1980s. It is in agricultural China that the central government has failed to match its exactions from the peasants with their capacity to pay. The one-policy-for-all approach to development policy has ignored the fact that local governments in this large region have lacked access to revenues generated by town and village enterprises. Further, the combination of the growth of centrally imposed “unfunded mandates” with the Center’s “revenue sharing” policies that favor the richer coastal provinces (and Tibet) has compelled local governments in the interior provinces to impose taxes, fees, and fines.
The authors conclude that the central government’s incentives to local governments to achieve its objectives are only sufficient to encourage local officials to develop their localities (providing career advancement for those who succeed). They are not sufficient to get local officials to meet its additional objective of lowering the tax burden. In any event, Beijing has given local governments an impossible task—developing without adequate revenues.

But why have these excessive tax burdens, catalogued exhaustively by the authors, not led to a social movement? Relying on local publications and press reports, the authors have pieced together a picture of peasant protest and resistance to excessive exactions in agricultural China. They contend that the Center, through numerous regulations, policies, and statements, has given the peasantry the strong impression that it stands on their side, against exploitation by local officials. Indeed, the Center has instituted a number of measures to protect peasants and to enable them to defend their interests. The authors provide a wealth of information about these measures and their impact on lessening the peasants’ burden. Some of the most important are institutionalizing village elections; encouraging those with grievances to write letters and make visits to officials; and allowing local protests, media coverage of egregious cases, and lawsuits against officials responsible for grievances. As a result, peasant anger is directed not at Beijing but at local government officials. Finally, the policy initiated during the reform period of allowing peasants to migrate to the towns and cities offers disgruntled and desperate peasants an exit strategy. This, too, relieves the pressures that might otherwise lead to an organized social movement.

These instruments and policies have allowed peasants to articulate their interests and to channel and contain their anger, but the authors also note the many cultural and institutional reasons that (excessive) taxation has not led to a social movement. Not the least of these is that a linkage between urban and rural grievances is nonexistent, and is unlikely to surface in a society where potential urban organizers both distrust and disdain the peasantry. Further, rural leaders have been unable to transcend the primarily local issues involved in collective peasant protests in order to unite large areas of the countryside in a broad-based social movement because peasants believe that their “excessive” burdens are imposed by local governments, not Beijing.

Bernstein and Lu have set their study in China’s historical and cultural context. They note that ad hoc levies had been a problem for more than two thousand years before the Communists came to power in 1949. They also note that the retention of certain post-1949 institutions, policies, and values once the communes were abandoned and agricultural reforms took hold in the 1980s led to a return of arbitrary levies. The authors conclude that local officials were squeezed by the Center’s many demands, and that political culture and institutional arrangements played an important role in the resulting mismanagement, corruption, and excessive fees. At the same time, they expose the central government’s dilemmas: It cannot afford to offend the politically powerful wealthier provinces by redistributing more of their wealth to the poorer provinces—and even if it could, it is unable to determine the actual distribution of wealth and poverty so that it can decide on an equitable tax structure. Furthermore, it has been unable to downsize the township bureaucracies, whose growing legions of officials are justified in the name of decentralization; yet their salaries can often only be paid by increasing fees, fines, and taxes on the local peasantry.

The reader must bear in mind that in spite of the title, this is a study purposefully limited to one part—the poorest part—of rural China. But Taxation Without Representation in Contemporary Rural China is so informative that it can only be hoped that the authors will now take on a study of “industrializing rural China.” The strength of the research is that it is not a mere case study but a broad regional investigation that allows them to put forth more general conclusions. Some of the authors’ efforts to apply theoretical constructs to their study, such as trying to determine where China fits on the continuum from a “developmental state” to a “predatory state,” seem ill-conceived, reflective of their own biases about the Chinese government, and unnecessarily distorting of China’s actual policies (e.g., comparing China to Zaire under Mobutu). A similar bias is reflected in their dismissal of such positive steps as the institutionalization of village elections, because they were primarily aimed at promoting rural stability rather than democracy for its own sake. Apart from failing to give the government credit for trying to maintain stability through elections rather than more coercive measures, they also fail to consider that it is rare indeed for any government to advance the cause of democracy without first doing a rational cost–benefit analysis of its impact on its own power.

The authors’ application of social movement theory is more revelatory. But their real contribution is the presentation of some of the dilemmas China faces as a modernizing state, dilemmas that China shares with other states having to address the complicated interwoven issues of taxation, decentralization, and unfunded mandates. The study also indicates, without the authors ever saying so, that the ideology of communism plays a limited role as the Chinese government addresses the quotidian issues of development. Rather, tax policy must be understood as one aspect of pragmatic development planning carried out in the context of China’s political culture, residual institutional arrangements, and limited resources.


—Strom C. Thacker, Boston University

Roderic Camp has spent a career studying Mexican elites. In Mexico’s Mandarins, he culminates three decades of research with a capstone volume that examines Mexico’s “power elite” in five sectors of society: politicians, military officers, clergy, intellectuals, and capitalists. Having previously published separate volumes on each of these groups, he extends that...
work by focusing on the critical roles that mentoring and networking play in the formation, linkages, and socialization of Mexican power elites, defined as a small set of people who control a power structure and who are linked to one another within, and sometimes between, their spheres of influence (paraphrased from p. 12).

Camp gives structure to ideas that Mexicanists have been familiar with for as long as they have been traveling to and studying the country. Drawing on an impressive array of widely varied literatures, he introduces such notions as political socialization, mentoring, and networking to make the complex, opaque, personalistic style of Mexican politics both more intelligible and comparable to other cases. It is one thing to say, as anyone who has tried to traverse the twisted trails of Mexican politics has, “you have to know the right people to get things done,” and quite another to delineate the manner in which individuals become power elites, the connections and relationships between them, their social backgrounds, the sources of their political socialization, and their impact on public policies. Drawing on background information on nearly four hundred individual power elites and extensive interviews, Camp gives us the most detailed and best account to date of Mexico’s elites. I know of no other study that comes close to it in both breadth and depth of coverage.

The most important contribution this book makes is its focus on the related concepts of networking and mentoring. By examining the roles of education, family background, geography, and social class, among others, Camp is able both to trace and explain patterns of networking and mentoring in Mexico. This gives us insight into how Mexican power elites exercise influence and how they reproduce themselves socially and politically. Perhaps more critically, he shows how such informal power networks can restructure formal organizations and institutions, as occurred during the economic reform process of the 1980s and the transition to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s.

According to Camp, such informal means of gathering and exercising power are more important in countries with relatively weak institutions. Thus, though his analysis is focused primarily on the Mexican case, its lessons are relevant to a host of developing nations with similar institutional weaknesses. In fact, this is one area where the author could have gone even further. The processes that shape power elites can often be found to be similar across countries. Therefore, it would be useful to see how other countries compare to Mexico. For example, Camp draws brief comparisons to other developing countries. Such comparisons raise as many questions as they answer, however. Do similar patterns of power elite recruitment, socialization, networking, and mentoring occur in other countries, with similar institutional endowments? If not, why not? A full comparison would require an inordinate amount of detailed data on other countries, such as that which Camp presents for Mexico. This raises a related point. How can we explain patterns of power elite politics? Camp does an excellent job of explaining changes in power elite composition and values (through changes in education patterns, for example). But he pays less attention to questions of power politics raised by his elite analysis. Why does the relative power of different elite groups change over time? How does influence over policy shift from group to group and over time? Camp offers some suggestive hypotheses to explain such patterns (e.g., the debt crisis empowered technocrats in the Bank of Mexico over other elite groups and gave them control over economic policy), but he does not develop them fully. It is likely that institutional dynamics, material interests, and external factors help determine the winners and losers within the power elite and their relative influence over policy. To understand the role that power elites play in Mexican politics, we need to know why different actors want what they want, how they fight to get it, and how their power relationships with each other and other social actors and institutions vary. Such factors come up frequently during the narrative, but typically in an ad hoc manner that contrasts with Camp’s more systematic treatment of the factors of elite socialization, for example.

The data and interpretations in this book are solid. While one could argue with the agglomeration of politicians, military officers, clergy, intellectuals and capitalists into a single category, Camp brings a tremendous amount of information to bear on these five distinct groups of elites. One minor quibble is that some of the relationships he highlights, such as the impact of adult residence or foreign education on elite values, may suffer from circularity problems. It is plausible to argue, for example, that more internationally oriented elites will choose to study abroad, whereas Camp’s analysis suggests that it is the study-abroad experience that gives such people an international orientation. In the same vein, there are some apparently minor contradictions in this book. For example, Camp argues that Mexican elites use mentoring and networking because formal organizational channels of influence are weak, yet he explains the relative lack of mentoring and networking by intellectuals as a function of the lack of structure and institutionalization in that realm (pp. 19 and 22).

In sum, despite the issues raised here, this is an excellent book that makes a major contribution to the study of elites in its focus on networking and mentoring. It is likely to become the standard source on Mexican elites, and required reading for all scholars of Mexican politics.


— Michael A. Launius, Central Washington University

This text may perhaps be best viewed as an exercise in theory building aimed at developing an argument analyzing popular premises that liberal democracy is a political form conducive to the generation of economic development, particularly as applied in the context of developing countries. The attempt may be viewed as particularly timely and important given
the current nation-building challenges presented in such places as the Balkans, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The argument is constructed around a model that the author posits as a “2 × 3 + 1 axis,” wherein the first set of three concepts are economic, civil, and political liberalism and the second set of concepts are security, stability, and information and openness. These six concepts interact together and are embedded in a particular “institutional matrix,” which is the seventh concept used to explain the democracy-development connection in the various East Asian countries (primarily Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea) developed as case studies in the later part of the text. The book appears designed to appeal most directly to scholars of political theory, comparative political development, and East Asian studies.

The text is divided into two parts; the first addresses the present context of democratization and the “decomposing” or disaggregating of the fundamental concepts of liberal democracy, while the second deals with the ongoing democracy-development debate within the subfield of comparative politics, as well as the contending explanations of East Asia’s relative developmental successes. Both parts are in essence extensive, thorough, and complex reviews of the relevant literature dominating the academic discourse concerning the aforementioned areas. This rather exhaustive literature review is perhaps the major strength of the work, as it not only presents the major contending arguments currently dominating the academic discourse but also subjects them to a very rigorous examination in terms of their individual strengths and weaknesses. This is augmented by the author’s impressive attention to theoretical detail, subtlety, and nuance as she deals with the many and diverse perspectives and approaches brought together. Graduate students in particular are going to appreciate the degree to which this work will assist them in organizing and synthesizing the relevant literatures dealing with both democracy and comparative development.

Of particular interest and utility is Sylvia Chan’s decomposing or disaggregating of the concept of liberal democracy into three discrete variants or subtypes, which are labeled “political,” “civil,” and “economic” democracy, her point being that each sphere has its own unique virtues and dynamics and will be present to varying degrees in different polities. To Chan, lumping all these dimensions of democracy together significantly confuses the analytical discourse, causes conceptual confusion, and facilitates mismeasurement and misunderstanding of complex developmental processes. This conceptual disaggregation may be viewed as the most important theoretical and procedural contribution that this work makes to the analysis of political and economic development studies.

Another important contribution is the author’s advocacy of moving from a “statist institutionalism” to a more “inclusionary form of institutionalism” when investigating the state and potentially constraining institutional settings “across time, societies, and industrial sectors” in various East Asian countries (p. 192). This focus advocates greater attention to the various policy consultation bodies, state-sponsored industrial peak organizations, export cartels, and informal interpersonal networks that are usually characteristic of East Asian polities. This approach supports and adds to Richard Doner’s arguments (“Limits of State Strength: Toward an Institutionalist View of Economic Development,” World Politics 44 [April 1992]: 398–431).

However, Liberalism, Democracy, and Development is not without its drawbacks. First, while the literature review is on the one hand laudatory, it is also perhaps overly thorough, ing into such great detail and unpacking approaches with such complexity that the average, nontheoretician reader may often feel not just confused but overwhelmed. This would be particularly true for those readers primarily looking for new insights offered in the case studies of East Asian experiences, rather than those primarily interested in the nuances and subtleties of developmental theory. The text’s strength clearly lies in the latter area.

Second, there seems a lack of balance between the theoretical and case study treatments; one has to get to page 191 of a 236-page text before the case studies are encountered. Those readers whose interests are driven primarily by a desire for in-depth information on the Chinese, Korean, or Japanese experience are likely to feel shorted. In addition, the text’s case studies rely almost exclusively on secondary sources rather than primary research for the critical data, with the result that the case studies may be perceived as lacking compelling currency. Although the author introduces the recent works of a welcome number of East Asian researchers (Teranishi Juro, Tsuru Shigeto, Kong Tat Yan, and Pei Minxin, to name a few), in addition to those of more well known and established authors, such as Samuel Huntington and T. J. Pempel, most of these data sources are already 10 to 15 years old. This is a vexing problem when dealing with dynamically developing political economies, such as those of the various East Asian states.

Nevertheless, Chan makes a strong case that the terms of debate on whether or not liberal democracy enhances economic development have in the past been poorly specified in the literature dealing with the East Asian experience. She persuasively argues that these systems have incorporated some liberal democratic elements, but with different institutions and manifestations. Hence, she concludes that “liberal democracy may help development in some respects, and a different mix of liberties in Asia (together with a particular set of institutions and under particular historical circumstances) can achieve a high level of development” (p. 232). In the final analysis, Chan has contributed an ambitious and thought-provoking work to the growing body of literature that focuses on the continuing debate over the precise nature of the connection between democracy and economic development.


— Marc Georges Pufong, Valdosta State University

In the early 1990s and right after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (TEU), most books
published on law and politics of the European Union fell into two categories. The first were either collections of articles, casebooks, or descriptive-type books weighing heavily on the legal, political, and structural aspects of the community (see, for example, L. N. Brown and T. Kennedy, *The Court of Justice of the European Communities*, 1995). The second category focused almost exclusively on the impact of economic integration and the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in that process. In this category, while some books focused directly on the jurisprudence and doctrinal impact of ECJ's case decisions on member states, others used existing theories and analyses of international relations to explain the role of the Court of Justice in the process of European integration. Some examples of the latter category of contributions include Renaud Dehouse's *The European Court of Justice*, 1998; Ann Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet, and J. H. H. Weiler's *The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence*, 1998; and Karen Alter's *Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Jurisprudence*, 1995.

In *Justice Contained*, Lisa Conant takes an approach in examining the European Court of Justice that is radically different from that of previous scholars. She explores the interaction between the ECJ, law and politics, and the impact of the Court's own decisions tied to its effects and the implications of its rulings on those affected in the real world. She sets a bold course to challenge the proposition that an "activist" European Court of Justice has brought about profound policy and institutional change within EU member states. To that end, she examines the "scope of ECJ's authority" in European politics and its policymaking process. She questions how the Court contributed to taming sovereign states who previously were combatants in one of the deadliest wars of the twentieth century to accept its rulings, which undermined their control over sovereign regulatory regimes. Undeniably, Conant is intrigued by prospects of the ECJ, a centralized international institution claiming to exert influence over sovereign member states in the absence of any mechanism of coercion.

Underscoring a widely held view of ECJ's judicial activism, Conant argues that since the Court, as do domestic courts in liberal democracies, depends on the support of powerful organized interests to gain compliance of its rulings, its influence is not predicated on its "activist" rulings alone. For example, she posits that the ECJ exercises its influence beyond the courtroom largely through the efforts of member states and societal actors who come to support its decisions. This, she argues, explains the Court's influence, rather than its activism. Drawing on the wide array of existing scholarship on the United States Supreme Court, Conant depicts the limits that the ECJ and other tribunals have. In the eight chapters of this book, she illuminates these limitations and traces ECJ's decisional impact and effect. She does so in four case studies on "market competition and national competition" in the EU (see Chapters 4–7, pp. 96–212). In the last chapter, she anticipates and sums up the Court's legal interpretations that are likely to inspire major reforms.

Initially, Chapter 1 does more than set the agenda for the source and conditions of judicial power in the EU. It challenges the conventional view that the impact of ECJ can be attributed to the compelling legal and functional logic of its decisions to include the strategic accommodation of national interest and support for national courts (pp. 15–49). Chapter 2 establishes that broader policy effects of ECJ decisions are a function of the reaction of organized societal and institutional actors supporting legal claims. Conventional explanations, Conant maintains, place too much emphasis on the enforcement of many ECJ decisions by national courts, as well as on the difficulty that unanimous voting poses for overturning decisions through treaty revision. Drawing from Charles Epp's theory of "support structure for legal mobilization" in *Rights Revolution* (1998), she styles her study with the contention that judicial influence over major processes of reform relies on a much broader mobilization of pressure for policy change.

In Chapter 3, Conant argues that while the ECJ and its case law command respect in the EU, the operation of an effective supranational legal system does not necessarily lead to judicial control over policy outcome. This is the case because compliance with the Court's decisions cannot be equated with policy change. It is argued that existing accounts often treat innovative Court rulings as binding policy prescriptions. This, she contends, conflates the application of legal interpretation in particular cases with the adoption of general reforms. By exploring how legal institutions generate fragmented patterns of authority, this chapter identifies gaps between ECJ case law and policy processes within the EU and its member states (pp. 50–94).

In Chapters 4 and 5, Conant presents case studies demonstrating institutional constraints that characterize the European legal system. In Chapter 4, she establishes that the evolution of interests and mobilization of pressure associated with telecommunications liberalization contributed to a dramatic instance of reform. Furthermore, she demonstrates that while member states retained a substantial degree of control over the process of regulatory policymaking, the competing interests associated with liberalization foreclosed the capacity of national governments to either actively evade or passively accept legal obligations (p. 96). In Chapter 5, Conant chronicles the evolution of legal obligations by tracing the policy responses and competing interests connected to the mobilization of pressure and policy outcomes. She establishes that the concentration and intensity of interests affecting the liberalization of electricity contributed to a political process that limited the scope of policy change (pp. 122–50).

Writing with a distinctive style, Conant joins those who argue that pressure groups and institutions contribute to judicial policy impact in both the EU and the United States. Her analysis, however, develops a general theoretical framework to explain the origins and consequences of variable patterns of legal and political mobilization. Her arguments contribute to an understanding of judicial power by assessing the type of mobilization that is likely to occur across issues and by tracing the views in which the mobilization of pressure
mediates policy outcomes. The debate, she argues, addresses a common question, namely, whether courts can impose their decisions against the will of states and governing majorities.

Conant sums up Chapter 8 with a comparative analysis of judicial power, identifying the ECJ as an institution with greater similarities to domestic courts than to international organizations. She maintains that while specific constraints on judicial influence vary across polities, the procedures and formal competencies assigned to courts usually operate to check the scope of judicial control in all democratic systems. Summarily, Justice Contained advances a deeper and yet unique understanding of the ECJ’s contributions to EU integration and the economics of litigation and reform. It demonstrates that institutional and political processes mediate judicial authority and argues that far from dictating policymaking in the EU, the ECJ acts in concert with other institutions.

The only shortcoming of the book lies perhaps with repetitiveness. However, scholars interested in comparative courts and judicial politics, especially the ECJ in the process of European integration, should not hesitate in reading this very interesting book. Faculty teaching graduate seminars in law and politics of the European Union will also find in it a suitable course addition.


—Elke K. Zuern, Sarah Lawrence College

The inability of standard political science approaches to fully capture dramatic processes of social change has led to a flurry of articles and books attempting to explain the South African transformation. Authors who underline the surprising nature of this transformation most often miss the struggles and the incremental and monumental processes of change that had been taking place in communities across the country. In short, they focus on relatively static conceptions of institutions over more dynamic accounts of agency that capture the actions not only of elite political actors but also of ordinary South Africans.

Jamie Frueh avoids these pitfalls by focusing his analysis of transformation upon an investigation of the political identities of actors. Within this critical constructivist approach, popular understandings of identity and identity labels become the basis for investigating social change. This innovative approach offers the possibility for a more fluid and complex understanding of social change than that which an individualist or structuralist perspective can offer. While the author stresses the importance of context and the danger of universalist approaches, he does offer this study as an example of the promise of an identity label approach to investigating social change in other contexts.

In order to investigate shifts in identity, Frueh chooses three significant, contentious periods in South Africa’s larger transformation process: the Soweto uprising in 1976, the mobilization in response to constitutional changes in 1983–84, and crime in postapartheid society. It is interesting that the author does not include a case study between 1990 and 1994, often narrowly defined as “the transition period”; although Frueh correctly notes that much has been written on this short period, he does not sufficiently explain why he excludes it from his analysis (except for a very cursory discussion of negotiations and violence on pp. 138–39) or consider how this exclusion may affect his conclusions.

For each of the three cases, Frueh investigates the struggle over the labeling of actors and their actions. In the case of Soweto 1976, the South African media describe riots occurring across the country, the apartheid government depicts a conspiracy led by a small group of insurgents, and the evolving antiapartheid movement defines a popular uprising. As the majority of South Africans, and increasingly outsiders as well, come to view these events as a popular uprising in response to very real and justified grievances, a heightened sense of activism, agency, and possibility for change is born. During the constitutional reform process, Frueh identifies media accounts that highlight increasing social divisions and debate, a government seeking to champion controlled reform, and a now-explicit antiapartheid movement promoting the concept of “people’s power.” In the postapartheid period, he moves to investigate discourses on crime, using people’s stories as a way of uncovering their understandings of their own identity and that of others. Here, once again, Frueh offers three perspectives: the media, which frame the discourses on crime; the government, which seeks to construct authority; and anticrime movements, which respond to the consistently high levels of criminal violence.

Frueh argues that the transformation of any social order is an “overwhelmingly complex phenomenon” (p. 169), which makes it impossible to study the transformation as a whole. This is certainly true. The question then becomes whether or not Frueh’s work has offered new insights into this complex process. By investigating competing discourses during each period, he has effectively demonstrated how the rhetorical construction of identities changed from one period to the next, providing a new perspective on the breadth and depth of social change in South Africa. But, in designing his inquiry, the author has placed too much emphasis on some members of society over others, limiting the reader’s understanding of some of the important contestations over identity that occurred within the majority of the population.

Across each of these cases, the third category is consistently too broad and becomes a catchall of sorts for widely varying forms of popular dissent. In the second case, for example, Frueh emphasizes the different perspectives within white communities (reflected in the media) concerning the new constitution, but not enough emphasis is placed upon conflicts occurring among competing actors claiming to represent the majority. Although he mentions the contrast between Black Consciousness and Charterist approaches and the presence of churches, labor unions, communists, the Pan
Africanist Congress (PAC), and Inkatha as claimants, he largely ignores the highly contentious interactions between these actors by simply concluding that Charterism won the day (pp. 126–27). In emphasizing the construction of new understandings and identities, the analysis unfortunately misses the great uncertainty of the time and the contingent nature of any shift in identities. This limits a fuller understanding of the shape of present-day society and the ongoing struggles over the future of the nation.

Despite these criticisms, Frueh offers an innovative and productive approach to the investigation of social change that is sure to promote fruitful debate. His very understanding of agency as residing in identity labels rather than actors is extremely provocative, and his argument that no one “is an agent all or even most of the time” (p. 171) leads the author of the book’s forward, Nicholas Onuf, to clearly state his disagreement (p. xvii). Frueh’s approach suggests that actors must have some legitimacy or social recognition to embody agency, but he does not fully address the crucial question: at what point does an actor become an agent? How do the powerless take on agency?

Although his conclusions concerning the South African case, where he sees a shift in identity labels and with them a shift “from race- to issue-centered politics” (p. 157) and a diffusion of power (p. 178), may be a bit optimistic, his analysis offers much to consider not only for specialists on South Africa but also those interested in processes of social change more broadly. In Political Identity and Social Change, Frueh has clearly and importantly demonstrated the power of identity labels, both in the ways they are constructed and reconstructured and in the ways in which these constructions then impact future actions or ideas as to which actions are appropriate or possible.


— Charles L. Davis, University of Kentucky

This book’s contribution can be situated within larger debates among comparativists about the appropriate theoretical objectives and methods to guide comparative research. At one end of the continuum, one finds area or country specialists who utilize thick descriptions and develop complex causal explanations with little or no attention to their generalizability. At the other end of the continuum, one finds those scholars less concerned with particular cases or area studies and more concerned with developing highly generalizable theories. Such work typically utilizes large-n studies and develops parsimonious explanations, in contrast to the complex explanations of the area-studies specialists.

Between these two extremes, one finds what Peter Evans calls “the eclectic messy center” (Atul Kohli et al., “The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium,” World Politics 48 [October 1995]: 1–49). This approach to comparative politics is more concerned with real-world problems of particular places than with theory development. Alternative theoretical perspectives provide useful tools for analyzing concrete problems, but generality becomes a less important goal and only limited generalizations are pursued. This approach implies attention to a relatively small number of cases and a willingness to develop “thicker” causal explanations than those found in the large-n studies. Moreover, one is likely to find in the problem-focused research of the eclectic messy center more attention to normative issues and to policy implications.

The book under review essentially seeks to develop a useful analytical framework for studying contemporary Latin American politics and society from that eclectic messy center. Manuel Antonio Garretón et al. view the grand development theories from the past—modernization theory, dependency theory, Marxism, and so on—as inadequate for understanding contemporary sociopolitical phenomena in Latin America and the profound structural transformations that have occurred in recent decades. What they propose is a thicker analytical framework, constructed around their idea of a sociopolitical matrix to fill the void in contemporary development theory. As the authors put it, “we concur with those who espouse the need to move from grand paradigms to middle-level hypotheses; from unicausal and unidirectional theories to the study of inter-related processes; and from understanding change as a form of essentialist determinism between structures to reciprocal historical causation across economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions” (p. iii).

A sociopolitical matrix (SPM) is comprised of “relationships among the state, a structure for representation or a party system . . ., and a socioeconomic base of social actors with cultural orientations and relations (including the participation and diversity of civil society outside formal state structures)—all mediated institutionally by the political regime” (p. 2). Essentially, a matrix provides a heuristic device to identify the interacting economic, structural, cultural, and political dimensions that define a particular society and to examine processes of sociopolitical change. There is no attempt to establish any system of causal ordering or analytical priority among any of these diverse dimensions.

SPMs go through a process of emergence, consolidation, and decomposition, reflecting societal and political transformations occurring within particular societies. In order to consolidate an SPM, the cultural system (particularly conceptions of modernity), the social base, social movements, and systems of representation must be mutually reinforcing and congruent with the dominant development model. Conversely, decomposition or disarticulation of an SPM comes about as the matrix of reinforcing relations among culture, society, the economy, and the state begins to disintegrate. The primary exogenous forces leading to SPM decomposition and reconfiguration within Latin American societies are structural transformations of the international economy and of geopolitical environment and concomitant changes in the development model. This work examines the “statist-nationalist-popular SPM” that characterized Latin American societies from
the 1930s to the 1980s, the decomposition of this SPM due to the forces of economic globalization, and the failed effort to construct a viable neoliberal alternative and possibilities for the recomposition of a more viable SPM in the face of increasing economic globalization.

According to the authors, a relatively consolidated, fused, statist-nationalist SPM emerged in many Latin American countries during the pre-1980 era. The developmental model of that era was premised on state-directed import-substitution industrialization (ISI). That model was premised on a conception of modernity associated with the reproduction of the Western industrial model in late-developing societies. As the authors succinctly explain, the ISI model was "centered on the domestic generation of an industrial society in which social classes became the 'allies of development' around a national, proactive, mobilizing state as the 'agent of development'" (p. 45). The proactive state became a central unifying force of the prevailing SPM, even if representational systems in some countries were weakened by the hybrid nature of ostensibly democratic regimes and by the problematic incorporation of the newly mobilized lower classes.

The autarkic model that guided development in much of postwar Latin America was not compatible with the increasingly liberalized global economy of that era. As a consequence, the region became increasingly marginalized in the international economy, even though becoming geopolitically important due to the Cold War (Chap. 3). By the late seventies and particularly as a consequence of the debt crisis of the 1980s, the ISI development strategy became increasingly less viable. Hence, Latin American countries turned to an export-oriented development strategy and structural readjustment that led to increasing insertion in the global economy. The book provides a superb discussion of the many forms of globalization and shows how Latin American countries have adjusted historically to transformations of the global economy (Chap. 3). The current shift in the development model has occurred in a context of political democratization, growing social exclusion, and the emergence of conflicting conceptions of modernity (Chap. 4).

In brief, the authors argue that the attempted construction of a neoliberal sociopolitical matrix from the ruins of the decomposition of the statist-nationalist-popular SPM has proven to be a failure (Chap. 5). They argue that "a new stable matrix of relations between the state and society and their key components has not consolidated itself" (p. 63) and that "most Latin American countries that tried to follow the neoliberal market-driven agenda of structural reforms failed to achieve sustainable development" (pp. 70–71). The problems with the neoliberal development model and SPM are not simply ones of economic sustainability but also of social exclusion, the weakened nation-state, the lack of an effective party system and systems of representation, and problems of "generating legitimacy, and providing for its own reproduction" (p. 67).

In the concluding chapter (Chap. 5), the authors consider prospects for transitions to a more democratic, progressive, and socially integrative SPM to overcome the pattern of continued drift and decomposition found in many countries. The achievement of their preferred SPM, they argue, depends on continuing integration into the global economy but with states capable of retaining some control and influence over economic outcomes, a stronger civil society and system of popular representation, and an integrative national ideology to overcome growing social and cultural diversity. A central argument throughout the book is that analysts of structural transformations in Latin America need to examine more than simple transitions from one type of regime to another or from one set of economic policies to another; they need to adopt a holistic perspective that takes into account the entire sociopolitical matrix, including social and cultural dimensions.

*Latin America in the 21st Century* provides a useful analytical framework for analyzing the major structural transformations that have radically changed the sociopolitical landscape of Latin America in recent decades. The framework is useful for generating complex or thick explanations of these phenomena, rather than parsimonious explanations. As such, it may be best suited for case studies and small-n studies in which the analyst seeks to unravel the complexities of domestic sociopolitical matrices in specific cases and to connect matrix change to the shifting international environment. There is no reason why this analytical tool would not be of major interest to comparatists and area specialists whose area focus is outside Latin America.

How this framework might be used in future studies is given little attention here. The authors are far more concerned with identifying deficiencies in the neoliberal model and with the presumed failure to construct a viable SPM in Latin America (see Chaps. 5 and 6). The case for the deficiencies of the neoliberal model is convincing. I would also agree with the normative preferences set forth by the authors in making their case for "an ethically desirable potential new SPM" (p. 98). However, I am not convinced that "the neoliberal project to construct a market-driven matrix has aborted in Latin America" (p. 94). While it has been contested in a variety of countries, this project remains stubbornly hegemonic despite the deficiencies that are noted in this study. Perhaps the critical factor sustaining neoliberalism has more to do with its congruence with the realities of geopolitics and of the current global capitalist economy than with its effects on the domestic sociopolitical order.


— Gregory A. Huber, Yale University

In their book, John Huber and Charles Shipan propose and test a theory identifying the conditions under which bureaucracies are imbued with independent policymaking authority. The core theoretical development derives from the authors' efforts to bridge the gap between existing theorizing in the American politics literature on the sources of bureaucratic discretion and in the European parliamentary context about policymaking in minority and coalition governments. Huber and
Shipan argue that rather than addressing these topics separately, progress in understanding the implications of institutional arrangements for executive governance is best made by simultaneously comparing policymaking within and across these institutional forms. To judge by their robust and interesting results, this is indeed a fruitful enterprise.

The core theoretical arguments, with technical details relegated to an appendix, are presented in Chapter 4. The theory focuses attention on the relative costs and benefits of producing detailed legislation. High levels of political conflict between legislators and bureaucrats, who are presumed to implement the wishes of the chief executive or relevant cabinet minister, lead legislators to desire restraints on bureaucratic discretion. Writing long and detailed legislation, however, is costly. It takes legislators, particularly those without high levels of expertise, away from other tasks. Furthermore, the very demand for this type of legislation can increase the difficulty of securing it because new laws are subject to review by a hostile executive and a potentially hostile second chamber in bicameral legislatures. These effects are mitigated, however, when legislators have other tools for controlling bureaucratic behavior ex post.

The empirical analysis is divided into two sections, the first examining the design of Medicaid laws in the American states during 1995 and 1996 and the second examining European labor legislation from 1986 to 1998. These undertakings build on an in-depth and comparative look at the nature of statutory controls in Chapter 3 and the case study of Michigan in Chapter 5. Chapter 3 deserves attention from a wide audience for demonstrating that 1) longer laws place greater constraints on bureaucratic behavior, and 2) the use of procedural controls to limit bureaucratic discretion is more common in separation-of-powers systems than in parliamentary systems.

Huber and Shipan’s statistical analysis of the length of state Medicaid legislation largely confirms their theoretical predictions, showing that policy conflict (divided government) leads to longer legislation, but that this effect is mitigated by 1) a lack of legislative capacity, 2) conflict among the chambers of the legislature, and 3) the existence of a legislative veto that otherwise checks agency discretion. In the parliamentary context, legislation is longer during periods of coalition government and longest during periods of minority government, but these effects are diminished by rapid government turnover early in a government’s tenure. These chapters are also noteworthy for their close link to the posited theory and for the careful attention given to evaluating alternative explanations.

Despite the overall strength of this work, several limitations remain. First, the statistical models are constructed around imperfect measures of autonomy. The authors make a strong case for the number of words governing agency behavior as a proxy for constraints on bureaucratic discretion, but then use the total number of new words in state Medicaid legislation (p. 141) and pages per legislative enactment for European labor laws (p. 177) as their dependent variables. The problem with both measures is that the “words in legislation” approach does not account for the cumulative degree of constraints on bureaucratic discretion. In the Medicaid case, that is because new laws rarely create policy anew or without reference to existing statutes. In Huber and Shipan’s coding, however, a new law that adds 100 words to an existing statute is treated the same way as a law that deletes 200 words of text and replaces it with only 100. Similarly, states that already have long (or short) laws on the books may have no need to replace them with short (or long) laws absent a shift from (to) divided government. In the analysis of European legislation, using passed laws as the unit of observation compounds this limitation. Absent amendment, constraints on discretion persist. It would seem more appropriate to use the cumulative total of words of labor law in force in a given year (perhaps broken down by issue) to measure the contemporaneous degree of bureaucratic discretion. By comparison, it would be inappropriate to evaluate the degree of judicial autonomy by examining the sentencing discretion given to judges in statutes enacted in a given year. Existing laws and sentencing guidelines might otherwise constrain judges. Looking in isolation at the number of words in individual pieces of legislation is different from examining active constraints on discretion.

Second, there is scant evidence in this work that statutory constraints on bureaucratic discretion substantially alter policy outcomes. This is ironic, given that Huber and Shipan frame their work in Chapter 2 around a forceful criticism of the existing empirical work on the political control of the bureaucracy (pp. 23–26). Perhaps legislative specificity is simply a substitute for other forms of agency control, or perhaps it is purely symbolic and has no effect at all on agency behavior. If one accepts Huber and Shipan’s assertion that bureaucrats are largely under the control of the executive, it would be straightforward to demonstrate (perhaps with a survey of state legislators) that oppositional legislators are less satisfied with bureaucratic performance when another legislative chamber sympathetic to the governor inhibits the passage of highly specific legislation.

That this hypothetical exercise would constitute a test of Huber and Shipan’s theory points to perhaps a more fundamental limitation of their packaging of the book as identifying the “institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy.” Bureaucrats in this model are not autonomous when imbued with bureaucratic discretion, but instead are perfect agents of some other actor. It is a thin autonomy, however, that is nothing more than the slavish implementation of a governor’s or cabinet minister’s ideal policy. In separation-of-powers systems, it is critical to determine which actor—the executive, the legislature, or the bureaucracy itself—“wins” in the presence of agency discretion. This is, of course, the goal of the “political control of the bureaucracy” scholarship that the authors seek to move beyond. Unfortunately, a pure focus on statutes cannot resolve this question.

These limitations notwithstanding, Deliberate Discretion is a substantial step forward in the institutionally based study of bureaucracy and policymaking. Huber and Shipan’s work is an impressive theoretical and empirical undertaking of great relevance to students of American and comparative politics alike.


— Sikata Banerjee, University of Victoria

“Towards Equality,” the 1974 report of the Committee on the Status of Women commissioned by the Indian government—now regarded by Indian feminists as a landmark document—revealed the postcolonial Indian state’s dismal record in protecting women’s health, education, and political rights. In the wake of this report, scholars intensified their investigation of the relationship between women’s lives and the developmental strategies followed by the postcolonial state in India. Consequently, a plethora of “Women in Development” literature in the tradition of Maria Mies’s (1982) *Lace Makers of Narasapur* argued that capitalism and mechanization, fused with patriarchy and caste hierarchy, have actually decreased the status of women in India. Falling sex ratios (the number of women per thousand men fell from 954 in 1971 to 927 in 1997)—the most dramatic evidence of this decline—illustrated that, in some cases, the impact of modernization on Indian women has literally led to death. The two books under review fall into this genre of critical feminist literature.

Women’s lived experiences form the analytic focus of both these volumes. The series of essays edited by Karin Kapadia challenge neoliberal assumptions that economic growth has actually created better lives for a majority of women in India, while Rajeswari Sunder Rajan argues that Indian democracy has failed to provide a welfare net for women and enforce its constitutional promise to protect their rights of citizenship.

The general argument underlying the essays in *The Violence of Development* is rather alarming: “[O]ne of the major findings to emerge from these papers is that in recent decades there has been a strengthening of male-biased (‘patriarchal’) norms and values across all castes and classes in India, simultaneously with increasing economic development” (p. 4). In the interest of brevity, this review will draw on two of the more provocative themes framing the essays: the danger of capitalist modernization and the futility of women’s political participation.

The authors draw on a wealth of empirical and ethnographic data—one of the major contributions of this volume—to reveal the myriad ways in which modernization has decreased the quality of many Indian women’s lives. While a bit more theorizing about the social construction of “woman” in the Indian context might have enhanced the arguments, this is a minor drawback, as the reader appreciates the authors’ refreshing and well-supported empirical challenges to many of the unquestioned claims advanced by policymakers in their enthusiastic quest to liberalize economies and rely on macroindicators for signs of progress. The oft-repeated truism that economic growth leads to some kind of female empowerment, which in turn leads to declining fertility rates, is cleverly challenged by Padmini Swaminathan. Conventional modernization arguments claim that gender-neutral capitalism will increase women’s education and employment opportunities, thus enabling women to demand rights to control their pregnancies. Consequently, high female labor participation and low fertility rates are read as signs of a rise in female status. Swaminathan’s detailed analysis of women in rural Tamil Nadu complicates the above truism. She finds that the least-educated and most-disadvantaged women have lower (for various cultural reasons) fertility rates than women with more economic advantages. Further, the increases in female employment tracked in Tamil Nadu are mostly in low-paying informal sector jobs. Indeed, adolescent girls are being removed from school to earn, while their brothers remain to receive a higher education. Nirmala Banerjee’s well-argued piece on the link between economic growth and consumerism and violence against women shores up Swaminathan’s points.

According to Banerjee, even families in which women are well educated and professional have not moved beyond the notion that women’s primary social roles are wife and mother. She does not extensively illustrate the exact manner in which these roles hinder an educated woman, and here some reliance on the extensive existing body of theorizing on the social construction of “woman” in the Indian context would enhance her argument. For example, she could have posed the following questions: How do professional, middle-class women—it is important to remember that lower-caste/class women have always worked outside the home—challenge elite Indian ideals of womanhood? What implications does this have for women’s lives? How do women negotiate between tradition and challenge? Banerjee’s most chilling argument is the link among consumerism, dowry, and female infanticide. Challenging conventional arguments that cite poverty and restrictive cultural norms as explanatory causes, she shows that it is not the desperately poor but the upwardly mobile who kill their girl children, and “these decisions are now being made by individual families purely on the basis of private calculations of cost and benefits; there is no pressure of community traditions” (p. 47). Karin Kapadia’s essay supports Banerjee’s claims as she traces the manner in which dowries brought by brides are seen as a quick and easy way to either buy consumer goods or receive venture capital in a rapidly globalizing India.

Female political participation may form a potent way of resisting the above economic contradictions, and the four articles by Revathi Narayanan, Seemanthini Niranjana, Shail Mayaram, and Anandhi S. examine this topic. Their work can be situated in a well-known arena of feminist theorizing (although the authors do not draw extensively on this literature): the tension between feminine and feminist political representation. Put another way, feminist work has extensively debated the fact that electing women to legislative assemblies does not necessarily mean a collective increase in
women's status and empowerment, unless the sociocultural context supports such social change. The authors intersect this debate with their individual analyses of women and rural electoral politics in South India.

In 1992 and 1993, constitutional amendments strengthened local government councils (or panchayats) at the village level and created quotas for women's participation, not only as general councillors but also as council presidents and vice presidents. This did indeed increase the percentage of women councillors and council presidents/vice presidents, but most of these women had very little power to actually change existing gender and caste power structures. All four authors relate this failure to the cultural power of male and caste dominance. The remaining articles by Kalpana Sharma, Urvashi Butalia, Nisha Srivastava, and Samita Sen continue the theme of resistance as they describe women's attempts both collectively—through the Indian women's movements—and individually to fight violence and gender discrimination.

In *The Scandal of the State*, Rajan continues the political conversation about women's lives begun by the Kapadia volume through her analysis of the relationship between Indian women and the state. Using a series of well-analyzed case studies, Rajan exposes the Indian state's inadequate commitment to protecting women's rights. She focuses on the battle over a Muslim child bride, sterilization of mentally retarded women in state institutions, female infanticide in Tamil Nadu, prostitution, the position of women in the debate over a uniform civil code, and the surrender of the female outlaw, Phoolan Devi, (she of *Bandit Queen* fame). Through a sophisticated discourse analysis revealing both a good knowledge of feminist and South Asian studies theorizing on state, the author adds political texture to the Kapadia volume by underlining the Indian state's reluctance to undertake a clear-cut and self-conscious program to enhance women's political/social rights.

On finishing these volumes, one is tempted to demand a plan of action aimed at ameliorating the lives of women in India. But such a demand raises further questions: Whose plan? Who is being represented? Who leads? Who speaks? How does one measure success? As Rajan's richly textured case studies reveal, multiple factors (e.g., social markers, such as caste, class, religion, language, ethnicity, sexualities) intertwine to construct ideas of womanhood and feminist political participation, making a systemic plan of reform fraught with the danger of silencing some women and furthering the agenda of groups who may not prioritize women's rights. For example, as Rajan argues, feminist organizing against the kidnapping of Ameena, the Muslim child bride, strengthened (unintentionally) the conservative Hindu nationalist belief in the “backwardness” of the Muslim community and its links to insidious “outsiders” (Ameena's parents had sold her to a Saudi Arabian man), without offering any solution for Ameena (who was forced to return to her family and, one suspects, sold again) and girls in her situation. Feminist organizing also did not really increase public awareness and/or acceptance of the structural gender oppression shaping Ameena's lot. Finally, Ameena and her mother were silent spectators as their lives were exposed under the gaze of the media and society.

The Kapadia and Rajan volumes—appropriate for advanced undergraduate and graduate classes as well as the specialist in Indian politics—add rich case studies to the well-established field of feminist postcolonial theory informed by critiques of economic and political modernity, paving the way for future works to imagine effective feminist resistance.


— Paige Johnson Tan, University of North Carolina Wilmington

This is the best book on Indonesia's 1999 elections yet written. Dwight King aims to “get beyond the stress on personalities” and to “shift the focus more toward policies and institutions” (p. 3). With this, King brings the study of Indonesia's politics into the mainstream. His trove of data, methods, and conclusions will interest Indonesia specialists and comparatists alike.

The book can be divided roughly into two parts. Most chapters deal with the evolution of Indonesia's new electoral institutions. Chapter 3, for example, explores the development of the post-Suharto party and electoral laws, highlighting the high level of contestation that went into the creation of the new system, as well as the many complementary reforms that were required in order to create a new political playing field. Similarly, Chapter 4 offers a retrospective on the 1999 vote, including an analysis of the numerous problems that arose as the new institutions were first tested. Further chapters in this vein offer a case study of the electoral institutions in operation in one community in Java, analyze institutional changes adopted since the 1999 elections, and compare the path of Indonesia's electoral institutions to those in neighboring democracies, Thailand and the Philippines.

The second part of the book focuses on using quantitative analysis to explain the outcome of the 1999 vote (Chapters 6 and 7). This is King's greatest contribution, and it is where his best data is mobilized. In Chapter 6, he takes on the common belief that there was a “broad continuity” in the vote results from 1955 (when Indonesia's last free elections were held) and 1999 (p. 124). For example, abangan (nominal) Muslims were believed to prefer Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democracy Party—Struggle (PDI-P) inasmuch as that same type of voter had preferred the Indonesian National Party (PNI) associated with her father or the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 44 years earlier.

Assuming that a district's sociocultural composition would be broadly similar in 1955 and 1999, as these types of characteristics change only slowly, King tested correlations of
support for major parties from 1955 with the major parties of 1999 by district. It is important to note that this was not a sample of districts. The author used vote results for most of Indonesia's districts, making this one of the most comprehensive comparisons of Indonesian elections ever conducted.

King’s findings strongly support much of the “conventional wisdom” on Indonesia’s politics. For example, as hypothesized above, PDI-P did in fact draw upon areas of past PNI and PKI support. As a further illustration, the Golkar party was believed to have “greened,” or become more Islamic, over the previous 20 years. King’s analysis supports this proposition by showing that Golkar’s support was positively correlated with past support for Islamic parties in 1955.

On some points, though, King’s analysis corrects the conventional wisdom. It could be assumed that with its basis in the bureaucracy and as a party from the secular-nationalist political stream, Golkar might find support in areas that had previously supported the bureaucrat-based, nationalist PNI. This turned out not to be the case. In fact, 1955 support for PNI was negatively correlated with 1999 support for Golkar. King’s analysis of all the major parties proceeds similarly and offers both confirmations and surprises. He concludes this analysis by finding that the New Order regime of Suharto “failed” in its attempts at using “political engineering” to reduce the salience of Indonesia’s sociocultural divisions in voting (p. 134). The cleavages of 1955 reappeared in 1999.

The author begins a new strand of quantitative analysis in Chapter 7. He uses regression to build models explaining each of the major parties’ 1999 vote. He does this relatively successfully, his models explaining more than half the variation in the parties’ votes.

The most significant critique that can be offered of Half-Hearted Reform has to do with the assumption that one can correlate votes by area in 1955 and 1999 and draw conclusions about the parties that are chosen by different types of voters on this basis. Sociocultural characteristics change only slowly, but they do change, as they have in Indonesia. The glaring example is in the decline of “nominal” Muslims over the past 40 years.

King often uses the term abangan and finds, in the final analysis, that the “basic cleavage in the Indonesian electorate between areas supporting nationalist and religiously inclusive parties (abangan) and areas supporting Islamic parties (santri) has not disappeared” (p. 130). Santri refers to pious, orthodox Muslims. This is striking because several studies in recent years have shown that the abangan themselves are dwindling. This is the finding of an unpublished study cited by King but not engaged on this issue (R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, “The Power of Leadership: Explaining Voting Behavior in the New Indonesian Democracy”). Like King, Liddle and Mujani hoped to understand the reasons behind voter choice in the 1999 elections. Their chosen means was via postelection opinion polling. They found that today about 80% of Indonesian Muslims would be described as santri. About 20% would thus be described as nominal Muslims, but only a small share of the total (a little more than 3%) fits the traditional characteristics of the abangan Muslim, that is, not avidly engaged in Muslim religious practice and simultaneously engaged in religious observances associated with Indonesia’s pre-Islamic past. Liddle and Mujani’s findings on the abangan need to be further studied, but the suggestion of changes in the population’s sociocultural characteristics, as is implied by the disappearance of the abangan, needs to be addressed by King.

As found by Liddle and Mujani, santri do not necessarily vote only for santri/Islamic parties. Of respondents who were characterized as santri, Liddle and Mujani found that more than 25% voted for PDI-P, a secular-nationalist party. Likewise, their study showed that 53% of santri voters overwhelmingly for the non-santri parties (81%).

With his study, King has decisively demonstrated that a pattern of voting by area exists. But he missed the chance to engage Liddle and Mujani’s absent abangan to consider what the sociocultural changes mean for his methodology and the conclusions he hopes to draw about voter groups. Voters in formerly abangan areas continue to vote for abangan parties, but we do not yet have an explanation as to why.


— Robert W. Compton, State University of New York-Oneonta

Some books seek to establish new ground while others seek to expand the contours of existing paradigms through the use of interesting cases. This book fits the latter mold and does so exceptionally well. David Leheny’s research on leisure politics provides a well-documented and well-written empirical study of the Japanese government’s role in the everyday lives of citizens. Building on previous works in anthropology, history, and sociological theory, he examines the historical development of Japan’s leisure world in the context of an active developmental state. In particular, the approach and themes addressed in this book parallel Sheldon Garon’s (1998) Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life.

According to Leheny, the Japanese government created and continues to craft leisure policies that seek to balance contradictory goals. These goals include the pursuit of Western leisure and the preservation of Japanese culture uniqueness. As he states (p. 41), “They (bureaucrats) know [original emphasis] . . . that Japan is supposed to be an advanced industrial nation, and therefore the Japanese should behave like citizens of other nations. They also know [original emphasis], because they take it for granted, that the Japanese are unique, and that the uniqueness should be valued and protected.”

Numerous factors constrain Japanese bureaucrats in the development of leisure policies. In addition to the Western model and the Japanese uniqueness orientation exhibited by Japanese bureaucrats, Leheny notes that conflicting economic
and bureaucratic demands impact policies. Leisure policy reflects the successes and failures of Japan’s modernization and nation-building process. His three empirical chapters explore the evolution of Japan’s leisure policy during the Meiji and pre–World War II era, during the post–World War II developmental state era of rapid growth, and in the latter quarter of the twentieth century as Japan industrializes.

The discussion of leisure during the Meiji and prewar Showa periods suffers from an almost singular focus on the tourism industry. Was it that Japanese government officials during this era did not value nontourism activities? While passing note was made about the introduction of baseball and amusement parks, a more rigorous discussion about these in the context of modernization versus Westernization would have proved useful. As it turns out, the pre–World War II discussion, by default, centers almost exclusively on tourism and the Japan Travel Bureau (JTB). This bureau, according to Leheny, played an instrumental role in the development of modern national-railways-based tourism within the country (pp. 58–65). During the 1930s, commensurate with the militarization of Japan, the tourism business was co-opted by nationalists and militarists and took on a more introspective character.

During the U.S.-led occupation of Japan, the United States sought to mold the Japanese society toward democratic and individual-centered organic system. This foray into social engineering affected leisure policies directly. Leheny should have focused on the reforms of this period and their impact on leisure policy, particularly the arts. Instead, Chapter 4 focuses almost exclusively on leisure in the 1970s and its ties to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government’s economic policies. This is a major shortcoming because democratization and its failures during the occupation and the years following it are crucial for an understanding of modern post–World War II Japanese politics and society. Democratization deserved greater attention so that the continuities and discontinuities of leisure policy from the prewar to the postwar era could be accurately traced.

Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the transformation of Japanese leisure in the context of the country’s economic growth and a deep-seated concern among many Japanese that their quality of life lagged behind the West. During the 1960s and 1970s, policymakers used leisure policies for economic purposes. Leheny’s discussion of the Leisure Development Office’s activities provides a useful analysis of the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry’s (MITI) orientation toward leisure as an extension of economic policy. By relying on white paper equivalents, the author’s meticulous research in this area clearly demonstrates that leisure policy was constructed in the context of Japanese social and economic needs, with Western models serving as a comparative framework. During the 1980s and 1990s, the emphasis on internationalization played an important role in promoting consumption of foreign goods and services and travel abroad as valid forms of recreation for the Japanese. However, as Leheny notes, programs such as the “Ten Million Program,” illustrate the enlightened self-interest of bureaucrats in crafting national policies. Not only did this program cater to Japanese and overseas interests, but it also provided a raison d’etre for Japanese bureaucrats who could obtain employment in the tourism industry after retirement. Simultaneously, the official development assistance (ODA) policy became an extension of Japanese travel in the Pacific region.

The Rules of Play provides important insight into the role of government in shaping the lives of ordinary citizens as part of a nation-building project. Social engineering exists in all societies, but in Japan, the government takes a much more active role in creating and implementing these policies, as Leheny clearly demonstrates through his research. Perhaps because of its esoteric nature, he goes far beyond what is necessary to legitimize this research, including the use of several obscure personal examples. Instead, the author should realize that his work appeals to those who study politics from a broader perspective.

**Stuffing the Ballot Box.** By Fabrice E. Lehoucq and Ivan Molina. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 294p. $60.00.

— David J. Myers, Pennsylvania State University

Fabrice Lehoucq and Ivan Molina’s research into electoral fraud and reform in Costa Rica is one of only a handful of studies examining the internal politics of a democratizing republic. Analysis begins in 1901, when competitive party politics took off, and ends in 1948, when institutional reforms completely removed the executive and legislature from electoral governance. During the interregnum, leaders used ballot fraud and violence to gain public office, but gradually they reformed political institutions to permit increasing numbers of adults to vote.

The authors explore the development of fair electoral practices in Costa Rica in order to shed light on the politics of institutional reform. The key reforms that undercut the ability of political parties to rig the ballot box appear to have been made against the best interests of those who implemented them. This presents three important puzzles, the ones that animate the book. First, why do politicians reform the institutions that keep them in power? Second, why do party leaders relinquish their ability to rig electoral results? Finally, why do incumbents consent to having—and respecting—the outcome of fair elections?

Stuffing the Ballot Box relies on a peculiar collection of documents known as the petitions to nullify electoral results (demandas de nulidad), commonly published in the official record of laws and government announcements. These petitions were the legal vehicle for aggrieved parties to file complaints about the electoral behavior of their opponents. Molina examined 123 petitions containing more than 1,300 accusations of ballot rigging. Lehoucq analyzed congressional and public debates about electoral reform and assembled roll-call data on deputy behavior, organized the effort to identify the partisan affiliation of congressmen, and took the lead in putting them together. The authors’ approach provides new data and insights.
Three kinds of findings emerge from this work: those that concern the nature, extent and magnitude of electoral fraud; those that shed light on the effectiveness of classical theories of electoral governance; and those that assist in assessing the usefulness of theories of institutional change.

From the perspective of ballot-rigging dynamics, Lehoucq and Molina find that the institutionalist approach makes better sense of that process than social, cultural, or economic differences. Only the former perspective can explain why political competition was more intense in the periphery and why levels of fraud declined over the long term. In addition, after establishment of the secret franchise, the nature of fraud changed: Parties spent more time in fabricating their own votes than in reducing that of their rivals. Finally, institutional arrangements best explain locational changes in the number of accusations of fraud, which by the 1940s were concentrated overwhelmingly in the provinces where most voters lived.

Findings about the effectiveness of the classical theory of electoral governance center on the postulate of constitutional doctrine, which states that the executive should organize the election. The legislature ensures honesty by certifying election results. Lehoucq and Molina marshal empirical evidence to assess the validity of this postulate by examining the behavior of the Credentials Committee—a congressional body that initially reviewed the petitions—and of congress as a whole. They found that splitting the “administrative” from the “political” functions of electoral administration failed to eliminate charges of unfairness. Compliance with democratic norms increased only as political parties removed the executive and legislature from electoral governance.

The third category of conclusions provides insights into the usefulness of three theories of institutional change. The most common explanation of why parties do not change laws that permit them to stuff the ballot box, the office-seeking theory, states that incumbents do whatever is necessary to augment their share of power. It does a reasonably good job of accounting for most opposition to far-reaching institutional reform, and of congress as a whole. They found that splitting the “administrative” from the “political” functions of electoral administration failed to eliminate charges of unfairness. Compliance with democratic norms increased only as political parties removed the executive and legislature from electoral governance.

Lehoucq and Molina find wanting may be more important in determining the course of political change than they admit. This possibility, which they themselves concede, should be the focus of future research that examines relationships between electoral fraud and democratization.

Finally, Stuffing the Ballot Box is a significant work in comparative politics. Not only does it focus attention on the institutional constraints and strategic behavior that set Costa Rica apart from the rest of Central America, but it also casts doubt on the argument that pacts among oligarchs, industrialists, middle classes, peasants, and workers determine regime type. Lehoucq and Molina also show that the absence of severe ethnic and class conflicts does not deprive political life of serious conflicts. Their account of the struggle to control the Costa Rican state is one that led to insurrections, undermined political stability, and thwarted democratic reform. They are persuasive when they affirm that the choice-theoretic perspective best explains the triumph of democracy in Costa Rica in the late 1940s. The arguments that they present in defense of this position are an important contribution to the debate within political science over the relative explanatory power of the rational choice, culturalist, and institutionalist approaches.


— Thomas G. Moore, University of Cincinnati

These books address two critical issues concerning China’s economic performance in the post–Mao Zedong era. Between Politics and Markets makes a seminal argument about the dynamics of China’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented system. Digital Dragon provides an engrossing account of China’s efforts to develop nongovernmental high-technology firms as a means of increasing the country’s indigenous technological capability. Together, the books reflect both the high quality of recent scholarship on China’s political economy and the need to further integrate this emerging body of work more systematically into the comparative political economy literatures on economic transition and industrial development.

One of the foremost puzzles of the so-called reform era is how China has achieved such robust economic growth and substantial transformation of its economic institutions while the political system remains relatively unchanged. For many observers, the answer is that economic markets operating largely outside the institutional parameters of state control have generated a powerful competitive dynamic in China’s economy that has progressively marginalized the bureaucratic mode of resource allocation. While the role of economic markets in China’s transition is undeniable, Between Politics and Markets identifies the interaction of economic and political
markets as the key to understanding a variety of important phenomena, including differences between urban and rural areas and differences between state and nonstate firms. According to Yi-min Lin, previous work on China's economic transition is characterized by a misplaced dichotomy between a focus on market relations among economic actors (the “economic competition thesis”) and a focus on authority relations among political actors (the “local developmental state thesis”). In an effort to synthesize and expand upon this literature, Lin argues that three distinct sets of exchange relations should be conceived of as market phenomena: relations among economic actors, relations between economic actors and state agents, and relations among state agents.

Using macrolevel industrial data and microlevel case studies of firms and administrative localities, Lin offers a sophisticated argument about the “dual marketization” of economic and political competition. He makes an important analytic distinction between “markets” (defined as “concrete markets for products and resources” [p. 17]) and “the market” (defined as a “mode of resource allocation and economic coordination” [p. 8]). While he readily acknowledges the growing pervasiveness of concrete markets in China's economy, Lin warns against assuming that they are the critical forces in shaping the decision making and the performance of firms (as would be assumed in neoclassical economic theory). In this sense, he argues that China's economy is not “marketlike” even if it is increasingly marketized (p. 10). From this perspective, a firm's competitiveness depends as much on particularistic state action as on economic efficiency. Specifically, what matters most is a firm's ability to play the “favor-seeking game” (p. 189). While economic competition (understood in conventional terms of resource efficiency) has certainly grown more intense, the central focus of Between Politics and Markets is the hardscrabble world of political competition familiar from the literature on corruption and rent seeking. In the context of China's reform, however, the author contends that “competitive favor seeking” has actually facilitated a transition away from central planning, rather than reinforced the status quo.

With its argument that China's economic transition from plan to market has been driven by both political and economic competition, the book will certainly spark a new debate among scholars working on this subject. In this reader's opinion, Lin occasionally overstates the failings of the economic competition thesis and the local developmental state thesis, although he does certainly provide fresh insight into reform dynamics by extending the argument that China's particularistic state remains influential in mediating economic activity. Moreover, his data has some limitations. As he forthrightly admits, the selection of his case studies was based entirely on access availability. Moreover, the evidence provided does not allow the reader to fully assess the importance of particularistic state action relative to other factors in shaping firm behavior and performance. It is difficult to fault the author for these shortcomings, however, as Lin has made the most of the data available to him. Indeed, he is refreshingly modest in his claims, repeatedly declaring that his research only provides “useful clues” (e.g., p. 216) for understanding China's post-Mao transition. Drawing on the case study materials, Lin identifies “hypothesized causal links” (p. 183) that he acknowledges will need to be verified through additional research.

Between Politics and Markets makes little effort to place China in comparative perspective. For example, the economies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are noticeably absent as reference points. Moreover, it is unfortunate that a book about the causes of rapid economic growth in China fails to place its argument within the vast literature on East Asian development. Except for a single reference in the book's final pages, Lin's discussion of competitive favor seeking and industrial development proceeds as if the extensive literature on exchange relations between economic actors and state agents in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia does not exist. Especially in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the concept of political markets (e.g., crony capitalism) has considerable resonance for analysis of countries such as South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Even if Lin would have argued that this literature has limited relevance to his study of China, it is a curious omission.

These criticisms aside, Lin's focus on the interaction of economic and political markets in China's industrial transition represents a significant challenge to existing accounts of China's economic transition. Although his book is not intended as a history of China's post-Mao economy, Lin indirectly provides a wonderful primer on the subject. Moreover, he combines macro- and microlevel analysis as well as better than any recent book on China's economic transition. The case studies, in particular, provide fascinating details that both illuminate the logical argument he advances and inform the reader's general knowledge.

In Digital Dragon, Adam Segal seeks to explain how and why policies for creating high-technology enterprises have differed across China during the post-Mao era. Toward this end, the book presents detailed case studies of efforts in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Xi'an to develop non-governmental enterprises in information industries. According to the author, technology policies and outcomes are better explained by local institutional and cultural contexts than by national-level variables. Specifically, Segal maintains that the “range of policies available... has not differed significantly throughout the country” (p. 86). Moreover, the opportunities for high-technology zones and science funding were similar everywhere. In short, favoritism by the central government does not factor significantly into his account. Rather, he argues that varying local conditions led to “different development strategies and development paths” (p. 123). In particular, he argues that the successful development of high-tech enterprises has required the active but carefully calibrated support of local government officials.

From this perspective, national policy, market forces, and foreign investment are inadequate for China to achieve success in information industries. Through its rich case studies, Digital Dragon offers a complex picture of how high-tech enterprises must be nurtured by a mix of relative autonomy...
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from state intervention and the creation of critical ties between local officials and technology entrepreneurs that fulfill important developmental functions in the “absence of civic organizations and other social institutions” found in the West (p. 156). Here, Segal likens the appropriate measure of support from local governments to that provided by a “good mother-in-law” (p. 15), one who does not interfere too much or too often but who is there when needed.

Given the delicate balance this role requires, the book emphasizes the “difficulties of creating a high-tech enterprise in China” (p. 156). In this connection, Segal argues that “Beijing was uniquely blessed” (p. 52) compared to the other cities he studied, a finding that does not bode well for China’s ability to develop the indigenous technological capability it seeks. Contrary to regional stereotypes, which identify Shanghai and Guangzhou as more entrepreneurial in spirit, Beijing has proved most adept at facilitating the development of nongovernmental high-tech enterprises. In his explanation for this surprising finding, Segal focuses on how local features—namely, local institutional structure and local culture—interact to determine how officials respond to national policy. As officials pursue the creation of high-tech enterprises, they are constrained by such factors as the varying organizational resources (structure) and long-standing development practices (culture) they face locally.

In this way, the author provides a sophisticated path-dependent analysis that incorporates ideational as well as institutional elements. For him, the “shared understandings and routine practices” (p. 44) that constitute culture are as important in determining local strategy as the features that define the institutional context, such as the balance of power within local governments and the nature of state–society relations that shapes the entrepreneurial environment at the local level. In Shanghai, for example, development strategy was informed by the long-standing norm of relying upon large state-owned conglomerates in pursuing industrial goals. By comparison, Beijing’s practices were characterized by a more pluralistic and experimental approach, both to enterprise size and ownership and to government supervision of enterprises.

As this discussion suggests, Digital Dragon hinges on the author’s ability to meld institutional and cultural analysis effectively. For the most part, Segal succeeds. Critics of cultural explanations often complain that any behavior can be shown to be consistent with some aspect of national or local culture. This is especially problematic when culture changes, as he admits has happened during the reform era in the four cities he studies. That said, his argument that local culture can serve as a complementary explanation to institutional analysis holds up fairly well in the context of his specific case studies, even if structural factors sometime seem adequate on their own.

Almost by definition, his research agenda leads Segal to overstate the significance of local factors to China’s development trajectory. Indeed, this reader expected the concluding chapter to provide a more formal explication of the author’s thinking on the interaction of local, national, and international factors and how the Chinese case fits into the vast literature on East Asian development. Instead, the book moves directly from the final case study chapter to a concluding chapter (entitled “Technology and China’s Future”) that is devoted—after a brief restatement of the major themes—to a discussion of technology-related issues concerning security affairs, Chinese foreign policy, and China’s potential rise as a great power. The “big picture” implications of China’s quest to develop a first-rate indigenous technological capability are certainly worth our attention, but Segal provides insufficient evidence to sustain the introduction of arguments unrelated to the book’s main focus. Even more importantly, these arguments seem to come in lieu of fully extending the analysis that flows from the excellent case studies.

Digital Dragon, a rather slender volume at 170 pages of text, would have been well served by an additional chapter, ideally placed between the final case study chapter and the conclusion, in which Segal could have made a concerted effort to advance the comparative political economy literature on industrial development by laying out a more thorough conceptual framework based on his analysis of China. The author’s notion that local government needs to act like a good mother-in-law is intriguing, but he fails to specify fully how he sees the role of the state differently than Robert Wade, Peter Evans, and others who have provided various ideal types to guide their studies of industrial development. In this respect, the book missed an opportunity to make an even bigger contribution than it does. That said, Segal’s absorbing analysis is highly recommended to sinologists and generalists alike.

Between Politics and Markets and Digital Dragon both add significantly to our understanding of China’s political economy in the reform era. At the same time, they also reflect the need for scholars both to place China’s experience more explicitly in comparative context and to contribute as fully as possible to conceptual debates in the general field of comparative politics.


— R. William Liddle, The Ohio State University

This is a theoretically and empirically ambitious book. Its author, Andrew MacIntyre, is an accomplished Indonesiast who has set out to synthesize two literatures on political institutions, one emphasizing credible commitments and the other policy decisiveness, and to utilize his new framework to examine recent governmental policy responsiveness and institutional change in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. MacIntyre’s scholarship is intelligent, thorough, balanced, and knowledgeable at both the theoretical and empirical levels. His empirical chapters provide explicit comparisons across the four cases, a rare and welcome approach in Southeast Asia studies, where authors tend to specialize in a single country and to avoid cross-national analysis. This approach has the potential of producing new insights for
Southeast Asianists and comparativists in general. In this first effort, however, many of the findings and their supporting arguments, at least at the empirical level, seem forced and Procrustean.

In the theoretical literature on political institutions, one prominent school of thought "stresses the importance of institutional arrangements that disperse power, thereby reducing the risk of arbitrary or capricious government action and making possible a stable policy environment in which governments can make policy commitments that are credible into the future" (p. 3). Another body of literature, which MacIntyre labels the decisiveness school, "underscores the way in which political fragmentation is the enemy of adaptable, responsive, and nimble government" (p. 4). To reconcile the contradictory conclusions of the two approaches, he utilizes veto-player analysis. He proposes that we think of the basic distribution of decision-making power in a polity (its "national political architecture") as a U-curve or "power concentration paradox" in which extreme concentration (a single veto player) and extreme fragmentation (many veto players) are equally problematic for effective governance.

In two substantive chapters that make up the bulk of the book, MacIntyre deploys the power concentration paradox to explore two central puzzles in recent Southeast Asian politics: the differing responses of the Thai, Indonesian, Malaysian, and Philippine governments to the devastating economic crisis that hit the region in the late 1990s; and the varying success of subsequent attempts to reform the national political architecture in each country. In 1997, at the beginning of the economic crisis, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand were all extreme cases, but at opposite ends of the architectural spectrum. Indonesia and Malaysia had only a single veto player (in Indonesia, an individual, President Suharto; in Malaysia, a multiparty alliance, the Barisan Nasional), while Thailand had six (all political parties in Parliament). The Philippines was an intermediate case, with three veto players: the president, House of Representatives, and Senate.

MacIntyre's principal finding is that there is indeed a relationship between national political architecture, on the one hand, and responsiveness to crisis and efforts at institutional reform, on the other. Indonesia and Malaysia responded quickly but erratically to the economic crisis, while Thailand with its many veto players was paralyzed. Of the four cases, the Philippine government's policy was most coherent and consistent. In the subsequent efforts at institutional reform, Indonesia and Thailand moved toward the center of the spectrum by, respectively, adding and subtracting veto players. Malaysian reformers were thwarted by the skillful maneuvering of the Barisan leader, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. In the Philippines, already in the center, there was no major pressure for change.

How persuasive are MacIntyre's arguments? To his credit, he repeatedly reminds the reader that he is only adding the variable of national political architecture to an already rich Southeast Asian and developing world literature, that he has no final answers, and that he intends his study to be the beginning of a new research enterprise that will lead ultimately to more definitive conclusions.

Even with these caveats, however, I am not convinced of the merits of the approach. In too many of his specific arguments, the role claimed for national political architecture seems better explained by other variables. For example, MacIntyre blames Indonesia's single-veto-player polity for the government's inconsistent economic policy responses from mid-1997 to mid-1998. But what is most striking about the Indonesian case is that it had been a single-veto-player polity at least since 1966, when President Sukarno (who arguably was one of three veto players, together with the army and the Communist Party) was overthrown by General Suharto. Moreover, for three decades, Suharto's New Order government was extravagantly (and accurately) praised by foreign governments and business leaders for the quality and consistency of its economic policy!

A better explanation would focus not on the high-level abstraction of the number of veto players in the New Order, but instead on two lower-level variables: the individual versus collective character of the single veto player; and the position in the life cycle of that individual. Suharto the individual made good economic policy decisions at the outset of his presidency, establishing a pattern that continued until near the end. In 1997, however, Suharto was 76 years old, in poor health, a recent widower. Moreover, several of his children stood to lose financially if he adopted the economic policies urged on him by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. These variables also help to explain both policy volatility and the absence of institutional reform in the Malaysian case. Like Suharto, Mahathir is more an individual than a collective veto player; unlike Suharto, in 1997 he was still at the top of his game.

Other examples of MacIntyre's Procrusteanism come readily to mind. The Indonesian shift away from a one-veto-player polity—that is, the 1998–99 democratic transition—was not driven by postcrisis awareness of the high price of an extreme concentration of decision-making power. Instead, it was the product of mass demonstrations against the individual Suharto's economic policy failures and the determination of opposition politicians to end the Suharto dictatorship (after many years of struggle) and to gain a share of power for themselves. Thailand, despite its multiveto player paralysis, came through the crisis more quickly and successfully than MacIntyre seems willing to concede. The Philippines was hit less hard than the other countries, which may explain its greater policy stability. Postcrisis Philippine politics is perhaps better understood as a debate about democracy, not veto players. Outside the cases, but still inside Southeast Asia, Singapore is a shining example of an extremely concentrated single-veto-player polity with stable policy and no movement for institutional reform.

These several criticisms, and the skepticism that underlies them, are not meant to disparage what is in fact a first-class scholarly effort. The Power of Institutions is theoretically...
innovative. It is also empirically solid, notwithstanding my interpretive challenges. MacIntyre’s book substantially advances our understanding of the causes and consequences of political institutions, in Southeast Asia and in the developing world.


This book has a good title, and the subject matter is an important one. The monograph focuses on the role of the top appointed official in local government, called here the chief executive officer (CEO). It records information gained from a large survey of chief executives in 14 countries about their role and actions, and their perceptions of how they interact with, and of the role of, their political counterpart (i.e., the most senior political leader in local government). It aims to address two key questions: whether institutions matter (reflected in the cross-country analyses of different political/administrative arrangements) and the impact of individual characteristics of chief executives on performance.

The focus is significant for understanding political and managerial action beyond local government: first, because globalization requires strong local, as well as global, governance (“glocalization”); second, because it is increasingly recognized that much innovation, “modernization,” and change take place at the local level (both initiated at the local level and in response to national governments); third, because the focus on the chief executive enables researchers to examine the interface between political and administrative logics, structures, and cultures. In addition, many chief executives have contacts with a range of stakeholders. Not only are they the key administrative contact point for politicians, but also they may interact with partners, community groups, other tiers of government, and so forth. The focus is also of interest as some of the limitations of “new public management” are increasingly recognized—especially the marginalizing of the role of politicians in running the local authority. This book provides a more balanced picture by looking at the interface of democracy and bureaucracy, at least as seen through the eyes of the chief executive.

Leadership at the Apex consists of 10 chapters, a technical appendix, and notes. The chapters study institutions comparatively, addressing some theoretical issues (about rational choice theory compared with normative institutional theory, primarily) and then presenting empirical material in seven chapters, rounding off with a conclusions chapter. The data set is impressive in size: 14 countries (Western Europe, the United States, and Australia), with 4,300 chief executives, who completed a long questionnaire survey.

There is a very heterogeneous collection of local authorities in these countries. Taking size alone, the sample varies from the largest authority, Copenhagen Council, with 43,000 staff, to a couple of Spanish authorities each employing four people. While size is commented on in an early chapter, unfortunately it does not reflect in later empirical analyses or discussions of results. Yet organization theory would argue that organizational size is a key influence both on organizational design (structure, culture, processes) and on individual behavior and performance. The authors have focused on institutional arrangements, national culture, and individual characteristics to explain variation.

Potentially, the monograph has much to offer in its approach to the impact of country; the impact of institutions (mainly though not exclusively taken to be based on one of four models of institutional arrangements: the strong mayor form, the committee-leader form, the collective form, and the council-manager form); and the reported roles, actions, and other characteristics of chief executives reflecting on their own role and that of their political counterpart. However, the empirical data and their analysis turns out to be rather disappointing. The institutional arrangements are based on the ideal type for each country, neglecting variation or the opportunity to examine institutional arrangements empirically through dimensions, rather than a typology. The empirical results are also hard to follow, and I spent some frustrating time moving between the text, the technical appendix, and the notes to try to reconcile discrepancies in the presentation of results (where wording of questionnaire items could be different and the loadings on factors both different and presented differently). In the text, new questionnaire items are brought in to support analyses, but nowhere in the book is a clear overview of what the questionnaire covered. I would have liked to see either this or a complete copy of the questionnaire as part of the technical appendix. There are also scales presented that, in an examination of the notes and appendix, are found to be far from robust (e.g., six items are used to present four “leadership styles,” which means that some scales are based on a single item). Some of these concerns about either the empirical data or their presentation reduced my confidence in the findings of the book. However, this is a large sample, and some facts and tables, used carefully, can be useful.

It is possible that the research design focused more on breadth than on depth. It is notable that the conclusions are somewhat anodyne. Inappropriate conclusions are drawn, in places, from the data (e.g., reporting political leader behavior as though it is empirically evidenced, rather than seen through the eyes of chief executives, and stating that the chief executives are making the kinds of contributions that political leaders prefer). I felt I had to work hard to keep assessing what conclusions could legitimately be drawn from the research, what was drawn from the literature, and what might be only assertion or speculation. Surprisingly, the conclusions focus almost exclusively on the characteristics of the individual chief executives on the basis of their similarities, not their differences. The analysis by country, by institutional form, and by national culture is downplayed or not mentioned (as is size, commented on earlier).
So, overall, this is a slightly disappointing book, though with several nuggets of interest across a number of chapters. Holding together a large research team for comparative analysis across a large number of countries is inevitably complex and difficult. The authors have scoped out a major area of questions and focus, but their empirical data is not sufficiently robust to help us too far toward conclusions.


— Anthony McGann, University of California, Irvine

Bernard Grofman ("Seven Durable Axes of Cleavage in Political Science," in Kristen Monroe, ed., Contemporary Empirical Political Theory, 1997) has suggested that game theory may become as central to political science as calculus is to physics. This may be seen in the growth of "soft rational choice" work that uses game theory as a language for discussing strategic interaction, and also in the increased use of game theoretic metaphors in a wide variety of fields. If this is so, Rosa Mulé’s book is a good example of this trend. It consists of a series of analytic narratives explaining changes in income inequality in terms of the strategic interactions of party elites.

Mulé seeks to explain the (generally inegalitarian) changes in income distribution that took place in advanced industrial democracies in the 1980s and 1990s. Using data from the Luxembourg income study, she dismisses the idea that these changes in inequality are simply a result of market condition, as the level and direction of change vary by countries and are largely the result of changes in government transfers. She also dismisses simple versions of the most common sociological and rational choice explanations. Whether or not inequality increases cannot be explained in terms of parties representing specific classes, as in some cases, parties identified with the working class presided over increasing inequality. Neither do rational choice theories based on electoral processes favoring the median income voter, or being driven by the political business cycle, fit the evidence. Instead, Mulé argues that the changes in inequality result from strategic calculations made by elites, particularly in regard to intraparty politics.

The core of the book is four case studies, considering Canada, Australia, the UK, and the United States. In the case of Canada, we learn that Pierre Trudeau used the electoral threat from the Left, posed by the NDP (New Democratic Party) in the 1970s, to embark on a redistributive strategy that marginalized the probusiness, antiwelfarist wing of the Liberal Party. However, once this faction was no longer a threat, Trudeau moved the party back toward the center. Similarly in Australia, Bob Hawke used economic and welfare state retrenchment to redefine the Labor Party ("New Labor") and marginalize the Left, although the changes in income distribution were relatively slight. Mulé argues that the adoption of monetarism and welfare cuts under Margaret Thatcher in the UK had as much to do with redefining the Conservative Party and its style of politics as it did with economic imperatives. Finally, she interprets Bill Clinton’s endorsement of the ending of national entitlement to welfare in 1996 in terms of an underlying strategy to redefine the Democratic Party. The case studies are impressive and well documented, although some of the interpretations—particularly, I suspect, the U.S. case—are likely to provoke controversy.

The research design is justified (p. 14) as a most-similar-systems analysis, comparing four countries with liberal welfare states and relatively high inequality. Given that the dependent variable is change in inequality over time and not the level of inequality, this does not have the result of eliminating the variance to be explained—the increase in inequality in the period covered was significant in the UK and the United States, marginal in Australia, and slightly negative in Canada. However, the research design does have significant costs in terms of the conclusions that can be drawn. Because the study only considers four countries with high inequality, it cannot say much about why inequality varies between countries, but can only talk about changes at the margin. Some rival hypotheses, such as the claim that policy is oriented to the median voter, really make claims about the outcome on average, not about marginal changes. In addition, consideration of institutional variables such as electoral systems is impossible, as these are similar across all cases.

There is no single game theoretic model driving the study. Indeed, there is no theory section that lays out a deductive model, but rather the modeling is deployed as needed in a reconstructive, interpretive manner to explain the strategic choices the players made. The models are precise and accessible and add clarity to the argument—game theory is a natural language to use when talking about strategic interaction. The only partial exception is the model of blackmail politics in Canada on pages 69–70, which attempts to deploy the portfolio allocation model of Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle ("Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics," British Journal of Political Science 20 [1990]: 489–507) when a far simpler pivotal voter model is implied in the narrative. The logic of the model in the narrative, however, is quite convincing.

Political Parties, Games, and Redistribution does an impressive job of arguing that the observed changes in government policy and income distribution can only be understood in terms of intraparty power struggles, and not simply as a result of economic imperatives or party competition. As such, it fits well with a growing body of recent work in both comparative politics and formal theory that emphasizes the importance of internal party politics. It also does an extremely thorough job of dealing with the very complex methodological issues involved in measuring inequality, a fact easily underestimated unless you read the technical addendum. It has difficulty, however, drawing more general conclusions than the fact that intraparty politics drives outcomes. For example, it is argued that the formation of new factions, the consolidation of new factions, or the demise of factions can lead to new policies (egalitarian or inequitable) that
redefine the identity of a party (pp. 196–98). Of course, it is rather unfair to ask the author to produce a theory that can explain the short-term changes in the redistributive policies that parties pursue. This is in all likelihood a highly stochastic, unpredictable process, driven by complex dynamics that cannot be explained but only described. This book does do an excellent job of providing a compelling description of these processes.


The post–Cold War period has witnessed a proliferation of political regimes that combine formal democratic institutions and markedly authoritarian practices. Such “hybrid” regimes outnumber democracies in the developing and postcommunist worlds. Yet they have received little scholarly attention. Marina Ottaway’s *Democracy Challenged*, which focuses on the phenomena of “semi-authoritarianism,” helps to fill that gap. Semi-authoritarian regimes “hold regular multiparty elections, allow parliaments to function, and recognize, within limits, the rights of citizens to form associations and of an independent press” (pp. 5–6). Yet because “power cannot be transferred through elections,” competition is ultimately “a fiction” (p. 15). Semi-authoritarianism regimes are found throughout Asia (Malaysia, Singapore), North Africa (Algeria, Egypt), sub-Saharan Africa (Senegal, Uganda), Latin America (Venezuela), and postcommunist Eurasia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan) (pp. 3–4). Ottaway argues that these regimes “are not imperfect democracies struggling toward improvement and consolidation.” Rather, they are an effort by autocrats to “maintain the appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risks that free competition entails” (p. 3).

The book is divided into three sections. Part I devotes a short descriptive chapter to each of five illustrative cases: Egypt, Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Senegal, and Croatia. Beyond regional, cultural, and socioeconomic differences, the cases vary in their regime dynamics: Egypt is a case of stable semi-authoritarianism, Venezuela of “democratic decay,” and Croatia of “dynamic change” toward democracy.

Part II uses the case studies to build generalizations about the dynamics of semi-authoritarianism. Chapter 6 examines the mechanisms through which semi-authoritarian governments maintain themselves in power. This is a critical issue. Because semi-authoritarian regimes are formally democratic, coercive mechanisms are largely informal. Moreover, given an international context in which open repression is costly, these mechanisms often must float under the radar screens of international observers. The chapter describes the “games” used to maintain an uneven playing field, including tampering with voter rolls, clientelism, illicit finance, “legal” proscription of candidates, monopolization of the airwaves, subtle harassment of the independent media (through control over newsspace and manipulation of tax and libel laws), and repeated institutional reengineering.

Chapter 7 seeks to explain the rise and persistence of semi-authoritarianism. Although the chapter’s focus on “structural obstacles” to democracy (low growth, social inequality, ethnic polarization, weak states) will not surprise scholars, democracy assistance programs, influenced by the leadership-centered “transitions” literature of the 1980s, often underestimate the impact of these structural conditions (p. 161). The chapter then examines the “asymmetric power structures” underlying semi-authoritarian regimes, showing how governments use control over state agencies and patronage networks to create such an uneven playing field that electoral competition becomes a farce.

Part III, which is aimed at practitioners, highlights several flaws in current efforts to promote democracy from abroad. First, civil-society assistance programs usually target “free floating” Westernized elites who run “small and isolated NGOs” that lack societal support (p. 213), while often ignoring “socially embedded” organizations that are less liberal or Western oriented (p. 181). Second, technical assistance programs tend to attribute the corrupt or abusive behavior of bureaucrats, judges, and legislators to a lack of technical skill, when it is usually a response to the incentives created by existing power structures (pp. 217–18). Third, efforts to reform judicial, legislative, and electoral institutions tend to assume that getting the rules right on paper will ensure their performance in practice, when in reality, these institutions often lack real power and are not taken seriously by elites (pp. 219–20).

Underlying these critiques is an important insight: The problem in semi-authoritarian regimes is “power, not knowledge” (p. 209). “Low-end” democracy assistance, such as training and technical assistance, has “little impact on the distribution of power” (p. 209). Consequently, it often “embellish[es] the facade of democracy without producing much substantive change” (p. 189). Only “high-end” assistance that strengthens opposition forces and independent power centers will weaken semi-authoritarian regimes.

Ottaway thus reaches a skeptical conclusion regarding the impact of democracy assistance programs. Although the international community “has been successful at encouraging, cajoling, and at times coercing the political elites of these countries toward acceptance of superficially democratic processes and institutions,” it has “ultimately been unable to push them further” (pp. 193–94).

A few shortcomings of the book are worth noting. First, notwithstanding its laudable effort to map out the gray zone between democracy and authoritarianism, its conceptualization of semi-authoritarianism is somewhat muddled. As a residual category for all cases that are neither democratic nor fully authoritarian, semi-authoritarianism lumps together what are quite different regimes. Regimes in Iran, Singapore, and Ukraine are all hybrid, but they differ in analytically important ways. The book also fails to distinguish between hegemonic regimes, in which electoral institutions are
essential a facade, and regimes in which elections are quite competitive. Ottaway defines semi-authoritarianism as the former; “competition is a fiction” (p. 15), and incumbents “are in no danger of losing their hold on power” (p. 6). This definition fits Egypt and Azerbaijan, but in many cases, including several of her own, incumbents are in danger of losing power through elections. In Croatia and Senegal, they did just that. In Venezuela, too, the electoral process remains fair (p. 87). Indeed, beyond the fact that President Chavez “rant-ed and raved against the press” and “tried to control the labor unions’ internal elections,” it is never clear how Venezuela “slipped into semi-authoritarianism” (p. 87).

This book also does little to explain variation in the trajectory of semi-authoritarian regimes. Why do some semi-authoritarian regimes remain stable (Egypt, Malaysia) while others democratize (Croatia, Peru)? Answers may lie in differences in power asymmetries between states and civil societies. They may also lie in the international context. Ottaway concludes that although external actors “contributed much to the creation of the façade of democracy,” domestic factors ultimately “determined the political realities behind that façade” (p. 226). Yet a closer look at post-1989 regime trajectories reveals a striking pattern: Whereas most semi-authoritarian regimes in Central Europe and Latin America eventually democratized, most in Africa, Asia, the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East remained intact. Hence, it may be that semi-authoritarianism is harder to sustain in countries with close proximity to the United States and Europe. Unfortunately, these explanatory paths are left unexplored.

Notwithstanding these quibbles, Democracy Challenged is an important book. Ottaway makes a compelling case that semi-authoritarian regimes remain stable (Egypt, Malaysia) while others democratize (Croatia, Peru)? Answers may lie in differences in power asymmetries between states and civil societies. They may also lie in the international context. Ottaway concludes that although external actors “contributed much to the creation of the façade of democracy,” domestic factors ultimately “determined the political realities behind that façade” (p. 226). Yet a closer look at post-1989 regime trajectories reveals a striking pattern: Whereas most semi-authoritarian regimes in Central Europe and Latin America eventually democratized, most in Africa, Asia, the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East remained intact. Hence, it may be that semi-authoritarianism is harder to sustain in countries with close proximity to the United States and Europe. Unfortunately, these explanatory paths are left unexplored.

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Cultures at War: Moral Conflicts in Western Democracies.

— Paulette Kurzer, University of Arizona

This is a refreshing look at some of the most contentious issues that bedevil modern political life. T. Alexander Smith and Raymond Tatalovich pull together a large amount of data to examine morality conflicts in five countries: Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The case studies they selected are capital punishment, homosexuality, and abortion, while they also make references to gun control, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage.

The first chapters outline the origins of culture wars and present a theoretical framework for an understanding of why morality conflicts proliferate. The second part of the book provides a rich tapestry of empirical data on the emergence and resolution of divergent morality conflicts in five countries. In the final chapter, the authors summarize the findings and introduce a more subjective evaluation of the policy process, pointing out that the establishment makes highly debatable decisions by disregarding public opinion.

Smith and Tatalovich account for the pervasiveness of culture wars in the declining salience of class politics or economic redistribution. They argue that unparalleled income growth, mass consumption, and dominance of white collar occupation have both reduced the intensity of socioeconomic conflict and increased demands for equality in many areas of social life. The individualization of social life and lenened attachment to church, community, and family have produced competitive struggles over status, which can be captured as “who among us ought to be esteemed and why” (p. 12). But the emergence of postmaterial values does not completely account for the frequency of conflicts since many of them are unrelated to quality-of-lifestyle issues such as abortion, gun control, or capital punishment. And they are also skeptical of the utility of “identity” to capture the full range of moral disagreements since gun control or euthanasia do not seem to involve “identity politics.” Relying on the literature on social constructivism, they argue that a high degree of individual mobility and social equality creates fluid societies with weak ties and decentered identities. In response to the decline of traditional collective organizations and family structure, groups of individuals coalesce either to push for the defense of their social status or alternatively to alter it.

In defense of status distinctions, collective hierarchists welcome lifestyle differences. They tend to cluster in traditional organizations and government bureaucracies. A second group of individuals consists of egalitarians who fight for equality and resent the status quo. They represent educated professionals, gays, feminists, environmentalists, or students. Moral conflicts erupt when egalitarians push for changes in the face of resistance by those who feel more comfortable in a society governed by hierarchies and status stratification. Conflicts break out when social groups propose different principles in response to moral relativism and individualism. Frequently, culture wars do not involve material trade-offs or even narrow self-interests because most people are only peripherally affected by the outcome of a particular issue. (Environmentalists fight for open space not because it directly benefits them; opponents of the death penalty are unlikely to have a friend or relative on death row, etc.) What provokes conflict is the existence of principled arguments about equality and liberty.

When Smith and Tatalovich trace the different stages in the policy process, they make several provocative observations. Although many conflicts produce legislative change, public attitudes rarely change or shift in tandem with new laws. The authors describe the decision-making process in the morality policy field as an extreme case of antimajoritarian rule.
Egalitarians (associated with the Left) are the most likely to move forward with new morality legislation in spite of considerable popular opposition. The abolition of capital punishment in Europe and Canada is such an example because the overwhelming majority of voters in these countries favor the death penalty. Homosexuality (the United States and Germany) and abortion (the United States, Canada, Germany) are other examples of the law going further than what the public was willing to accept.

Collective hierarchists (the Right) also have their favorite projects although they retain greater respect for the status quo and are more likely to resist reform. But two examples of right-wing antimagoritarism are gun control in the United States, where the majority of Americans are in favor of stricter laws but lawmakers refuse to act, and assisted suicide, which enjoys support in the United States and Canada but is blocked by judicial intervention that disallows the practice.

In general, the authors conclude therefore that the clash between alternative lifestyles is frequently resolved in an elitist fashion without much regard for public opinion. They find this tendency across all five countries. In parliamentary systems, executive dominance is facilitated by procedures that dictate collective responsibility and party cohesion and is further abetted by the existence of a single-party cabinet or two-party coalition. The authors strongly feel that parliaments have fundamentally lost their influence over morality policy. The United States possesses a more porous political system, but its judicial system has imposed decisions that go counter to the preferences or attitudes of the majority.

While the authors are correct to point out that morality conflicts yield new laws that tend to contradict the broad sentiments of the electorate, a good argument can be made that the quality of a democracy should not be equated with the rule of the majority. Conflicts within liberal democracies propel elites to advance their policy preferences, and it is inaccurate to consider such actions as impositions of a small minority as opposed to the type of behavior that makes democratic institutions work in the first place. Moreover, many democratic systems accept the existence of constitutional constraints placed on the preferences of the majority. Public opinion in the American South might have supported slavery. Should the elite have retained this unjust system in accordance with the opinion of the majority? Public opinion can turn against freedom of the press, against freedom of association, or against certain rights. Theorists of liberal democracy have advanced the argument that one needs to consider the substantive nature of preferences. Standards of representation conflict: A good representative acts as a trustee and as a delegate. For this reason, we need to ask why a representative does not respect the preferences of the represented. Smith and Tatalovich provide no answer to this significant question. Although they note that most politicians prefer to shun highly emotional controversies, they do not explain why the political elite goes, once it is ready to intervene, against the preferences of the electorate.

_Cultures at War_ stands out, however, as an important contribution to the growing field of comparative public policy of moral regulation. The authors are undoubtedly correct to conclude that morality issues will increase in salience and that their resolution leaves much to be desired. This accessible study goes a long way toward charting the unpredictability of new political alignments and the opaqueness of the democratic process.


— Sun-Ki Chai, University of Hawaii

Each of these books offers a wide-ranging, retrospective look at the theoretical literature on nationalism in light of recent history. In some ways, they have remarkably similar outlooks. While both authors seem to accept the usefulness of mainstream theoretical approaches to analyzing nationalism and ethnicity, each book puts forward a novel view regarding the implementation and interpretation of these approaches. For Ray Taras, it is the idea that conventional methodologies for studying nations and nationalism are too narrow and surreptitiously encourage the association of liberal nationalism with the West and illiberal with the rest of the world. For Andreas Wimmer, it is the idea that exclusionary nationalism of the illiberal type is not only consistent with modernization but has also been a necessary precondition for modernity’s political and economic institutions.

Taras posits that existing theoretical categories and research agendas tend to either focus exclusively on the West or base their comparison between the West and developing world on a stereotyped view of the two sides, leading to misleading dichotomies, such as “banal” versus “violent” or “civic” versus “ethnic.” For him, the defining characteristic of nationalism is its embodiment of the concept of home, a place where geography, culture, and legal institutions are made consistent with one another. This conceptualization in turn spreads nationalism far beyond the contexts in which it typically is investigated.

To correct this tendency, Taras examines four different types of nationalism cross-cutting the East–West divide: nationalism of empires, secessionist nationalism, right-wing nationalism, and pan-nationalism. For each type, he examines two empirical cases, which tend to cross the divide as well. In aggregate (Russia and India, South Africa and Canada, Germany and Israel, the Islamic _Umma_ and Latin America, respectively), he manages to cover a diverse range of Western and non-Western societies and civilizations.

Along the way, he accepts certain well-known propositions in the literature (e.g., that nationalism was in large part a product of Enlightenment thought), while rejecting others (e.g., that nationalism is associated with the striving
for linguistic unity). Most importantly, he draws the conclusion that civic nationalism, far from being a solution to chauvinism, is actively complicit in its persistence and presents perhaps the greatest threat to state stability today. He blames this not so much on the civic ideals but on the way that they, in practice, have become an excuse for imperialistic attacks against political entities based upon historical communities.

Wimmer begins his book by noting the seemingly incongruous fact that “modern societies have unfolded within the confines of the nation state” (p. 3) and proceeds to analyze why this might be so. His key proposition is that the main components of a modern society, such as democratic citizenship and economic security, are feasible, given contemporary scarcity, only if there is a clear limitation on who is entitled to them. This in turn requires a level of cultural agreement that is, in practice, found only within the confines of certain ascriptive derived groups. Hence, modernity in a sense requires ethnic exclusion in order to be sustainable, and ethnically based nationalism will not, and perhaps should not, be completely abandoned. While many writers have explored the causal link between modernity and ethnonationalism, Wimmer goes a step further in specifying the relationship in a clear and precise manner.

In his analysis, the author presents two new concepts, *cultural compromise* and *social closure*. Cultural compromise is an agreement among actors inhabiting a common arena for communication about basic principles. These are not so much principles relating directly to government policies, but rather about meaning, about the moral and social categories that are salient in determining those policies. Once these categories are defined, social closure is the process by which certain characteristics and practices are taken as part of a group’s collective identity, while others are viewed as external and foreign, as well as ways in which this identity is made concrete through institutions. In essence, social closure refers to the process of boundary formation and maintenance.

Nonetheless, the nature of the compromise depends on the balance of power and interests, and hence may be altered during times of change in social structure. In this view, modernization is associated with nationalism because it leads to the incorporation of elite and nonelite classes into a common set of social boundaries. This broader definition of social identity in turn results in a broader and more fluid sharing of power and wealth. Given continued conditions of limited resources, this creates an incentive among the members of society to slow down further broadening of social boundaries, which would upset the cultural compromise and could lead to the dilution of benefits for the less privileged.

Wimmer examines his arguments in light of three different contemporary case studies: Mexico, Iraq, and Switzerland. Mexico and Iraq are an interesting contrast because in the former, a mestizo elite rules over a set of unassimilated Native American minorities, while in the latter, a Sunni Arab minority ruled (until very recently) over Shiite Arabs and Sunni Kurds. His case study of Switzerland is particularly well chosen, since Switzerland has long been seen as a successful multietnic state. However, increasing homogeneity and accord among existing inhabitants has created conditions under which newer immigrants are subject to increasing levels of discrimination. He is thus able to use this case to attack the notion that ethnic conflict is a simple outgrowth of heterogeneity.

As mentioned, these two authors seem to share similar points of view on a number of matters. They both challenge the notion that modernization will eventually lead to elimination of ethnic and nationalist identity, a notion that at any rate has few proponents nowadays. However, they also attack the idea that the burgeoning of “identity politics” in Western countries is an indication of the repudiation of modernity, seeing it instead as a manifestation of interest group politics in a modern context where interests are legitimated by inclusion within a particular concept of a nation. Finally, they also criticize the idea that exclusionary, violent nationalism is largely a malaise accompanying a transition to modern capitalism and democracy, as well as the notion that nationalisms in modern societies are somehow benign compared to those elsewhere. Rather, both argue that nationalism, including its exclusionary form, will continue to plague all areas of the world for the indefinite future.

If there is a major difference in the style of the books, it is that while they contain considerable theoretical and empirical analysis, much of Wimmer’s *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict* tends to organize around a logic of theory testing, while Tala’s *Liberal and Illiberal Nationalisms* is more interested in surveying a relatively broad range of states and nations in order to uncover sources of variation. Both, however, are part of a larger movement that seeks to show how the study of nationalism can be improved by throwing off some of the legacy of its European origins.


— Roger Petersen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

In his book, Charles Tilly argues that a relatively small set of causal mechanisms underlies the entire range of collective violence. On its own, this argument is an important and provocative challenge to existing explanations of political violence. It suggests that riots, rebellions, civil wars, revolutions, and other categories of violent events that are often treated as separate phenomena by political scientists are, in fact, built from common and identifiable causal forces. While this argument is substantively important, I believe that the book is equally important from a methodological viewpoint. Building on recent research (e.g., see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 2001), Tilly rejects a standard variable-based approach and instead adopts a mechanism-based method to explain variation in collective violence. Students interested in violence will benefit from reading this book, but so will political scientists interested in the application of the book, but so will political scientists interested in the application.
of a methodology that seeks to highlight causal specificity. After a brief review, I will return to this methodological issue.

In The Politics of Collective Violence, Tilly first develops a typology of collective violence determined by two dimensions—salience of short-run damage (that is, the extent to which relationships are dominated by violent rather than nonviolent interaction) and the extent of coordination among violent actors. The result is seven types of violent episodes: violent rituals, coordinated destruction, opportunism, brawls, broken negotiations, scattered attacks, and individual aggression. Each type is typical of a certain space on the salience-coordination field of variation. For example, violent rituals are high on salience and coordination; brawls are high on salience but low on coordination; broken negotiations are low on salience but high on coordination. Tilly’s goal is to explain why different times and places experience variation in these types of violent episodes. Moreover, the work attempts to explain how one type of violent episode evolves or creates the conditions for violence of a different type. If we can understand these types of processes, then we will be in a better position to address such puzzling questions as why collective violence often occurs in waves, why social interactions so easily shift from nonviolence to violence, and how regime types influence different levels and forms of collective violence.

Tilly searches for the causes of this variation in combinations and sequences of mechanisms, rather than in laws or models. As he defines, “Mechanisms are causes on the small scale: similar events that produce essentially the same immediate effects across a wide range of circumstances” (p. 20). For example, “brokerage” is the joining of two or more previously less-connected social sites by a third actor. “Certification” involves the validation of actors by external authorities. In total, Tilly employs perhaps 12 to 15 such mechanisms in the book. It is important to note that the same mechanisms show up in different forms of violence. It is the specific combination and sequence, as well as the setting, that determines the causal effect on collective violence. Changes in type of violence are explained through changes in the set of operative mechanisms or their sequence. For example, coordinated destruction, involving high salience and high coordination, results from mechanisms of brokerage, network-based escalation, and activation of political identity. However, if brokerage fails to operate, the level of coordination among social sites will drop, and the violence may mutate from coordinated destruction to opportunism. Such an explanation helps explain how politically oriented violence can descend into violence marked by pillage and rape.

Chapters 4 through 9 each illustrate one type of violence. Each chapter lists a set of causal mechanisms and processes and theoretically describes how they create a certain type of collective violence. Tilly then uses a diverse set of cases, ranging both across centuries and across the globe, to illustrate the argument.

Some of the substantive findings of the book are less than surprising. For instance, the conclusion that high-capacity democratic regimes are far less prone to violence than low-capacity nondemocratic regimes will not come as a shock to most students of conflict. However, Tilly’s goal in this work is not so much to uncover new relationships among broad factors as it is to develop a much higher level of causal specificity for explanations of political violence. In his view, a concentration on mechanisms provides this causal specificity, while retaining a measure of parsimony. Tilly’s goal here is to develop a new way of thinking about collective violence that goes beyond correlation and beyond present compartmentalized debates.

There are costs to a mechanism-based approach. If too many mechanisms are cited, the explanation lapses into description simply dressed up with a new terminology. Mechanism-based explanations are difficult to falsify. Some will argue that good variable approaches based on coherent theory will already contain, at least implicitly, an idea of causal mechanism (for an extended discussion, see Arthur Stinchcombe, “The Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing About Mechanisms in Social Science,” Philosophy of Social Science 21 [1991]: 367–88).

Given these potential problems, the book raises the question of why Tilly feels compelled, especially after so many years as a leader in the field, to explicitly adopt a method based on mechanism and process. Perhaps his answer is most clearly stated in a previous article. After describing the standard political science approach as a combination of propensity and covering law explanations trying to capture general uniformities in human political behavior, he writes: “Despite more than a century of strenuous effort, political scientists have securely identified no such uniformities. But they have recurrently identified widely operating causal mechanisms and processes. Rather than continuing to search for propensity-governing laws, it would therefore make sense to switch whole-heartedly toward the specification of mechanisms and processes” (“Mechanisms and Political Processes,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 [2001]: 25).

Whether the majority of political scientists would agree and make such a switch is highly unlikely. However, the numbers of those already practicing a mechanism-based approach is growing. One problem is that a plethora of definitions and usages of mechanism and process has created confusion. My own work on collective violence, for example, is also mechanism based. However, the mechanisms underlying my explanations are all at the individual level and primarily cognitive. While advancing our substantive knowledge of collective violence, The Politics of Collective Violence also provides an exemplar of one type of mechanism approach that serves to clarify and advance this methodology. As Tilly hopes, the book should open doors on several issues.


— Karen J. Vogel, Hamline University

This excellent study of gender, globalization, and postsocialism in the Czech Republic is a welcome addition to feminist
international relations and comparative politics theory and the literature on transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. In the 1990s, such edited collections as Marilyn Rueschemeyer’s (1994) *Women in the Politics of Post-Communist Eastern Europe* and Chris Corin’s (1999) *Gender and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe* provided early accounts of how the social, economic, and political transformations after the fall of the Berlin Wall affected women. Many of the studies in these collections pointed to the disproportionate burden carried by women in the transition process, but few discussed the degree to which larger forces of globalization determined, as well as were shaped by, gender relations at home, work, and in the political arena. Some women’s studies and feminist international relations theory, such as Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan’s (2002) *Introduction to Women’s Studies: Gender in a Transnational World*, have explored larger global questions of the relationship between gender and transnational forces, but they have missed what may be a more nuanced account of women’s experiences at the domestic level. No recent research on women in Central and Eastern Europe has been as in-depth on one country, or as theoretically grounded and aware of international interconnections, as Jacqui True’s book.

True focuses on two key questions: First, how are changing gender relations transforming and being changed by marketization and liberalization? And second, to what degree are women able to find empowerment and political space in fluid social, economic, and political contexts? With these questions in mind, she uses a case study of women in the Czech Republic to illuminate the complexity of women’s day-to-day lives and to give us a powerful insight into the various local and international social, political, and economic forces at work.

The book is organized into seven chapters. True begins by briefly sketching the Czech experience with communism and democratisation. The reader is presented with a lucid overview of the origins of the state of Czechoslovakia in the interwar period; the socialist revolution; activities of reform during the “Prague Spring” and Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968; the founding of Charta 77; the Velvet Revolution of 1989; and transitions to capitalist democracy. She then explores and evaluates the various interpretations of post-socialist transformations coming from neoliberalist, Marxist, institutionalist, and feminist perspectives.

The author’s own theoretical contribution is a synthesis of neo-Gramscian, institutionalist, and feminist theories. She draws on the “bottom up” notion of social change from neo-Gramscian theory, the historical focus and analysis of political institutions from the institutionalists, and finally a concept of gender as both a “superstructure” and a material “base.” As stated on page 26, she views historically specific, “common sense ideas about male and female human nature as being encoded in social practices. In turn, these encodings shape state and civil society, and the forces of production and reproduction in transitions to capitalist democracy.” This synthesis allows her to argue that an examination of gender relations is key to understanding micro- and macroprocesses of change and continuity in political economy, culture, and politics.

The remaining chapters of the book focus on what the author sees as four important sites of transformation and gendered processes of globalization: the redefinition of the family; the establishment of local labor markets and the gender dynamics within them; the changing, globalized consumer market and reconstruction of gender identities; and finally the gendering of informal and formal politics where men control formal political democratic institutions and women participate in nonprofits supported by transnational nonstate actors. Throughout her study of women and the Czech Republic, she convincingly demonstrates that gendered processes and globalization are a “two-way street.” Globalization, democratization, and marketization shape—and at the same time reflect—gender relations.

One of the great strengths of the book is True’s use of empirical research and detailed examples to illuminate her arguments. For instance, in the chapter on gendering state socialism, the author examines the official Communist Party women’s magazine, *Vlasta*, to demonstrate the early democratic awakening of Czech women. She analyzes the role played by the publication and the themes it presented from 1968 to 1969. Another interesting example is presented in the chapter on labor markets where she uses a discussion of sexual harassment cases to show the growing efforts of women’s groups to raise awareness about the maltreatment of women in the workplace. True also examines the ever-expanding sex trade and trafficking of women and girls in Europe, and the Czech Republic in particular, to illuminate further the failure of the Czech government to deal with developments resulting from globalization and capitalist transitions in the labor market. Two photos (on pp. 145 and 167) also provide stunning visual references to how women are portrayed and often exploited in the public sphere.

If any flaw at all exists in this excellent work, it is True’s claim on page 27 that her book “does not take the collective identity of ‘women’ for granted.” While she does examine the “paradoxical nature of female and male agency” after the fall of communism in the Czech Republic, she fails to analyze fully the experiences of women who have different ethnic backgrounds or sexual orientations. Only in passing does she acknowledge Romany Gypsy women who may be working in low-paid jobs or at the margins of the economy, and no mention is made of the degree of discrimination experienced by lesbian women in the workforce or elsewhere. Therefore, even if unintended, some assumptions of collective identity permeate her analysis and lump together experiences of women when they may not be entirely all the same.

*Gender, Globalization, and Postsocialism* is highly readable and well organized. About halfway through each chapter, True gives a summary of her arguments, followed by more examples to prove her points. Her writing is clear, direct, and uncluttered with excessive jargon; charts and tables show important trends and statistics. The overall construction of the book and its accessibility make it useful for undergraduates as well as experts in the fields of international relations and comparative politics. Finally, her

— Louise K. Davidson-Schmich, University of Miami

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the advent of free elections there led political scientists to debate whether stable patterns of voting behavior, based on underlying social or ideological divisions, would emerge in postcommunist Europe in the same way they did in Western Europe. Scholars skeptical of the “stabilization” hypothesis argued that such an outcome was unlikely in Eastern Europe given the region’s weak civil society, lack of established programmatic parties, and high level of economic uncertainty surrounding the transition to capitalism. Ultimately, the question of Eastern European voting behavior is an empirical one that, because more than a decade has passed since the first free elections there, can now be answered. Hubert T. Worzecki’s Learning to Choose is an excellent first step in this direction. The author explores social cleavages, public opinion, attitudes toward political parties, voter turnout, and vote choice in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic between 1992 and 1995. His conclusions, based primarily on survey data collected by the Central European University, place him firmly in the stabilization camp.

T. Worzecki begins by examining the region’s history for sociological factors that might divide the electorate. He convincingly argues that the present cleavages among voters stem from three periods in east-central European history. First, legacies of the precommunist period manifest themselves in Poland as a division between voters with Catholic-nationalist tendencies and those who hold more secular-universalist values. In Hungary, an urban-rural cleavage is present in addition to a religious-secular divide.

Second, unsurprisingly, T. Worzecki finds that both the nature of communist rule and the transition to democracy also shape postcommunist society. The pacted transitions of Poland and Hungary allowed the Communist Party to gradually cede power. As a result, reformed communist parties survived the transition, and a key political division in these countries became how harshly, if at all, communists should be judged. In the Czech Republic, in contrast, communism abruptly collapsed, the ex-communists never reformed, and strict lustration laws were passed. As a result, the pro-/anti-communist cleavage was much weaker there. Finally, T. Worzecki maintains, the current transition to a market economy divides east-central European voters in all three countries, especially the Czech Republic, into “winners” of the transition, who favor market reforms, and “losers,” who favor social protection to cushion citizens from the market.

Using survey data, the author makes a convincing case that these underlying societal divisions translate into coherent ideological preferences among voters. Just as in Western Europe, mass opinion in all three countries can be broken down along two dimensions. The first, what T. Worzecki calls the “decommunization-clericalism” axis, separates voters who favor a public role for the church and strict lustration laws from those who support church-state separation and who are less anti-communist. His “economic” axis separates citizens on the basis of their positions vis-à-vis market reforms and social welfare, as well as their satisfaction with national economic performance and the democratic political system.

The book then investigates whether these clear preferences influence voters’ assessments of political parties. T. Worzecki uneartths evidence of what he calls tendencies or “a general political predisposition rather than loyalty to a specific party organization” (p. 105). For example, voters who had anti-communist beliefs tended to have positive views of anticomunist parties. The author additionally shows that voters were swayed not only by their sociological characteristics and ideological beliefs but also by parties’ campaign appeals, leaders, and performance in office. In other words, the short- and long-term factors that shape voter preferences in Western democracies appear to be at work in east-central Europe as well. T. Worzecki also finds this to be the case for variables predicting voter turnout.

Finally, the author seeks to connect voters’ preferences and party assessments to their actual voting behavior. On the one hand, he utilizes aggregate voting data from subnational units and finds consistent relationships between regional characteristics and voter choice. For example, in depressed regions voters favor leftist parties and in economically successful ones citizens support pro-market parties. On the other hand, when he relies on survey data, he can find less evidence for stabilization; very few central European voters were loyal to a given political party, or even a party family, over the course of multiple elections. T. Worzecki blames this situation not on voters, who, he argues, have clear and stable preferences, but on the supply side: “even when there is a clear opening on the political stage . . . it may take some time before it is filled. . . . In the meantime voters keep searching for the right match” (p. 208).

Thus, while Learning to Choose provides convincing empirical evidence and logical arguments to make the case that voter preferences have stabilized in east-central Europe, the book also leaves unanswered some interesting questions about the actions of political entrepreneurs and party leaders. If indeed it is the case that east-central European voters have stable and identifiable political preferences, are cognitively able to assess political parties, and make vote choices based on these preferences, why have political entrepreneurs not moved to fill the voids the author identifies? Is it because elites are for some reason unaware of these voter preferences? Do party organizations somehow hinder party movement into the spaces filled by voters? Or are other factors responsible for the apparent inability of party supply to meet voter demand? The book neatly sets up this puzzle for future scholarship to answer.
Another limitation is the book’s focus on only 1992–95. Tworzecki argues on a number of occasions that while this period may seem quite brief, “time was actually flowing at an ‘accelerated’ rate” due to the quick pace of the change to democracy and the market (e.g., p. 81). Nonetheless, this reader was left wondering how durable some of the observed cleavages will prove. Although religion and economic issues seem likely to continue to divide voters in increasingly modern and capitalist societies, the pro-/anticommunist cleavage seems likely to decline in salience as former communists die off and younger voters enter the electorate. Had the author enjoyed access to survey data from the latter part of the 1990s or the early 2000s, his conclusions would have been all the much stronger.

As it stands, the book is an excellent baseline from which future students of east-central European voting behavior can assess stability (or change) in the decades following the fall of communism. Such scholars may also want to examine how other postcommunist electorates compare to Tworzecki’s cases. All three countries analyzed here enjoyed an elite commitment to play by the new democratic rules of the game, and all (after the Velvet Divorce) benefited from clear-cut national boundaries and a relative lack of ethnic conflict. As a result, the stabilization of mass opinion observed here likely was greatly facilitated by the presence of a relatively stable political system, and the results may not be applicable elsewhere in the postcommunist world.


— Roy Pierce, University of Michigan

The fourteen contributors to this book have taken on a large and difficult task: to survey and systematically compare the performance of political parties in most advanced industrial democracies without neglecting to discuss the distinctive features, endemic problems, and recent developments attaching to the party systems of the many individual countries discussed.

The organization of the book is straightforward. An introductory chapter by the editors briefly describes its aims and plan. In a broad sense, the goal is to determine whether some variant of a “decline of parties” argument holds up under close comparative scrutiny. Thirteen separate chapters written by various scholars then follow; most are devoted to a single country (one deals with Scandinavia, another with the Low Countries). The country experts were free to emphasize whatever salient features of the party systems they thought appropriate, but they all also tried to adhere to a common plan to include sections relating to certain more or less specific themes: the popular legitimacy of the parties, their organizational strength, and their performance, with specific reference to governance and political recruitment, interest articulation and aggregation, and political participation. Japan is unaccountably excluded from the roster. A less constrained chapter is devoted to the parties that populate the European Parliament, for which the comparative design is not appropriate. In a final chapter, the editors sum up the findings, concentrating on the themes designated in advance for comparative analysis but not exploiting the idiosyncratic contributions from the country studies.

There is a considerable disconnect between the comparative design and the separate, more or less country-specific studies in which the strength of the book lies. These studies are of higher caliber than such collections often are, and their occasional sorties into historical analysis, major party system transformations, and organizational particularities far outweigh in interest (and potential for comparative analysis) their semiobligatory contributions to the preselected comparative categories that sometimes narrowly skirt tabular tedium.

There are, I believe, two main reasons that the particular contributions of the country chapters are more penetrating than the comparative design. One reason relates to the weakness of the design; the other relates to the richness of the country studies.

The first reason is that the comparative design is not grounded in a clear and coherent theoretical conception of what parties are and do. Political parties in a democratic society, operating through the elections with which they are inevitably associated, are instruments of competition for the exercise of power. Parties are both arenas within which competition occurs and agencies that compete with one another within other constitutionally defined arenas, according to rules that are themselves objects of partisan conflict. An understanding of parties needs to start from a recognition that they are the latter-day counterparts of warring baronies, for which the key concept is rivalry.

There is little if any recognition of this in the introductory chapter. Instead, the emphasis is placed on “the functions that any stable and effective democracy might expect of [parties],” including representing citizens effectively, translating wants and needs into effective governmental outputs, and fostering democratic involvement (p. 1).

Parties may, of course, fulfill such functions, and there is certainly nothing wrong with investigating whether and the extent to which they do. Such an investigation, however, requires some conception of why one would expect them to do so. If parties do produce the benign results cited, they must do so in the service of satisfying their primary, competitive urges. Rather like the general economic benefits produced by Adam Smith’s self-interested entrepreneurs, the social benefits highlighted in this book are by-products of otherwise motivated partisan activities. One would think that a comparative analysis of the extent to which such benefits are produced would profit from some specification of why and how they might be expected to emerge from alternate forms of partisan competition.

The authors of the country studies do a heroic job of trying to satisfy the terms of the comparative design, and readers will find these chapters a useful source of data about such matters as public attitudes toward parties; electoral turnout
and results; political participation; and party organization, membership, and finance. Their great strength, however, lies in their constant awareness of what parties purposefully do. Parties compete with one another. The country chapters show how the parties with which they are concerned adapt to and interact with their environments, with the formal institutions of government, and with both organized and latent social forces. But they do not lose sight of the fact that that activity takes place within the context of the parties’ perpetual pursuit of their selfish ends.

The ceaseless maneuvering that can be involved in this process is skillfully captured—often dramatically—in chapter after chapter. Space limitations permit me to cite but a few illustrations. R. Kenneth Cary’s chapter on Canadian parties treats the “electoral earthquake” of 1993 (p. 344) as the latest stage of a cyclical pattern of successive transformations of the Canadian party system, dating from World War I, that have been linked to the nation’s still unsolved sectional issues.

Andrew Knapp’s chapter on France skillfully describes the recombinant configurations of interaction between polarization and fragmentation among the multiple parties, specifies policies typical of right and left that have moved from party platform to government policy, and describes well the complex routes of political recruitment and the competition among parties, movements, and ad hoc groups for control of the political agenda.

Luciano Bardi discusses an Italian party system that, against a background of near-universal scandal and corruption, was almost wholly transformed within little more than a decade. Between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s, the main governing parties of earlier years—the Christian Democrats and the Socialists—virtually disappeared, the Communist Party tried to remake itself, and new parties were formed, including tycoon Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and the separatist-inclined Northern League. During that same period, there was virtually a complete turnover in parliamentary personnel (p. 67).

By way of contrast, the German party system, discussed by Susan Scarrow in a chapter that is particularly sensitive to the basic theoretical issue that I raised earlier in this review (see esp. p. 102), appears to have been highly resistant to change, despite being the spawning ground of the Greens and suffering the shock of the large, potentially destabilizing forces unleashed by reunification.

That sampling of important themes that are treated in the country studies is almost criminally brief. I hope, however, that it suggests the huge potential for illuminating comparative analysis of political parties that can be extracted from a careful reading of Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Societies.


— Patricio Silva, Leiden University

During the last two decades, democratization has emerged worldwide as one of the most dominant themes within political science. This has resulted in a huge body of literature on the dynamics of democratic transition in Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. While some authors have elaborated general theoretical frameworks, others have produced descriptive studies focusing on the democratization process in specific countries. So the following question emerges: Why another book on democratization, as this debate has apparently already reached a point of saturation? Laurence Whitehead implicitly provides a consistent and convincing answer about the reason d’etre for this study. Although not explicitly stated as an objective by the author, he has actually managed to provide an interpretative synthesis on the entire debate on democratization. This quite difficult and ambitious task could have only been successfully conducted by scholars with the trajectory of Whitehead. During the last twenty years he has been, together with political scientists such as Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, at the forefront of this debate. In this sense, the book also has something of the autobiography as it nicely shows Whitehead’s own involvement in this collective undertaking.

Even the structure of the book represents in itself a valuable contribution for the understanding of this academic discussion. By inventively sorting out the main aspects of this huge and rather amorphous debate, and by articulating them around 10 large themes, the author gives us a useful picture of this veritable “galaxy” called democratization debate. He states that he does not aim to survey all the different approaches to democratization that have been proposed for the last two decades, but rather to confront them with challenges posed to all analysis by the still-unfolding experiences of present-day democratization. So in Chapter 1, for instance, in which the concepts “democracy” and “democratization” are explored, he makes clear that democracy is best understood not as a predetermined end state but as a long-term and somewhat open-ended process. Consequently, there can be no single recipe for democracy applicable to all times and places. This represents a timely warning for contemporary attempts to universalize a certain type of Western democracy around the globe. The same goes for the concept of democratization, which can seem to resist a universally valid definition, as many of the recent processes of democratization sometimes show very little resemblance to each other.

Whitehead uses the metaphors of theater and drama to characterize the complex dynamics, shifting agendas, and multiple interactions that characterizes democratization. Like theater, democratization processes show unexpected twists in the plot as they are studded with surprises. Passions and interests of the main players constitute important factors in democratization processes, but a purely rationalistic account of their motivations fails to capture the essence of their collective behavior. At the end of the day, the role of leadership remains a dramatically important factor in the whole process. Sometimes nations are fortunate to have leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Václav Havel, who were of vital importance in ensuring a peaceful transition in South Africa and
Czechoslovakia, respectively. But Whitehead also stresses the existence of leaders who raise expectations they are entirely unsuited to fulfill. One can mention the unfortunate cases of Abdalá Bucaram in Ecuador, Joseph Estrada in the Philippines, and Abdurrahan Wahid in Indonesia whose personalities and public behavior greatly aggravated political instability and seriously threatened the democratic process in their countries.

Whitehead also stresses the importance of recent political history and the ways in which actors take lessons (or not) from it in efforts to build up new democratic structures. How important “the weight of history” is he makes clear in Chapter 9 in his comprehensive analysis of the Chilean democratic transition. Indeed, both the contours and the dilemmas of the Chilean democratization process are almost unintelligible if one does not take into account the impact of the Allende governments in the early 1970s and the dramatic consequences of the Pinochet regime on the people’s collective memory. As this country already possessed a long democratic tradition previous to the 1973 coup, Chileans have been mainly trying to rebuild previous institutions following democratic restoration in 1990. However, the traumatic experience of democratic breakdown in 1973 and the hardship imposed by the Pinochet regime made most Chilean democrats extremely cautious and conscientious about the fragility of democracy and the dangers of unrestricted participation for democratic consolidation. By adopting a pragmatic and defensive posture, Chile’s political class consciously tried to avoid recreating the conflicts and clashes of the past, instead following a consensus-seeking approach toward key national issues. Here again Whitehead stresses the role played by the political class in facilitating a peaceful transition to democracy. However, he makes clear that Chilean democracy is still haunted by many nondemocratic reminiscences of the past, as became apparent following Pinochet’s arrest in London in 1998.

Democratization is a welcome invitation to strengthen the dialogue between theory and experience and, hence, to avoid the adoption of defensive or preconceived approaches toward the dynamics ruling democratization processes. Whitehead has succeeded not only in showing the long-term, open-ended nature of these processes but also in stressing the need for constant monitoring and study of the ever-changing democratic structures and practices.


— Gregory D. Schmidt, Northern Illinois University

This important but uneven book analyzes successive phases of post–World War II state intervention in Peru and four other Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Carol Wise argues that an accumulation of various state-related problems during the initial postwar decades was the major cause of the severe economic crisis that plagued the region during the 1980s. She further maintains that Latin America’s dramatic recovery during the 1990s was largely due to the resolution of these problems, with the conspicuous exception of persistently high levels of poverty and income inequality.

Noting that the streamlined Latin American state of the 1990s accounts for approximately the same share of GDP as the grandiose developmental state of the 1960s and 1970s, Wise aptly infers that the critical changes in the state’s role have been qualitative in nature. Chapter 1 derives four unwieldy “working hypotheses” from the political economy literature and a sketch of institutional variation between the pre- and postreform periods in the five countries. In a nutshell, these hypotheses portray bureaucratic autonomy, powerful economic and planning institutions, stable and effective leadership supported by dominant groups, and policy mediation through state-sanctioned peak associations for business and labor as key determinants of policy success. Although each of these four institutional variables could be delineated in generic terms, the author ties them to the postreform period and market-oriented policies (pp. 31–43). Moreover, the dependent variable inexplicably shifts from enhanced economic performance (p. 33) to “effective policy outcomes” (p. 35), “effective modes of economic reform” (p. 39), and enhanced state policymaking (p. 41). The latter pages of the chapter use the four institutional variables to identify the different paths to market reform taken by the five countries.

Most of the book (Chapters 2 to 6) applies this analytical framework to examine successive governments in Peru, where shifts in economic policies and performance have been the most pronounced in Latin America. Unfortunately, the hypotheses remain loosely cast, the criteria for evaluating them are unclear, and the supporting evidence is largely unconvincing. Moreover, Chapters 2 to 5 treat different prereform governments during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but they are incongruously guided by hypotheses designed to contrast the pre- and post reform periods and awkwardly employ institutional variables that have been fleshed out with reference to market-oriented policies. Although these chapters make valuable contributions to the literature on Peruvian economic policy, they are mostly irrelevant to the book’s central arguments. As Wise herself notes, “the story up to 1990 is largely one of opportunities lost and paths not taken” (p. 229).

The changing character of the Peruvian state is finally treated in Chapter 6. The author maintains that relatively modest institutional innovations during Alberto Fujimori’s first term (1990–95) played a critical role in the country’s spectacular economic recovery, but she suggests that market reforms must be linked to more comprehensive processes of democratic institution building in order to be successful and sustainable over the long haul. Although these general arguments are plausible, the discussion is too cursory and disjointed to link convincingly the four institutional variables to the hypothesized outcomes. Indeed, this chapter shows that
new and renovated state economic institutions were largely by-products of market-oriented policies, limited to only a few pockets of efficiency, and subject to Fujimori’s direct control. The book’s title is thus somewhat misleading.

Wise fails to address directly the key question of whether Fujimori’s presidential coup and subsequent constraints on democracy were necessary for the success of market reforms and the limited institutional innovations that did take place. In Latin America, only Argentina and Bolivia have initiated far-reaching market reforms under democratic governments, and both of these cases are problematic in terms of democratic norms. Similarly, the author acknowledges the extensive power of sinister spymaster Vladimiro Montesinos but does not discuss any role that he might have played in shaping economic policy during the Fujimori years.

In her concluding Chapter 7, Wise provocatively argues that Peru’s new democratic government would do well to follow the recent examples of Mexico and especially Chile by moving beyond the standard neoliberal prescriptions of the Washington Consensus to adopt more proactive export-led policies. Far from withering away in the era of globalization, the Latin American state must strategically assume additional responsibilities if the region is to realize its developmental potential.

Throughout the book, Wise’s treatment of Peruvian politics and institutions is surprisingly sketchy. For example, she largely overlooks the strong reactive powers of the Peruvian congress and does not distinguish presidential decrees based on claims of constitutional authority from those based on legislative delegation. This distinction is critical for understanding economic policymaking under democratic regimes and the executive-legislative conflict leading up to Fujimori’s presidential coup. More generally, the paucity of supporting detail produces ambiguities, apparent inconsistencies, and important omissions that are likely to irritate specialists and confuse general readers. There are also some outright errors. For example, Fujimori did not use a legislative decree to initiate the presidential coup (p. 187); not all departments outside of Lima voted against the 1993 Constitution (p. 195); the so-called Democratic Constituent Congress elected in 1992 did not lack an active opposition, which included members from the traditional parties (p. 211); and, despite the blatant unfairness of the 2000 election, it is highly unlikely that “massive voting fraud” occurred (p. 247).

Nevertheless, the strengths of Reinventing the State outweigh its significant shortcomings. Wise offers an abundance of valuable information and insights, develops intriguing arguments, and writes in a lucid and accessible style. A focus on the state makes her book more attractive to political scientists than a fine complementary work by John Sheahan (1999), Searching for a Better Society: The Peruvian Economy from 1950. Scholars interested in the political economy of Peru or Latin America will likely find the entire text worthwhile. The more general and contemporary chapters should also appeal to a broader audience.

### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

#### Governing the World’s Money.

**Governing the World’s Money**


— Jennifer Sterling-Folker, University of Connecticut

Given the inroads that constructivism has made into international relations theorizing in general, it is not surprising that international political economy (IPE) scholars would increasingly incorporate it into their work. This incorporation is central to Social Construction and the Logic of Money, which attempts to blend rationalist and constructivist methodologies in order to explain when nation-states decide to provide leadership in international economics and how they go about doing so. Constructivism is not as central to Governing the World’s Money, which brings together some of the best-known scholars in IPE today in order to discuss how international monetary relations may be effectively managed, yet even here there is a growing awareness of the socially constructed aspects of IPE.

J. Samuel Barkin’s analysis begins with the observation that while a rationalist would claim there is an inherent logic to international monetary exchange, a constructivist would argue that “the international political economy is a social construct, and is thus historically specific” (p. 10). Barkin attempts to bring these two positions together by accepting “that political and economic structures and behaviors are historically contingent, but also that given certain of these contingencies there are objective logics that can help us to understand the operation of both structures and behaviors” (p. 23). The particular logic in which he is interested is the logic of money, which he equates with the logic of international financial predominance. He argues that when the ratio of a country’s holdings in long-term international stock investment surpasses half of the total stock of such investments, that country will have achieved financial predominance and be motivated to provide international monetary leadership (pp. 28–29). This logic of money “tells us whether or not a country can, and is likely to want to, be a leader” (p. 26). It cannot tell us how a leader will choose to lead, however, and for that we need the logic of social constructivism, which involves “looking at the social structures underlying the making of leadership policies domestically” (p. 27). Hence, the logic that produces international economic leadership is the “framework,” and to understand it we need a rationalist methodology, but to understand the particular
policies that are hung on that framework, and the international monetary systems that result, we need a constructivist methodology (p. 41).

Barkin goes on to apply this argument to three cases in which infrastructural public goods were provided to varying degrees: the "ad hoc" leadership of the Dutch in the early 1600s; the "comprehensive" leadership of Great Britain from the middle of the 1800s to 1914; and the "multilateral" and "institutionalized" leadership of the United States after World War II. In each case, he explores the domestic constituents who demanded leadership and the particulars of domestic politics that led to the type of leadership supplied. A fourth case, the interwar years and the Great Depression, underscores his premise that no leadership is forthcoming in the absence of a nation-state with more than half the systemic total in foreign investment holdings. Yet the chapter is written as if his argument expected leadership to have been provided, and in fact, it is clear that Barkin subscribes to Charles Kindleberger's argument that in conditions of anarchy, only leadership can provide the public goods necessary for stable and efficient international economic interactions (pp. 17–22).

One immediate question provoked by Barkin's interesting attempt to combine rationalism and constructivism is whether it will satisfy proponents of either perspective. For a number of reasons, I suspect that rationalists will find it more convincing than constructivists. Of course, there are many different types of constructivists, and Barkin's self-description as "thin constructivism" that accepts the scientific assumption that there is a clear distinction between researcher and data (p. 9) is consistent with some forms of constructivism in the IR mainstream. John Odell's contribution to the volume edited by David Andrews, C. Randall Henning, and Louis Pauly strikes a similar note, suggesting to constructivists that there is no inherent reason why shared beliefs or intentions could not be conceived theoretically and studied empirically as properties of individuals as well as of groups, within a neo-postivist epistemology (p. 189). Odell's chapter would be a good companion piece to Barkin's book in this regard.

"Thick" constructivists will be less satisfied with Barkin's attempt at a compromise, however, because it is the logic of money, not the logic of social construction, that is the dominant logic in his analysis. While he acknowledges that "money is thus not an objective phenomenon: it is a social category with the full content of which can only be understood in historical context," still he agrees with economists that "there is something inherent in the nature of money that makes monetary systems behave in a certain way" (p. 25). This produces a constructivism that is only important on rationalist terms. The logic of money determines that leadership will be provided under the right empirical conditions, but there is just enough wiggle room left for differences in the form leadership will take. Constructivism is then employed to explain those differences, but ultimately they are still deviations from an assumed norm of leadership in the provision of infrastructural public goods. So, for example, the British attachment to the sterling is an example of "contextually specific historical quirks" (p. 38); Dutch economic leadership is shaped "by the quirks of the system of government" (p. 65), the failure to provide leadership results "from the peculiarities of the individual domestic political cultures and processes" (p. 94), and variety in policy outputs are due to "the peculiarities of the domestic political structures" (p. 159).

Far from being central to an understanding of how international monetary leadership is constructed, then, the logic of social constructivism is employed to explain why there is deviation from the logic of money. As Barkin puts it, "the logic of international economic leadership is one of functions fulfilled by policy, rather than one of specific policies" (p. 158). Of course, this is what makes the Andrews, Henning, and Pauly volume interesting in comparison, since it is about the logic of money, too. Yet according to the editors, "the questions of how to govern supranational monetary areas effectively, and how to render such governance authoritative, remain open" (p. 5). The result is different interpretations regarding what sort of governance the logic of money demands, which significantly undercuts any rationalist claim that there is an "objective" logic of money that should be privileged over the logic of social constructivism.

Some of the contributors to the volume concur with Barkin that a powerful nation-state is needed to provide commercial infrastructural public goods. For example, Robert Gilpin argues that governance structures such as international regimes are established to obtain the interests of powerful nation-states, and Miles Kahler argues that the institutional design of monetary governance reflects a combination of functional monetary demand and the particulars of domestic politics. Other authors in the volume, such as Thomas Willett and Odell, also argue that "functions are fulfilled by policy": however, it is not the logic of leadership that dominates the functions in their analyses but the logic of organizations and human decision making instead. The chapters by Peter Kenen and Pier Carlo Padoan examine currency union as a particular form of monetary governance that does not require leadership to be realized. Nor is leadership important to Kathleen McNamara's study, which examines the role that warfare plays in the development of a consolidated monetary union. Finally, there are those chapters in which not only is leadership irrelevant to international monetary governance structures but so too are nation-states. Eric Helleiner's examination of the deterritorialization of money indicates that many states are simply abandoning any attempt at regulating their currencies, while Philip Cerny argues that increasingly markets are serving "as quasi-political governance structures in their own right" (p. 198).

The point here is not to argue that Barkin is wrong about leadership while these other interpretations of the logic of money are right. It is, instead, to underscore that if different interpretations exist, if there is no single rationalist logic to money, then why give it causal billing over the social construction of the logic itself? Why does each instance of international economic leadership or governance, and lack thereof,
not change the meaning of the logic of money? In fact, the Andrews, Henning, and Pauly volume can be reread as an example of how the logic of money is being socially constructed among the current generation of IPE scholars. After all, monetary governance has been of interest to IPE scholars for some time, but the framing of the questions and the answers given have been very different at various points in time. As the editors themselves note, for example, “optimum currency area theory was the analytical workhorse of economic approaches to monetary integration,” and they were “fairly realistic in the 1960s but hardly appropriate to the 1980s and 1990s” (p. 6). This implies that the logic of money is not simply an empirical, objective fact but also a socially constructed category that must be rethought and hence reconstructed. Indeed, if what was considered “common sense” in 1960 is now inappropriate, what is left of the rationalist claim to the objective logic of money?

The temptation to cut into the issue of “governance” or “leadership” with a “logic of money,” and leave the rest to constructivism, is entirely understandable from a traditional IPE perspective. But how governance, leadership, and the logic of money become the “common sense” categories of the international economic system, and hence the scholars who study it, is also the stuff of constructivism. In the final analysis, however, whether this initial marriage between rationalism and constructivism in IPE will satisfy proponents of either is probably less important than the attempt itself, which reflects a willingness on the part of IPE scholars to explore and incorporate new ideas and different perspectives. Barkin’s book does so by pushing us to consider the relationship between rationalism and constructivism in IPE more fully, while the Andrews, Henning, and Pauly volume asks us to consider equally plausible but alternative perspectives on monetary governance. At a time in the discipline of IR when debates are more dismissive than heated, such willingness to take seriously alternative theoretical positions and to honestly engage them is much needed.


— Kathy L. Powers, University of Arizona

The relationship between economic interdependence and conflict has been a central debate in international relations, especially since Solomon Polachek published his seminal article in 1980 (“Conflict and Trade,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24:1 [March 1980]: 55–78). Whether trade can quell political hostilities through increasing the costs of disrupting trade, creating mutual interdependence among trading states, or increasing human contact is a key question. Polachek argued that trade produces a “natural peace,” as opposed to one constructed by the rule of law. Today, the debate rages over whether trade leads to peace or promotes interstate war. In a very thorough treatment of all sides of this debate and the use of multiple forms of analysis, Katherine Barbieri evaluates liberal, realist, and dependency theorists’ claims about the nature of economic interdependence and conflict in her book. Whether trade uniformly reduces conflict among all trading states or only under specific conditions is a central question for the author. In order to understand the relationship between trade and conflict, Barbieri argues that the conditions under which trade diminishes, exacerbates, and has no influence on interstate war should be assessed. Specifying such circumstances is a central goal in The Liberal Illusion. This objective sheds light on international relations, builds IR theory, and gives policymakers a guidepost for when and how to apply trade as a policy tool for conflict reduction and prevention.

The liberal perspective on trade and conflict is the point of departure for this book since this perspective has had such a powerful influence on IR theory and foreign economic policy. Liberal scholars argue that the “virtues of trade” lie in incentives for cooperation and reduction in misconceptions between people, for example. According to this view, trade can change oppressive regimes into peaceful democratic societies. Barbieri maintains that some liberals see trade as a panacea for most ills, ranging from the nasty characteristics of human nature to poverty and war. Given that this theoretical perspective has a strong influence on policy in international relations, we must understand the virtues and vices of trade for alleviating conflict.

Realist and dependency theorists maintain that trade promotes conflict and is a barrier to peace because of the inequities in the distribution of the gains from trade, as well as the imbalance in the terms of trade. Economic interdependence does not have a uniform impact on the incidence and severity of interstate conflict across major and minor powers, according to these viewpoints. The actual and perceived disparity in the gains and terms of trade can be an obstacle to interstate conflict reduction and prevention. Barbieri has consistently made the argument that the liberal trade-conflict relationship may not be uniform across different types of country pairs. Trade in relation to conflict is mediated by whether dyad members are symmetric or asymmetric in economic development and capabilities.

The book departs from previous research on trade and conflict in several ways. First, Barbieri examines overlooked scholarship on trade and conflict. She evaluates arguments by advocates as well as a range of opponents of the “trade produces peace” proposition. Second, she provides comprehensive analysis of the trade-conflict relationship. The temporal domain for her study is 1870 to 1992 and is based on a global sample of 100,000 observations of country pairs. Her analysis includes large-n statistical studies, as well as some case examples. Barbieri not only assesses the significance of economic interdependence for conflict but also examines trade’s connection to negotiation in and the escalation of interstate war.

This book also brings our attention to the levels-of-analysis issue in the study of trade and conflict. This debate occurs over different scales of interaction. For instance, liberal explanations are often provided at different units of analysis, but
most studies have been conducted at the state level. Moreover, some explanations for how trade reduces conflict originate at the individual level. Increased human contact fostered by trade reduces differences between societies and leads to less war. Trade will bring out the harmonious characteristics in humans, as opposed to characteristics that make humans prone to violence, are such examples. Barbieri argues that scholars have made the trade-produces-peace proposition equally applicable between people, classes, communities, and the global community. These explanations require a different kind of assessment than ones that have been conducted at the state level of analysis. She suggests that system-wide interdependence should be considered as well. Consequently, her analysis goes beyond trade’s impact on dyadic relationships to an assessment of its impact on states and the state system. She asks the question, does increased trade reduce a state’s conflict proneness? Are states with extensive foreign trade in general more peaceful than states without such extensive ties? This alternative level of analysis is an initial step toward addressing her critique about testing trade and conflict across different levels of analysis.

Findings in the book suggest that there is little support for the argument that trade promotes peace in dyadic relationships. Interdependent dyads are more likely to engage in militarized conflicts than are those with less extensive trade ties. Trade links aid states in achieving negotiated settlements to conflict, yet they do not eliminate escalation of conflict. These dyads are the most likely to experience the most extreme type of conflict, war, according to Barbieri. In other analyses conducted in this book, she found that there are differences in trade’s influence across different levels of analysis. States heavily dependent on trade are less prone to conflict. In contrast to previous work, she finds that economically strong states are the most conflictual when trade flows are high between these trading states. The possibility of the simultaneous contribution of trade to wealth and peace becomes an important issue for further consideration. Barbieri concludes that trade promotes peace when ties are extensive and both dyad members are symmetric.

In sum, the strength of The Liberal Illusion is that multiple views about the nature of trade and conflict are assessed and backed by a comprehensive analysis. Barbieri builds on a solid foundation of work on trade and conflict and specifies the conditions under which trade reduces and increases conflict. Multiple conceptualizations of trade, multiple trade measures, multiple data sets (i.e. Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organization, 2001), and variation in data collection method enrich this research program but also create issues of comparability across studies. This problem remains for scholars of trade and conflict. We do not fully understand the consequences of variation across these trade data sets for the study of trade and conflict. The bottom line is that this is an important book in the study of trade and conflict because of its comprehensive approach. The book sets the stage for addressing these issues, as well as the gaps that remain regarding trade’s influence on different kinds of conflict and the role of domestic politics, as argued by Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins (“The Study of Interdependence and Conflict: Recent Advances, Open Questions, and Directions for Future Research,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 6 [2001]: 834–859).


— Richard Falk, University of California, Santa Barbara

Quietly, as if by stealth, Robert W. Cox’s stature as an international relations theorist has grown over the last two decades until it seems reasonable to suggest that he has become a dominant figure in the field, whose influence is magnified by a growing cadre of loyal former students and close associates. Cox, as he disarmingly admits, is almost impossible to categorize as realist, liberal, constructivist, or Marxist, although he has drawn insights from a wide variety of intellectual sources. In his own words, “I do not shy away from the word ‘eclectic’” (p. 29), and that is as close as we can responsibly come to a comprehensive label.

But there is more to this problem of locating Cox’s approach, and especially his engagement with the politics of change that is so characteristic of his work. On the one side, Cox, in responding to critics, says that “[t]he most pertinent criticism is that I have lacked a coherent vision of what I am for” (p. 37), and he goes on to explain that his two careers as an international civil servant with the International Labor Organization and then as an academician may have had the double effect of removing him “from a sense of primary identity with nation or class” while allowing him to “hone the critical faculty and confirm a feeling of distance from active political and social engagement” (p. 37). And in the same passage, “I am an observer, not a representative” (p. 37). But on the other side is a critical voice that seems to have chosen sides in the great unfolding global drama that commands major attention at the present time. Again Cox’s own words are clarifying: “I am not content merely to analyse the historical process. I also want to put that analysis to the service of historical change” (p. 37). And so he does. Just as the intellectual progeny of Leo Strauss, we are learning these days, veer to the far right of the political spectrum, those who follow Cox’s lead are to be consistently found on the left. Such a generalization is confirmed by scanning the contributors to a volume put together a few years ago to honor Cox at the time of his retirement from York University (Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, Stephen Gill and James Mittelman, eds., 1997). It is a mark of Cox’s humility (and importance) that an initial long chapter authored by Michael Schechter summarizes the principal criticisms of Cox’s academic output, and is followed by a chapter of explanations written by Cox that responds meekly and usefully, clarifying intentions, refraining from argument and debate.
The Political Economy of a Plural World, which consists of a series of essays written over the last decade or so together with some previously unpublished material, provides a clear, stimulating, and surprisingly coherent expression of Cox's understanding of the current world situation. Although the concerns are shaped by the realities of the 1990s, which were mainly economistic, explaining the focus on globalization, Cox also incorporates the post–September 11 context. What is most impressive about this line of interpretation is the degree to which Cox's emphasis on what he calls the "global cleavage" has shifted from the modernist rivalry among leading sovereign states to a struggle between different classes of people, pitting the beneficiaries of globalization against those who are marginalized and excluded, and who, for a range of reasons, reject the path of globalization (p. xix). The pro-globalization elites accept as inevitable, and desirable, the emergence of a single world civilization that is capital-driven and consumerist. Their civil society adversaries of a homogenized world order seek what Cox calls "an alternative order" with the following two main features: a project of a revitalized civil society operating on a transnational basis and a commitment to "a plural world" made up of several civilizations interacting on the basis of mutual respect and reflecting "the diversity of material conditions, historical experience, mentalities and aspirations that prevail among the world's peoples" (p. xxi). The historical drama being played out is, according to Cox, a dialectical encounter between these two visions of the future.

What sets Cox apart among international relations theorists is the subtlety, sweep, erudition, and historical and philosophical depth of his commentaries and conceptualization of world affairs. Much of the writing is informed by a deep appreciation of the macrohistorical writings of Giambattista Vico, Oswald Spengler, and Arnold J. Toynbee, first of all to convey a longer view of international trends and as a principled criticism of Western Enlightenment views of history as linear, and as a vehicle of progress. Cox is also conversant with the writings of Marx and Gramsci, and takes from the latter the importance of Hegemonic ideas. But he has read carefully, also, the great Arabic thinker Ibn Khaldun, and is noticeably influenced by these two visions of the future.

This series of learned and fascinating essays can be read as a way of thinking about how the future may not be shaped by what Cox conceives as "[t]he dominant vision of Empire" (p. 192), that is, the protagonist or "one-civilization vision" (p. 191). The contrary "vision of a plural world is not likely to be advanced by catastrophic events or victory of arms," but only through a worldwide "strengthening of civil society and citizen participation," especially in "the heartland of the Empire" (p. 192). In the end, Cox does seem to place his hope in the dynamics of democratization, not in liberal formats of parties and elections, but through activism and popular movements transforming the climate of expectations beyond what now seems plausible, and resting on civilizational pluralism and normative commitments to a sustainable and equitable world economy that enhances the voice and impact of the peoples of the world. It is a coded message that we in America need to hear, and never more than now.


This is an excellent book that deserves a wide audience of international relations scholars, economists, and policymakers: It is ambitious, intelligent, insightful, learned, thorough, and gracefully written. The Making of National Money will soon be required reading for students of international political economy, as is Eric Helleiner's States and the Reemergence of Global Finance (1994). In the introduction, Helleiner outlines goals that appear modest, as well as deferential, to existing scholarship. The central purpose of the book, as described on page 1, is to place contemporary monetary transformations "in a longer historical context." The author also notes that the scholarly literatures on territoriality and state building have not adequately dealt with the meaning of national money, aside from the outstanding recent work of David Woodruff.

Helleiner's project to historicize the territoriality of money, however, necessitates that he evaluate, and ultimately reject, two of the most standard propositions about money. Contrary to the view that territorial currencies are distinctly modern and "Westphalian," some 300 years old, the author shows that they are a very recent phenomenon of distinctly political origin. This conventional wisdom will certainly be overturned by the book.

The second proposition that Helleiner effectively refutes—that the geography of money derives in any way from the optimality of currency areas—is likely to remain impervious to data and empirical findings. Among many scholars, optimum currency area (OCA) theory continues to be influential as a baseline explanatory framework, despite the fact that its originator conceived it to be a normative, not positive, approach to international money. Helleiner emphasizes "the
potential usefulness of a broader analytical framework that examines how the geography of money is influenced by technological and state structures as well as by political struggles in which currencies are seen to serve broader purposes than OCA allows for” (p. 218). I am hopeful, but not optimistic, that economists and economics-inspired political scientists will adopt his more eclectically and far more robust—analytical framework.

Helleiner’s framework is composed of an analysis of four sets of motivations for territorial currencies, and he devotes the first five empirical chapters of the book to them: 1) fostering the emergence of national markets by altering transaction costs; 2) controlling the domestic money supply for macroeconomic purposes; 3) meeting the fiscal needs of the state, particularly through seigniorage; and 4) strengthening national identities. His analysis of these first three motivations is incisive and synthetic, and his examination of the relationship between national identities and national currencies is highly original and sets a new standard.

The second part of the book (Chapters 6–10) analyzes the spread of territorial currencies to most regions of the world during the twentieth century, as well as contemporary challenges to the territorial currency as an institution. Amid so many claims of novelty in international monetary affairs, Helleiner effectively documents what exactly is new among the challenges to territorial currencies. This historical perspective allows him to opine usefully about the likely influence of various trends in the coming decades. According to Helleiner, the challenges to territorial currencies include 1) a revived interest in monetary unions; 2) the growing use of foreign currencies within national territories; 3) the growth of subnational local currencies; 4) the emergence of new forms of “electronic money”; and 5) disillusionment with the various motivations that had led to the emergence of territorial currencies, particularly with the desire to engage in “macroeconomic activism.”

A book that proposes to synthesize so much is bound to be limited in other ways, and my only complaints have to do with issues on which Helleiner has chosen not to focus. Of these, the most important is the broader implications of his analysis for international relations theory. The Making of National Money is too reserved about contemporary theoretical debates among scholars of international political economy especially. Perhaps this neutrality and eclecticism will both increase the staying power of the book and widen the audience, but by not weighing in on these debates explicitly, Helleiner’s approach may not get the attention it deserves. The author’s insightful analysis of the motivations for territorial currencies, as well as contemporary disillusionment with those motivations, might have, for example, been linked systematically to more sociological understandings of international political economy. An important aspect of these transformations is the rise and fall of a set of ideas about the social purposes of macroeconomic policymaking, and that transformation remains to be theorized.

Still, as an author, Helleiner displays so much good judgment that this sort of criticism may be seen as irrelevant for such a truly outstanding book reflecting an intellectual style that eschews disciplinary boundaries.


—Patrick James, University of Missouri, Columbia

This book succeeds in its basic goal of demonstrating that foreign policy is a central part of international relations. The focus is on the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA), which seeks to understand the nature of agency in international relations. Foreign policy is defined as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (p. 3). The introductory chapters on the politics of foreign policy and those in the three main parts of the book, which cover agency, the international system, and responsibility for action, do justice to foreign policy as described in such inclusive terms.

Part I, on agency, covers actors, agents, rationality, and implementation. The quest for comprehensive explanation begins with a discussion of the importance of individual leaders and a reminder to determinists that foreign policy office-holders, in most circumstances, have more freedom to act than generally assumed. The review of bureaucratic politics is evenhanded and entails a thoughtful assessment of how this literature fits into the overall picture of FPA as a complement to ideas that derive from other levels of explanation. This analysis leads very well into an understated and compelling case in favor of “disjointed incrementalism” as the norm within the practice of foreign policy decision making and implementation (p. 103).

Even more interesting is Figure 6.1, which shows a continuum of power as related to implementation of foreign policy (p. 135). The continuum ranges from “soft” to “hard” (or from influence to power) and, by incorporating intermediate concepts like blackmail and sanctions, helps to move forward the previous hard/soft power dichotomy in relation to FPA (pp. 134–36). Discussion of the continuum introduces the most elaborate framework within the book, which links resources, capabilities, and instruments (pp. 136–38). This encompassing model is presented at a very general level, but is sufficiently developed to provide the foundation for applied work beyond the book itself, which would seem worthwhile.

Part II, which covers the international system, reveals the book’s implicit and useful affiliation with the work of the English School. The chapter on living in an anarchical society provides an enlightening discussion of the emergence of norms regarding foreign policy, most notably in relation to humanitarian intervention and other contemporary issues among states. Transnational relations, covered in the following chapter, is discussed in a way that broadens FPA by connecting the worlds of peoples and governments to each other in relation to domestic and international politics. Perhaps the most interesting contribution of this chapter is a reminder that valuable
ideas about linkage politics, expressed by James Rosenau several decades ago, have been neglected to the detriment of FPA. The concepts of reactive, emulative, and penetrative linkage are reintroduced and used effectively to explain the workings of a range of historical examples, from Hungary's failed rebellion in 1956 to contemporary anxiety among the French elite about U.S. influence on their culture.

Aspects of responsibility are covered in Part III. The chapter on domestic sources of foreign policy urges a sense of historical perspective in response to the field's overwhelming attention to the role of modern democracy in the last two decades. Derived from a perspective that values a wide range of historical evidence, concern is expressed about acceptance too quickly of generalizations that are taken, at best, from barely a century's worth of experience. This cautionary note highlights the book's use of historical examples from different periods and regions; it eschews any fixation on a small number of events that might be representative in some way or another. For example, the chapter on the constituencies of foreign policy probes generalizations about public ignorance of foreign policy and succeeds in bringing out some interesting nuances.

Purpose in foreign policy as related to choice, action, and responsibility is the subject of the concluding chapter. While he sees foreign policy as gaining public attention, the author also acknowledges that people in general do not compel action by governments. This mixed conclusion is consistent with the way in which the book stays away from sweeping generalizations and probes for more subtle connections. By the end of the book, the reader indeed is convinced of the main argument as noted at the outset, namely, that foreign policy is of central importance to international relations.

The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy is valuable to the field of international relations at several levels. It provides an excellent review of FPA that would be worth assigning both in general seminars and those devoted more directly toward comparative foreign policy. The citations are impressive and reflect the eclectic approach taken throughout—perhaps the book's greatest contribution is to provide a rigorous and comprehensive assessment of FPA as a field that includes insights from virtually all of the major approaches.

One area that could use more work is the role granted to rational choice. This approach is acknowledged at various points but could have been mined for more insights. For example, the claim that rational choice has had "little particular impact on the study of foreign policy" (p. 8) would not be borne out by a review of the literature on strategic interaction, which includes, for example, game-theoretic and other formal models of the actions given prominence in the continuum of power noted earlier. In addition, as put forward in many recent applications, the strategic approach does not require the assumption of the state as a unified actor; formal models of coalitions, for example, begin with precisely the opposite premise.

For a book with such a vast agenda, the lack of coverage for just one approach among many is a small failing. This volume should be required reading for those already in the field of FPA and may help to generate interest from new scholars.


— Richard Langhorne, Rutgers University, Newark

This is a study in ambiguities. They are inevitable and important ambiguities, and this book is well timed and was well worth producing. It will be of use to scholars of the European Union, of diplomacy both in general and in particular relation to EU practice, and of global politics as they are evolving. To some extent, all foreign ministries face fissionary responsibilities as a result of the effects of globalization. The three main areas involved are shifting patterns of administration within states, the need to deal with important external interlocutors whose constituencies are not legitimized in a state form, and the ever-increasing difficulty of identifying what a "national interest" might be. This context applies equally to the member states of the European Union, but in their case, it occurs in a particularly concentrated form and their own situation adds further complications. The editors have tackled the problem of describing all this in two ways: They have commissioned snapshots of each member state's foreign ministry and they have supplied three chapters of their own that take the broader view.

The accounts of individual states show, predictably perhaps, that those with a long tradition of powerful foreign ministries have and are adapting more readily to contemporary pressures; secondly, that there are differences between each one, partly derived from their internal situations and partly from their external needs; and thirdly, that in no case does it appear that a foreign ministry is in danger of extinction. This last is quite important since there has been for some time a sense that foreign ministries may not have a real job to do for much longer and that the European Union might show the first examples of mergers or abolitions as responsibilities pass to a centralized organization in Brussels. Among these chapters, it should be noted that there is a particularly interesting contribution on Belgium contributed by Rik Coolsaet.

However, it is in the editors' own contributions that the real meat lies. Brian Hocking's introduction and conclusion is both the clearest available account of the pressures that globalization has put upon the traditional conduct of foreign affairs and a very effective treatment of the particular evolution in the European Union. The ambiguities abound. When dealing with the creation of EU policies, foreign ministries are pressured to achieve both internal coordination and external consensus and not to allow presidents' or prime ministers' offices to scoop the role; but when the policy is foreign policy under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) regime, the task can return to the more familiar effort to articulate and successfully insist upon the inclusion of what are national interests. But then again, if a question of economic competition arises outside the EU, there may be no place for any common policy, and dog will continue to attempt to eat dog. Moreover, this situation continues in any case as far as most, but not all, of the...
individual foreign relations of member states with non-EU states are concerned. There arises therefore at times a Jekyll and Hyde character in the behavior of member states.

The ambiguity between having and taking the initiative at some times and over some matters and the growing role of coordination between the internal departments dealing with EU questions is a reflection of the structural state of flux. Here, David Spence’s chapter on the EU itself emerges as probably the most significant element in the book. The cause of the ambiguity is clear: The states of the EU are not full states in that capacity, but the EU itself is not a state either; nor is it certain that it will inevitably become one. He suggests that this paradox may eventually be resolved in a way that is not derived from the forms of the evolved state, but that even allowing for such a possibility, it is improbable that the flow of responsibility toward the center will cease at its present stage. If that judgment is correct, then the significance of the coordinative function will rise and the remaining initiative-taking role will fall off further, particularly in relations with non-EU states.

Brian Hocking has this to say by way of conclusion and it is an effective description of the ground covered in Foreign Ministries in the European Union: [w]e are in a condition of ‘betweenness’ operating at three interlinked levels: that of the European project, the nature of the state as it adapts to the pressures of globalization and regionalization, and the role and structure of the foreign ministry itself” (p. 285). It was brave to attempt a description of something so fluid. It was also extremely valuable and has been done as well as it could be. It is, furthermore, a most welcome addition to the extremely slight discussion that exists about the role of foreign ministries in general. That slightness is undeserved because foreign ministries, as this book makes quite clear, are able to serve as fascinating litmus tests for other questions, particularly those arising out of the new contexts that globalization has created.


— Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, University of California, San Diego

The democratic peace or the observation that no two democratic states appear to have waged wars against each other has spawned a wealth of research in recent years. The first wave of research debated whether the empirical finding was correct and advanced tentative explanations of why democracies might be able to avoid war. These two books represent a second wave of research that takes a more comprehensive look at linkages between domestic political institutions and international behavior. Here, the democratic peace finding itself is taken for granted, and researchers instead focus on the broader implications of theories relating democratic institutions to peace. Both books seek to go beyond the two dichotomies that guided much of the first wave of democratic peace research: the war–peace dichotomy in the case of Paul Huth and Todd Allee, and the democracy–autocracy dichotomy in the case of Norrin Ripsman.

Huth and Allee’s theoretical point of departure remains close to existing theories of democracy and peace, but the way the authors attempt to test these theories sets this book apart from earlier work. Instead of focusing on all dyads or pairs of states that may or may not go to war, they argue that more may be learned about linkages between democracy and conflict or peace by focusing on interactions between challengers and defenders to territorial disputes. Rather than a war–peace dichotomy, the authors examine how regime type influences a wider range of conflict behavior by looking at patterns of escalation and negotiations between the parties. They identify three different explanations of conflict behavior based on political accountability, political norms, and political affinity, and then test predictions from the different explanations on three possible stages of a conflict: a) decisions to challenge the status quo; b) offering concessions in negotiations; and c) escalation to the use of force.

Their results suggest that political institutions indeed help account for conflict behavior, in particular in areas where features of traditional theories of international politics, such as power and military alliances, do not display much explanatory power. For example, the balance of capabilities seems a good predictor of when states will threaten to use force to challenge the status quo, but gives few insights as to when countries initiate negotiations or offer territorial concessions. Political institutions play an important role here, as democracies appear to be highly sensitive to the electoral cycle in managing territorial disputes. Consistent with theories stressing accountability, leaders in democracies prefer to initiate negotiations and offer concessions shortly after elections, and diplomacy becomes less likely the weaker an executive’s position in the legislature. Moreover, democracies capitalize on the opportunity to reach negotiated outcomes when a democratic adversary is in a relatively secure position domestically. However, democracies only engage in negotiations or make concessions if they believe that these efforts are likely to be met with some success, and they do not hesitate to stand firm if they do not expect such efforts to be reciprocated. Indeed, the authors argue that democracy confers an advantage by allowing leaders to better signal resolve when dealing with nondemocracies. Finally, they find some evidence of monadic effects, as democratic leaders are less likely to initiate force against adversaries, irrespective of their regime type.

Huth and Allee’s book is an impressive effort to tailor research design and data collection more closely to the hypotheses of interest. Disaggregating interactions in territorial disputes allows the authors to reach new findings about leaders’ ability to substitute other policy options for the use of military force and how regime type influences this. However, although the authors’ decisions on research design contribute to this book’s strength, they also entail some limitations. All the
analyses are carried out on a sample of states with outstanding territorial claims, and many readers will wonder whether the factors considered could not also conceivably influence the likelihood that states will develop territorial disputes in the first place. Despite their general emphasis on accountability, the authors claim to find striking evidence of political norms in that almost no pair of democracies in their sample escalate disputes to the use of force, but instead settle by other means. If this is the case, then one wonders whether democracies may not also be more likely to avoid getting into territorial disputes by making public claims. If so, the most peaceful relations between democracies would be absent from the authors’ sample, and much of the interesting effects of democracy cannot be assessed from the data. To say something about this, we would need a supersample of potential issues over which conflict might arise, such as shared water resources. Moreover, territorial disputes are only one type of disputes, and it would be interesting to see additional discussion about the extent to which the authors’ inferences may apply to other forms of international behavior and contentious issues.

Ripsman holds that although domestic politics and institutional matters, the democracy–autocracy dichotomy alone is ill suited to capture the relevant differences. Both democracies and autocracies can be constrained, but the relevant question is whether some institutional features and practices afford an executive more or less autonomy or ability to act upon its preferences in the face of political opposition. Ripsman relates structural autonomy both to formal institutions and informal decision-making procedures and norms, and he examines how structural autonomy influences a leader’s ability to normalize relations with defeated adversaries. International relations theorists have argued that states often find it difficult to resist popular pressure after wars, even though a vindictive peace will make it more difficult to avoid future conflict. The argument is tested on the peacemaking policies with Germany of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States after World War I and II. Ripsman argues that although leaders in structurally constrained states such as the French Fourth Republic have little leeway in avoiding vindictive policies that they believe to be unfortunate, democracies do not generally follow poor peacemaking policies. The more autonomous leaders in Britain and the United States were able to effectively rebuild and rearm Germany to counteract the new Soviet threat after World War II, despite widespread popular resistance.

Ripsman’s book succeeds in demonstrating that democracies should not be regarded as a monolithic bloc inasmuch as they display considerable variation in their foreign policies. The author cleverly demonstrates how various perspectives on institutions and behavior may all be correct but apply under different circumstances, depending on the executive’s structural autonomy. Moreover, he highlights the importance of informal institutions such as party discipline for foreign policy behavior. Cognizant of the problems of classifying autonomy on the basis of the foreign policy decisions to be explained, he makes great efforts to classify structural autonomy from ex ante identifiable characteristics, although the qualitative way in which these features are identified is somewhat case specific and less transparent than I would have preferred.

Perhaps the greatest problem in Ripsman’s empirical test is the relative lack of variance among the cases. As the author concedes, it is difficult to disentangle the role of structural autonomy from the intensity of public opinion. He argues that public opinion cannot account for variation in the peacemaking policies, since public opinion was consistently anti-German in all the three states. I am not persuaded that this is a good test of the salience of issues between countries, and a more comprehensive test of the structural autonomy thesis should compare between cases with more easily identifiable differences in public opinion and issue salience. Moreover, since all the cases examined are liberal democracies, this analysis tells us little about structural autonomy among autocracies and whether the variance in structural autonomy within democracies is large relative to autocratic regimes. Finally, Ripsman holds that state autonomy is issue specific, and notes that his approach to classifying state autonomy often yields results at odds with the existing literature on state autonomy, which usually regards France after World War II as a prototypical strong state. Given the importance accorded to informal institutions in this account, it is not clear to me if public opinion can be considered independently of the institutional features held to shape state autonomy, which again raises issues about ex ante identifiability.

Both of these books exemplify the perhaps disproportionate amount of attention given to institutional characteristics relative to preferences or public opinion in current research on political institutions and international behavior. Even though the authors argue that public opinion plays an important role in the demand for foreign policies, neither book evaluates its impact in any systematic manner. The accountability concerns identified by Huth and Allee, for example, may allude to how democracies sometimes lack opportunities to use force, but they tell us less about the possible role of the public in altering willingness to use force against some opponents but maybe not others. Data availability has lead many researchers to study the role of institutions divorced from preferences, but without more systematic research on the role of public opinion, we cannot really know whether institutions alone or their interactions with preferences lead to the observed differences in behavior.

My minor reservations notwithstanding, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century and Peacemaking by Democracies are both important contributions to the literature on domestic politics and international behavior, and they deserve a wide audience.


— Benjamin J. Cohen, University of California at Santa Barbara

In the study of international political economy, economics and politics perennially struggle for dominance. Are state